Salvation outside the church: Judicial protection in the third pillar after the pupino and segi judgments

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 883-929

  Peers, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 51249153733     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (259)

1. Peers, "Who Judges the Watchmen", 18 YEL (2000), 337. This phrase was used to describe former Home Secretary (Justice and Interior Minister) Michael Howard. The "Watchmen" paper also discussed the Court's jurisdiction over the First-Pillar aspects of EU Home Affairs law (immigration, asylum and civil law);
2. for an updated analysis of this issue, see Peers, "The ECJ's Jurisdiction over EC Immigration and Asylum Law: Time for a Change?" in Toner, Guild and Baldaccini (Eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, (forthcoming in Hart, 2007).
3. This phrase has been used by the current (at time of writing!) Home Secretary, John Reid, to describe his scandal-prone department.
4. nd edition, chs. 8-10.
5. See ibid. at pp. 390-397 and particularly: Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR I-7879;
6. Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, European Parliament v. Council and Commission, [2006] ECR I-4721;
7. Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council and Case C-102/06, Ireland v. European Parliament and Council, pending.
8. See infra section 4.
9. On this issue, see the analysis in Peers, "The future of the EU judicial system and EC immigration and asylum law", 7 EJML (2005) 263, which can be applied mutatis mutandis to the Third Pillar.
10. O.J. 2004, C 310. See now the IGC mandate agreed in June 2007.
11. See Art. 42 TEU.
12. See COM(2006)331, 28 Jun. 2006, and the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 14-15 Dec. 2006.
13. The other areas are: enhanced cooperation, the procedural stipulations concerning suspension from EU membership (Art. 7 TEU) and the final Title VIII TEU.
14. Previously the Court only had jurisdiction to receive preliminary rulings or dispute settlement actions concerning Conventions, if those Conventions made provision for this. Six criminal law or policing Conventions made such a provision, and four of these are in force. For details, see Peers (op. cit. supra note 3), 17-19.
15. See Art. 35(1) TEU.
16. See Art. 35(2) TEU.
17. These comprise twelve of the first fifteen Member States (all except the UK, Ireland and Denmark) plus Hungary and the Czech Republic. See the information in O.J. 2005, L 327/19.
18. See Art. 35(3) TEU.
19. See the information on the Court's jurisdiction (supra note 14).
20. See Art. 35(4) TEU.
21. See Art. 35(5) TEU.
22. See Art. 35(6) TEU.
23. Art. 35(7) TEU.
24. Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, [2006] ECR I-2333.
25. Cases C-176/03, Commission v. Council and C-440/05, Commission v. Council, pending (supra note 7).
26. See also the pre-Amsterdam Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council [1998] ECR I-2763.
27. Cases: C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285;
28. C-467/05, Dell'Orto, pending (Opinion of 8 March 2007);
29. and C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3 May 2007, nyr.
30. Joined Cases C-187 & 385/01, Gozutok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345;
31. Case C-469/03, Miraglia, [2005] ECR I-2009;
32. Van Esbroeck (supra note 21);
33. Case C-467/04, Gasparini and Case C-150/05, Van Straaten (both judgments of 28 Sep. 2006, nyr);
34. and Cases C-288/05, Kretzinger
35. and C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink (Opinions of 5 Dec. 2006, pending).
36. On the substance of these cases, see Peers, "Double Jeopardy and EU Law: Time for a Change?", forthcoming in (2007) European Journal of Law Reform.
37. The withdrawn cases were Case C-491/03, Hiebeler and Case C-272/05, Bowens.
38. See Pupino, supra note 23, paras 29 and 30 and 22.
39. See the judgments in Gasparini (supra note 24), para 41,
40. and Van Straaten (supra note 24), para 31.
41. See the judgments in Gasparini, para 41,
42. and Van Straaten, paras 33 and 37.
43. See the judgments in Gasparini, paras 42-45, Van Straaten, paras 31-39, and Advocaten voor de Wereld, supra note 23, paras 19-22. See further the Opinion in Kretzinger, supra note 24, paras 79-80.
44. See the judgment in Gasparini, supra note 24, paras 12, 15 and 21.
45. See supra note 7.
46. Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, [2005] ECR I-2077.
