Complementing complementarity

International Criminal Law Review

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 549-583

  Meyer, Frank ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 51249132538     PISSN: 1567536X     EISSN: 15718123     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181206778992278     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. Ivan Simonovic, Attitudes And Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 29 Yale Journal of International Law 342, 345-52(2004).
2. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 667, 669 (Volume 1, Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta, and John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002);
3. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 Yale Journal of International Law 383, 384-5, 394-6(1998).
4. See Philippe Kirsch, The Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 28 Fordham International Law Journal 292, 300(2005).
5. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869, 889(2002).
6. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 450 (Oxford University Press, 2003);
7. Christine van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty, in: Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (eds.), supra note 3, 705, 726-27;
8. Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretive Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 695(2005);
9. Claudia Cárdenas Aravena, The admissibility test before the International Criminal Court under special consideration of Amnesties and truth commissions, in: Complementary Views on Complementarity (Jann K. Kleffner, Gerben Kor eds., TMC Asser Press, 2006).
10. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming To Terms With Atrocities: A Review Of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations Of Human Rights, 59 Law & Contemporary Problems 127, 140(1997);
11. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in: Post-Conflict Justice 3-54 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
12. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 Harvard Law Review 761, 806(2004).
13. See Gregory L. Naarden, Non-prosecutorial Sanctions for Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Wartime Conduct of Bosnian Police Officials, 97 American Journal of International Law 342-52(2003).
14. This trends is likely to intensify for they serve vital functions including establishing justice and accountability of large numbers of perpetrators despite scarce resources and complexity of crimes, Ivan Simonovic, Dealing With The Legacy of Post War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 701, 710(2004);
15. Neil J. Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-conflict Justice, in: M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), supra note 6, 55, 81.
16. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text 166-7 (Volume 1, Transnational Publishers, 2005), 166-7;
17. Allison M. Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 American Journal of International Law 510, 518(2003).
18. Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity On National Implementation Of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86(2003), has examined how the complementarity principle correlates with the establishment of national legal frameworks for such prosecutions.
19. Gerard Conway, Ne Bis In Idem in International Law, 3 International Criminal Law Review 217-44(2003).
20. Schabas has espoused a different view. He expresses some doubt about the application of the ne bis in idem principle to situations where an individual has already been tried by a national justice system, but for a crime under ordinary criminal law such as murder, rather than for the truly international offences of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 70 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004).
21. Immi Tallgren, Article 20: Ne bis in idem, in: Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article 419, 431 (1st ed., Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
22. This approach gives rise to critique for dismissals generally do not bar prosecution in common law systems, Steven A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 1522-3 (7th ed., West, 2004). Judges may enter a judgment of acquittal before or after the jury reaches its decision based on insufficiency
23. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140(1986).
24. This judgment would be final, United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U. S. U. S. 564(1977). A dismissal usually does not bar a second prosecution. Even if mistrial has been declared over defendant's objection, double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial where mistrial was granted for "manifest necessity" serving the ends of public justice
25. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458(1973). Manifest necessity is a flexible test and courts have discretion to grant new trials as long as they act rationally and responsibly
26. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497(1978), 512-16. If mistrial was declared upon defendant's motion retrial is not barred, as long as the state did not goad the defendant into seeking the mistrial.
27. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 Cornell International Law Journal 507, 525(1999).
28. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in: International Criminal Law 3, 13-4, 21 (Volume 3, 2nd ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, 1999).
29. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of The ICC: From The Hague to Rome and Back Again, in: The United States and the International Criminal Court 31, 56 (S. Sewall, C. Kaysen eds., 2000).
30. Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U. C. Davis Law Review 427, 448-52(2002);
31. John Dugard, Dealing With Crimes of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option?, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 1001, 1003-4(1999). Only some soft law documents denounce amnesties indiscriminately; for instance Principle 7 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction.
32. Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 62, 65 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005).
33. Clark recently advanced a different view, Thomas Hethe. Clark, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Amnesties, and the "Interests of Justice": Striking a Delicate Balance, 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 389, 406-14.
