A new direction for theory-building in intelligence studies

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 699-716

  Honig, Or Arthur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51249146497     PISSN: 08850607     EISSN: 15210561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08850600701249840     Document Type: Article

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