47. Ibid. paras 35-40.
48. Ibid. para 38.
49. Ibid. para 41.
50. Ibid. paras 42 and 43. This must now be taken as a reference to the right of a Member State to appeal a ruling of the Civil Service Tribunal to the CFI: see Art. 9 of Annex I to the Court's Statute, annexed to the Decision establishing the Tribunal (O.J. 2004, L 333/7).
51. Case F-61/06, Sapara v. Eurojust.
52. See Art. 13 of the Decision (re-)establishing the College (O.J. 2005, L 256/63).
53. See Art. 38 of the proposed Decision (re-)establishing Europol (COM(2006)817, 20 Dec. 2006).
54. The specific issue of Court jurisdiction regarding the use of the EC budget is considered infra section 2.2.
55. This issue is considered further infra section 2.2.
56. Spain v. Eurojust, supra note 31.
57. See Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Spain v. Eurojust, supra note 31, para 17 (emphasis in the original).
58. Ibid. at para 19.
59. Ibid. at paras. 20-21.
60. Ibid. at paras. 22-23.
61. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, [1985] ECR 873.
62. Art. 236 EC.
63. See supra note 23 at para 19 of the judgment.
64. Ibid. at para 35 of the judgment.
65. Orders of the CFI of 7 June 2004 in Cases T-333/02 (unreported) and T-338/02, Segi and others, [2004] ECR II-1647, para 35.
66. See the earlier Second Pillar claim for damages resulting from the Community measures linked to the allegedly illegal military action against the former Yugoslavia in respect of Kosovo (T-201/99, Royal Olympic, [2000] ECR II-4005). The CFI dismissed this claim with the general statement that Art. 46 TEU did not confer jurisdiction for the EU courts over actions of the EU, and that EC measures were insufficiently linked to the military action. An appeal was dismissed by an unpublished order of the ECJ (Case C-49/01, order of 15 Jan. 2002).
67. See the judgments in Cases T-306/01, Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533 (on appeal as Case C-415/05 P, pending);
68. T-315/01, Kadi [2005] ECR II-3649 (on appeal as Case C-403/05 P, pending);
69. T-253/02, Ayadi, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr (on appeal as Case C-403/06 P, pending);
70. T-49/04, Hassan, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr (on appeal as Case C-399/06 P, pending);
71. T-228/02, OMPI, judgment of 12 Dec. 2006, nyr;
72. and T-362/04, Minin, judgment of 31 Jan. 2007, nyr;
73. the interim measures decisions in Cases T-306/01 R, Aden [2002] ECR II-2387 and T-47/03 R, Sison [2003] ECR II-2047;
74. and the orders in Cases T-206/02, KNK [2005] ECR II-523, T-229/02, PKK and KNK [2005] ECR II-539 (reversed on appeal in Case C-229/05 P, judgment of 18 Jan. 2007, nyr) and T-299/04, Selmani [2005] ECR II-20*.
75. A complaint to the European Court of Human Rights against the (then) 15 Member States was dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that Segi could not be considered to be a "victim" of any breach of the rights set out in the ECHR: Reports of Judgments and Decisions (2002-V).
76. Segi order, supra note 50, at para 35.
77. Ibid at para 36.
78. Ibid at para 34.
79. Ibid at para 37. On human rights and JHA, see further Peers op. cit. supra note 3 at pp. 64-69.
80. Segi, order, supra note 50 at para 38, referring to Case C-50/00 P, UPA, [2002] ECR I-6677.
81. Segi, order, supra note 50 at para 39.
82. Ibid at paras 41-47.
83. Selmani (order, supra note 52), paras 52-58.
84. On this point, the CFI was perhaps influenced by the Opinion in the pending Segi appeal to the ECJ, which had by then been released; see Opinion in Case C-355/04 P, Segi, infra note 64;
85. discussed in text at note 79 infra.
86. See OMPI v. Council (judgment, supra note 52), paras 45-60.
87. Cases C-354/04 P, Gestoras pro Amnistia v. Council, and C-355/04 P, Segi et al. v. Council, judgments of 27 Feb. 2007, nyr.
88. Segi judgment at para 44 (emphasis added).
89. Ibid. at para 45. In fact, the Court here omitted to mention that the Court's jurisdiction to rule on disputes over the interpretation or the application of acts adopted pursuant to Art. 34(2) TEU as conferred by Art. 35(7) TEU, also extends to disputes between Member States and the Commission regarding Conventions.