34. Nanda reaches a similar conclusion, Ved P. Nanda, Civil and political Sanctions as an Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of Human Rights, 26 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 389, 396(1998);
35. Britta Specht, Die zwischenstaatliche Geltung des Grundsatzes "ne bis in idem" 55-73 (Springer, 1999), provides an overview on implementation of ne bis idem in relations of national states vis-à-vis international organizations;
36. see also Eva Scheschonka, der Grundsatz "ne bis in idem" im Völkerstrafrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kodifizierung durch das ICTY-Statut und das IStGH-Statut 213-23, 228-9, 248-50, 217-2 (LIT-Verlag, 2005).
37. The underlying rationales differ widely, Dietrich Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht 583-5 (2nd ed., Heymann, 1983).
38. Sabine Gless, Zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung, 116 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 353, 362-3(2004);
39. Roland M. Kniebühler, Transnationals ne bis in idem 169-303 (Duncker & Humblot, 2005).
40. Sibyl Stein, Ein Meilenstein für das europäische "ne bis in idem", Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1162, 1163-4(2003).
41. Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kommentar Art. 103 para. 56 (7th ed., C. H. Beck, 2004);
42. Differing from common law systems this protection attaches to the actual course of events specified in the indictment (Prozessuale Tat, Section 264 para. 1 StPO), Hanns Engelhardt, Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung § 264 paras. 3, 9 (5th ed., C. H. Beck, 2003).
43. Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 56, 22, 32.
44. This protection does not apply to quasi-criminal proceedings before panels of professional organizations or disciplinary measures, BVerfGE 27, 180, 185;
45. E 43, 101, 105.
46. Often administrative consequences are triggered automatically by felony convictions, Gerhard Schäfer, Praxis der Strafzumessung 176, 311 (3rd ed., C. H. Beck, 2001).
47. As to the scope of legitimate conditions see Lutz Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozessordnung § 153 a paras. 13-22a (47th ed., C. H. Beck, 2004).
48. Promulgated in 1974 it was not available at the end of the Nazi era and studies suggest that neither criminal prosecution nor alternative accountability mechanisms were enforced rigorously back then. Even after the initial implementation of purge programs like denazification and related policies it was the factual and legal reversal of such measures that took center stage, Kerstin Freudinger, Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen 12-3, 20, 33 (Mohr Siebeck, 2002);
49. in: Transitional Justice; Volume II/Country Studies (Neil J. Kritz ed., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
50. Klaus Marxen & Gerhard Werle, Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung von DDR-Unrecht - Eine Bilanz 237 (De Gruyter, 1999).
51. Daniel P. Kommers, Transitional Justice in Eastern Germany, 22 Law & Social Inquiry 829, 832-3(1997);
52. Markovits offers an exciting and illustrative account about the transition of the GDR justice system, Inga Markovits, Die Abwicklung: Ein Tagebuch zum Ende der DDR-Justiz (C. H. Beck, 1993).
53. Jean Pradel, Manuel de Procedure Penale Nr. 239-42 (11th ed., Editions Cujas, 2002). After defendant's consent and confession the case is submitted to a judge for validation and ends with a stay of proceedings;
54. see also Francois Falletti, The French Prosecution Service, in: Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States 175, 189 (Peter J. P. Tak ed., Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004).
55. Serge Guinchard & Jacques Buisson, Procedure Penale, Nr. 839 (2nd ed., Litec, 2002);
56. Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay, The Prosecution Service Function within the French Criminal Justice System, in: Coping with overloaded Criminal Justice Systems 185, 191-2 (Jörg-Martin Jehle, Marianne Wade eds., Springer 2006).
57. Judgment of Constitutional Council, CC decision no. 89-260 DC of July 28, 1989.
58. Judgments of Constitutional Council, CC decision no. 89-248 DC of January 17, 1989;
59. CC decision no. 89-260 DC of July 28, 1989. This follows from the rule of non-cumulative punishments according to which the maximum sentence for the most serious current offense may not be enhanced on the basis of another current charge, Richard S. Frase, The French Code of Criminal Procedure 32 (F. B. Rothman, 1988).