90. Ibid. at para 46.
91. Ibid. at para 47.
92. Ibid. at para 50.
93. Ibid; cf. para 45 of the UPA judgment (supra note 58). Logically the Court should also have mentioned the possible application of Art. 42 TEU, which would have the consequence of applying the jurisdictional regime applicable to Title IV EC (which concerns immigration, asylum and civil law: see Art. 68 EC) to Third Pillar matters.
94. Ibid. at para 51;
95. cf. para 38 of the UPA judgment (ibid). The reference to review of the Member States is a new point in the Segi judgment as compared to the UPA judgment.
96. See infra section 3.2.
97. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 53, referring to Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263.
98. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 54.
99. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi para 17. An appeal was pending before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), which as (presumably) the final court in Spain in this case would have the jurisdiction (and, under national law, the obligation) to refer questions to the Court of Justice.
100. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 55.
101. Ibid. at para 56.
102. See supra note 58 at para 42.
103. See infra section 3.2.
104. But it must follow from UPA that challenges via this route should not be impossible. In the Jégo-Quéré appeal (Case C-263/02 P, [2004] ECR I-3425, para 35), the ECJ effectively concludes that EC measures should always be open to challenge through the national courts without having to contravene them first, even if those measures do not require the adoption of national implementing measures which would be open to challenge as such.
105. See Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), [1990] ECR I-2041. Having said that, the Court's Segi judgment should not necessarily be understood as excluding the possibility of expanding (or "interpreting") its Third Pillar jurisdiction in order to rule on actions brought by the European Parliament to protect its prerogatives within the context of the Third Pillar, since the Chernobyl judgment was founded on the different principle of the protection of the Community's "institutional balance".
106. This must follow from the exhaustive nature of Art. 35 TEU (para 34 of the judgment, read in combination with paras 35 and 55).
107. Case 294/83, [1986] ECR 1339.
108. The same might even be said of the EC legal order, where Member States generally enjoyed a de facto First Pillar veto until the mid-1980s.
109. The literature is voluminous; for a cogent critique see the Opinion in UPA, with further references, and (implicitly) the CFI judgment in Jégo-Quéré (Case T-177/01, [2002] ECR II-2365).
110. The same point could be made of NGOs who wish to bring a challenge to an EU measure, cf. Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23).
111. Cf. Joined Cases C-87 to 89/90, Verholen, [1991] ECR I-3757.
112. Cases 104/79, [1980] ECR 745 and 244/80 [1981] ECR 3045.
113. See e.g.: Case C-74/99, Imperial Tobacco, [2000] ECR I-8599;
114. Case C-491/01, BAT, [2002] ECR I-11453;
115. Case C-210/03, Swedish Match, [2004] ECR I-11893;
116. Joined Cases C-154 & 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and others, [2005] ECR I-6451;
117. Case C-453/02, ABNA, [2005] ECR I-10423;
118. Case C-344/04, IATA and others, [2006] ECR I-403;
119. and Case C-308/06, Intertanko and others, pending.
120. See Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23) and, as regards the validity of part of a directive closely linked to the Third Pillar, see Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone and others, judgment of 26 June 2007, nyr.
121. See, for example, Case 66/80, ICC [1981] ECR 1191, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 3199, Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik, [1991] ECR I-415 and Case C-465/93, Atlanta, [1995] I-3761. On the consequences of invalidity of a directive, see further Case C-421/06, Fratelli Martini and Cargill, pending.
122. UPA (judgment, supra note 58) at para 42.
123. See also the appeal judgment in Jégo-Quéré (supra note 80), para 32 and Atlanta, supra note 91, para 46.
124. See infra section 3.2. The Opinion in the Segi judgment did draw a link between loyal cooperation and national courts' obligations on this point (paras. 106-107).
125. See Foto-Frost etc. (supra note 91), with the exception of Atlanta.
126. This raises the prospect that the European Parliament has standing to sue to annul Common Positions which should have taken a different form, on the grounds that the "institutional balance" has been affected: cf. supra note 81.
127. This assumes that, as in the First Pillar, a breach of the requirement to consult the European Parliament invalidates a Third Pillar measure, and that optional consultation of the European Parliament is similarly insufficient (see Peers, "Watchmen", op. cit. supra note 1, 384-385). In any event, the European Parliament has never been consulted in practice before the adoption of a Common Position.
128. For details, see Peers (op. cit. supra note 3), 389-402 and also 446-449 and 510-523.
129. This explains the jurisdiction of the CFI to rule on the integration of the staff of the Schengen Secretariat into the Council Secretariat: Case T-107/99 R, Garcia de Retortillo v. Council [1999] ECR II-1939 (interim measures; the main action was later withdrawn);
130. Joined Cases T-164/99, Leroy v. Council, T-37/00, Chevalier-Delanoue v. Council and T-38/00, Joaquim Matos v. Council [2001] ECR II-1819;
131. and Case T-166/99, Andres de Dios v. Council [2001] ECR II-1857.
132. Case C-503/03, Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I-1097.
133. See Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, and Case C-102/06 (supra note 7).
134. I have previously analysed this issue (which also currently arises as regards the distinct rules on the Court's immigration, asylum and civil law jurisdiction) in detail: see Peers, "Watchmen" (op. cit. supra note 1), 397-399.
135. See paras. 12-18 of the judgment in Case C-170/96 (supra note 22).
136. See the OMPI judgment and the Selmani order (supra note 52).
137. See the Segi order of the CFI (supra note 50)
138. and the Opinion in the Segi judgment (supra note 64);
139. the Court of Justice judgment on the Segi appeal did not address this issue.
140. The Court of Justice has referred to Art. 47 TEU in a reference from a national court: see Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I-3171, para 23.
141. See Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council (supra note 4).
142. On this point, see Peers, "Watchmen" (op. cit. supra note 1), 386-388.
143. Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet, [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 81-87. The Court's EC Treaty jurisdiction now applies to disputes over access to Third Pillar documents pursuant to the reference to Art. 255 EC in Art. 41 TEU.
144. Case T-447/04 R, Cap Gemini, [2005] ECR II-257. After this interim measures order, the case was withdrawn. In fact, the tender also concerned the Visa Information System project, which primarily falls within the scope of the First Pillar.
145. Case T-231/04, Greece v. Commission, judgment of 17 Jan. 2007, nyr. This case concerned the CFSP, but there is no reason to doubt its applicability by analogy to the Third Pillar, given the identical wording of Arts. 28(4) TEU and 41(4) TEU.
146. Ibid. at para 73.
147. Ibid. at para 74.
148. Ibid. at para 111.
149. See Arts. 34-38 of the Eurojust Decision, as amended (O.J. 2002, L 63/1 and O.J. 2003, L 245/44), Arts. 15-18 of the European Police College Decision (supra note 37), and Arts. 41-43 of the proposed Europol Decision (supra note 38).
150. Arts. 246-248 and 268-280 EC.
151. See most recently O.J. 2007, L 7 and 13.
152. Spain v. Eurojust judgment at para 38 (supra note 31).
153. Segi judgment at para 47 (supra note 64).
154. See infra section 3.2.
155. On the staff regulations, see the Spain v. Eurojust case (supra note 31) and supra notes 38 and 114. On immunities, see Art. 3 of the Police College Decision (supra note 37) and Art. 50 of the proposed Europol Decision (supra note 38).
156. "[T]he Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt measures necessary to implement those decisions at the level of the Union".
157. See the Third Pillar Decision conferring such powers on the Commission (O.J. 2004, L 64/45), adopted in parallel with Reg. 378/2004 (O.J. 2004, L 64/5), since implemented by the adoption of identical Commission Decisions (O.J. 2006, L 317). As for the future, see Art. 67 of the agreed text of the SIS II Decision (Council doc. 14914/06, 12 Dec. 2006), which is consistent with Art. 51 of the SIS II Regulation (Reg. 1987/2006, O.J. 2006, L 381/4).
158. E.g. see the Opinion in Segi, which simply assumes on this basis that Art. 307 EC is inapplicable to the Third Pillar.
159. See supra notes 23, 31 and 64 respectively.
160. See also supra note 23 Gozutok and Brugge at para 36;
161. Miraglia at para 34;
162. and Gasparini, at para 36.
163. Order in Segi (supra note 50).
164. The Court agreed with this argument explicitly in Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras 17 and 18 (supra note 23).
165. See also paras. 33 and 34 of the Opinion in that case, and the Segi Opinion (supra note 64), para 66.
166. Supra note 23.
167. There have been two subsequent references, one concerning the interpretation of the same Framework Decision (Dell'Orto, pending, supra note 23) and one on the validity of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (Advocaten voor de Wereld, supra note 23).