60. The principal authority in England is the decision of the House of Lords in DPP v. Connelly which was adopted in Ireland by the Supreme Court in O'Leary v. Attorney General, Dermott Walsh, Criminal Procedure 16. 10-16.19 (Thomson Round Hall, 2002).
61. I am grateful to Professor Conor Hanly, National University of Ireland, Galway, for providing this information.
62. Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163(1873), at 176.
63. See generally David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishments under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 Oklahoma Law Review 587, 595, 600-7(1993).
64. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemporary Problems 23, 26-30(1997);
65. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: the Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale Law Journal 1795, 1844-46(1992).
66. A two-part test was established under which all civil sanctions would be reviewed for an inherent criminal essence, United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242(1980), 248-9;
67. Lisa Melenyzer, Double Jeopardy Protection from Civil Sanctions after Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488(1997)
68. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 1007, 1014(1999).
69. United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435(1989).
70. The Court indicated that a lack of proportionality related to loss or harm caused by defendant would mean that sanction might not be fairly characterized as remedial, United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435(1989), 449-50;
71. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93(1997), 101-4.
72. Assessment is to be based on the expressed or implied intent of Congress, United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242(1980), 248-9.
73. Courts of appeals tend to give considerable deference to legislative intent, see Cole v. United States Department of Agriculture, 133 F.3d 803, 804 (11th Cir. 1998);
74. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 864 (2nd Cir. 1998).
75. Defendants who were sanctioned even with extensive non-criminal sanctions are unlikely to build viable legal defense against criminal prosecution under the Fifth Amendment, Troy D. Cahill, The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. United States: One Step Up And Two Steps Back For Multiple Punishment Protection Under The Double Jeopardy Clause, 33 Wake Forest Law Review 439, 464(1998).
76. Clivia von Dewitz, Strafrecht in: Reaktion auf Systemunrecht, Teilband 8 - Südafrika 123-25 (Albin Eser, Ulrich Sieber, Jörg Arnold eds., 2005);
77. in the South African case amnesties excluded civil liability too, at 140;
78. Anurima Bhargava, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study Of The South African Truth And Reconciliation Commission, 102 Columbia Law Review 1304(2002). National incentives to facilitate peace foster a climate of tradeoffs. The establishment of truth commissions or utilization of lustration in lieu of criminal prosecution might serve as a vehicle for reconciliation. But they also entail the institution of systems of non-criminal sanctions that factually function as a price tag for amnesties.
79. These instances found broad agreement at the Rome Conference, Louise Arbour, Will the ICC Have An Impact On Universal Jurisdiction?, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 585, 586(2003).
80. J. Czarnetzky and R. Rychlak, 'An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the International Criminal Court', 79 Notre Dame Law Review (2003), 55-126, at 95-6 - The decision is going to be made by the ICC, not the national state.
81. Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion before National Courts and International Tribunals, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 124, 141(2005).
82. The ICC is arbiter of its own jurisdiction, Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 71, 72(2004). Prosecutorial discretion to initiate investigations or institute prosecution is an integral part of this system.
83. Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law 123 (Transnational Publishers, 2002);
84. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Court, 14 European Journal of International Law 481, 499(2003).
85. Héctor Olásolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court, Procedural Treatment of the Principle of Complementarity, and the Role of the Prosecutor, 5 International Criminal Law Review 121, 139(2005);
86. Rod Jensen, Complementarity, 'genuinely' and Article 17: Assessing the boundaries of an effective ICC, in: Kleffner, Kor (eds.), supra note 5, 147, 148-159.
87. Sadat and Carden argued that this word might create ambiguities. "Genuinely" could refer to situations where the State's motives are not genuine, e.g. duplicitous or disingenuous, as well as to situations where the national state is really unable or unwilling to prosecute, Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 Georgetown Law Journal 381, 418(2000).