168. O.J. 2001, L 82/1.
169. As of 10 Apr. 2007, twenty-one Framework Decisions had been adopted, the Council had agreed in principle on six more, and four more were under active discussion.
170. Art. 8(4) of the Framework Decision.
171. See Pupino (supra note 23) at para 10. For details of the latter arrangements, see para 11 of the judgment.
172. See further supra section 2.
173. I shall use the populist term "indirect effect" in this paper to refer to the principle of the interpretation of national law consistently with EC or EU law. As usual, the Court did not use this term in its Pupino judgment.
174. nd ed. (OUP, 2005), ch. 8, with further references.
175. See Pupino (judgment, supra note 23) at para 33.
176. Ibid. at para 45. The Court refers here to parallel case law limiting the legal effect of Directives on the same grounds.
177. See Pupino (supra note 23) Opinion of the Advocate General, at para 32.
178. Ibid. at para 33.
179. Ibid. at para 37.
180. Prechal (op. cit. supra note 135), at p. 180.
181. Cf. the Opinion in Pupino, which concluded that all children were "vulnerable" victims of crime.
182. For details of this suggested approach, see Peers, "Watchmen" (op. cit. supra note 1), 365-374.
183. See particularly Les Verts (supra note 83) and UPA (supra note 58).
184. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 3 and Case 6/64, Costa, [1965] ECR 585.
185. See the references in supra note 124.
186. Case C-213/89, [1990] ECR I-2433, para 19.
187. Pupino (judgment, supra note 23) paras 21 and 22.
188. Supra note 147 at para 18.
189. Case 106/77, [1978] ECR 629.
190. See also Van Gend (supra note 145).
191. See para 26 of the judgment in Case 14/83, Von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891, referred to in the other key judgments on indirect effect (see e.g. Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, para 12;
192. Case C-106/89, Marleasing, [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8;
193. Joined Cases C-397-403/01, Pfeiffer, [2004] ECR I-8835, para 110).
194. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357, particularly para 36.
195. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, [1994] ECR I-3325, particularly para 19. The judgment makes no reference to the supremacy of EC law.
196. See Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, [1995] ECR I-4599, para 12.
197. See Case C-453/00, Kühne and Heitz, [2004] ECR I-837, para 27. In comparison, the Opinion in this case begins by applying the principles of primacy and direct effect, and only subsequently mentions Art. 10 EC, with reference to Case C-213/89, Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, para 20 and Francovich (supra note 153).
198. It is striking that these provisions permit a possible transfer to the First Pillar, not merely a possible change to the decision-making process within the Third Pillar.
199. Cf. Art. 67(2) EC, which was negotiated in parallel with Art. 42 TEU.
200. Case 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337.
201. See Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Factortame III and Brasserie de Pecheur, [1996] ECR I-1029.
202. See Francovich, supra note 153.
203. See Faccini Dori, supra note 154 and generally Prechal (op. cit. supra note 135), ch. 10.
204. The Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23), para 56, expressly suggests that the case law on the relationship between EC law and national procedural law applies to the Third Pillar. On these principles, see Prechal (ibid), ch. 9, and most recently the judgment of 13 March 2007 in Case C-435/05, Unibet, nyr.
205. See e.g. the important judgments in Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965, Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959 and Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011, all of which mention Art. 10 EC.
206. Para 47 of the judgment, implicitly referring to Pfeiffer (supra note 152).
207. See supra note 152.
208. Ibid.
209. See, for instance, the report on the application of the Framework Decision on facilitation of illegal entry (COM(2006)770, 6 Dec. 2006, pp. 4-5) and Prechal (op. cit. supra note 135), ch. 5.
210. For example, the obligation in the Framework Decision on crime victims' rights for offenders to compensate crime victims, which is at issue in the pending Dell'Orto case (supra note 23).
211. Kühne and Heitz (supra note 156) and Case C-224/01, Köbler, [2003] ECR I-10239.
212. It is worth remarking in passing on the remarkable dynamics of the Kühne and Heitz judgment (supra note 156). Rather than relying on the national courts to enforce Community law against recalcitrant national administrations, as it has so many times in the past, in this case the ECJ enjoins national administrations to enforce Community law in spite of recalcitrant national courts.
213. See the Opinion of 11 Feb. 2007 in Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa, pending.
214. See: Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany, [1996] ECR I-3989 (supremacy);
215. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 and Joined Cases C-300 & 392/98, Dior and others, [2000] ECR I-11307 (no review of EC acts in light of WTO measures; lack of direct effect of WTO measures);
216. and Case C-53/96, Hermès, [1998] ECR I-3603 (indirect effect).
217. See the Opinions in Gasparini, supra note 23, para 81 and Advocaten voor de Wereld, supra note 23, para 43.
218. See supra notes 20 and 23.
219. As regards wrongful detention, Art. 5(5) ECHR is also relevant. As regards wrongful conviction, see also Art. 3 of the Seventh Protocol to the ECHR.
220. Again, Art. 5 ECHR is relevant to proceedings relating to detention.
221. See Art. 11 of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (O.J. 2002, L 190/1) and Art. 11 of the Framework Decision on freezing orders (O.J. 2003, L 196/45).
222. COM (2004) 328, 28 April 2004.
223. Supra note 64.
224. See also para 40 of the Advocaten voor de Wereld judgment (supra note 23).
225. For further details of the judgment, see supra section 2.
226. See Segi judgment, supra note 64, at paras. 52 and 53.
227. Art. 37 TEU states that "[w]ithin international organizations and at international conferences in which they take part, Member States shall defend the common positions adopted under the provisions of this Title".
228. For details of the adopted Common Positions, see Peers (op. cit. supra note 6), 36-37.
229. It will be recalled (see supra section 2) that the Court has jurisdiction according to Art. 35(7) TEU over conflicts between Member States as regards the interpretation or application of (inter alia) Common Positions; but it has no other jurisdiction over them, except to rule that they should have been adopted in some other form.
230. nd ed. (OUP, 2006).
231. Paras. 58-60 of the Pupino judgment (supra note 23) and para 51 of the Segi judgment (supra note 64). On the details of this general principle, see Tridimas (ibid.) ch. 7.
232. Para 45 of the Advocaten voor de Wereld judgment (supra note 23).
233. This also can be considered implicit in para 60 of the Pupino judgment (supra note 23).
234. Although most judgments on this point concern the application of the human rights principles to national derogations from internal market law (case law beginning with Case C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925), the Court has implicitly confirmed that the same rule applies to derogations from other EC law provisions (see Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, [2006] ECR I-5769).
235. Para 44 of the judgment. On the details of these general principles, see Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 6.
236. Paras 36, 38 and 42 of the judgment. On the details of this general principle, see Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 9.
237. See also the Opinions in Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23) and Kretzinger (supra note 23).
238. Para 40 of the Van Esbroeck judgment (supra note 21);
239. para 59 of the Van Straaten judgment (supra note 23).
240. On the details of the general principle of legitimate expectations, see Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 6.
241. In particular, the Court referred in Van Esbroeck to a First Pillar competition law judgment, and several opinions of A.G. Sharpston have argued that the rule against double jeopardy is a fully-fledged general principle of law (Opinions in: Gasparini, para 27;
242. Kraaijenbrink, paras 60-63;
243. and Kretzinger, paras 65 and 70, all supra note 23).
244. Paras. 55-60 (supra note 23).
245. See also Opinions in Spain v. Eurojust (supra note 31), paras 32 and 33;
246. Segi (supra note 64), para 115;
247. and Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras 83-99.
248. Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld, (supra note 23), para 61.
249. See Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 4.
250. For example, see the Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld, ibid., para 62, and Tridimas, ibid. ch. 3.
251. The latter provision is one of the conditions for authorizing "enhanced cooperation" in any of the three pillars: it provides that any proposed enhanced cooperation must remain "within the limits of the powers of the Union or of the Community".
252. See respectively Segi and OMPI, discussed supra section 2,
253. and the Opinion in Segi, para 104 (supra note 64).
254. See Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 5.
255. Opinions in Kraaijenbrink, para 60
256. and Kretzinger, paras 64, 65 and 70 (both supra note 23).
257. See Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 8.
258. Peers, "Watchmen" (op. cit. supra note 1), at 378.
259. See the discussion of the ECJ's Segi judgment in supra section 4. On the link between the general principles and Art. 220 EC, see for instance the Opinion in Palacios de la Villa (supra note 172).