88. Philippe Kirsch, Keynote Speech, 32 Cornell International Law Journal 437-42(1999);
89. Iain Cameron, Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issues under the ICC Statute, in: The Permanent International Criminal Court 65, 87 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnely (eds.), Hart Publishing 2004).
90. Gerry Simpson, Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance, in: McGoldrick, Rowe, Donnely (eds.), supra note 90, 47, 56. To avoid the risk of undue invasion of sovereignty national jurisdictions should retain their primacy unless dysfunctional or aberrant.
91. Sharon A. Williams, Issues of Admissibility, in: Otto Triffterer (ed.), supra note 39, 383, 390-91;
92. Micah S. Myers, Prosecuting Human Rights Violations In Europe And America: How Legal System Structure Affects Compliance With International Obligations, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 211, 233(2003).
93. Wayne R. La Fave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure, § 13.2 (g), at 685 (4th ed., Thomson/West, 2004).
94. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wisconsin Law Review 837, 878.
95. Rachel A. van Cleave, Death Is Different, Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages: Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 217, 247(2003).
96. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321(1998);
97. Pamela S. Karlan, Pricking the Lines: Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minnesota Law Review 880, 881(2004).
98. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1(1991);
99. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559(1996);
100. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U. S. 424(2001);
101. Those penalties are only subject to limited review. Courts of appeals tend to be very deferential to agency decisions, Debra Marie Ingraham, Civil Money Sanctions Barred by Double Jeopardy: Should the Supreme Court Reject Healy?, 54 Washington & Lee Law Review 1183, 1188(1997).
102. Richard S. Frase, The Decision to file Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 University of Chicago Law Review 246, 248, 256, 262-9(1980).
103. The English police has the option to "caution" offender, Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System 476-77 (7th ed., Cavendish Pub., 2004), at 476-77. Prosecution seems to be barred factually after caution had been formally administered since police will not report case to crown prosecutors. But the right to prosecute does not lapse legally.
104. Andrew Sanders, Prosecutions in England and Wales, in: Tak (ed.), supra note 56, 97, 107. The DPP is the national head of the CPS. He is responsible for issuing a Code for Crown Prosecutors under section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, giving guidance on the general principles to be applied when making decisions about prosecutions. The code is available under http://www.cps.gov. uk/publications/docs/code2004english.pdf.
105. Antoinette Perrodet, The public prosecutor, in: European Criminal Procedures 415, 442 (Mireille Delmas-Marty, John R. Spencer (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2002). This is a very flexible concept that can be used to justify almost any decision;
106. Christopher Lewis, The Prosecution Service Function within the English Criminal Justice System, in: Jehle, Wade (eds.), supra note 57, 151, 157-8.
107. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 California Law Review 539, 611(1990);
108. Gaston Stefani, Georges Levasseur, and Bernard Bouloc, Droit Penal General, § 595 (18th ed., Dalloz, 2001)
109. § 595. Aubusson de Cavarlay, in: Jehle, Wade (eds.), supra note 57, at 193-96.
110. Roger Merle & André Vitu, Traite de Droit Criminel, §§ 1092-97 (5th ed., Editions Cujas, 1984).
111. Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law, A Comparative Study 88-9 (Kluwer Law International, 1996).
112. John Bell, French Constitutional Law 145, 218 (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1992).
113. Giulio Illuminati, The role of the public prosecutor in the Italian system, in: Tak (ed.), supra note 56, 303, 313.
114. Bars of trial are a controversial issue and their preconditions are far from being elaborated or accepted, especially bars of trial derived directly from the constitution, Judgment of German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 21, 378, 388ff;
115. Judgment of German Supreme Court, BGHSt 46, 159;
116. Judgment of German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 57, 250, 275;
117. Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band 1, § 3 paras. 48-54 (3rd ed., C. H. Beck, 1997).
118. Judgment of German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 21, 378, 388ff.
119. Judgments of German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 50, 166, 176;
120. E 92, 277, 326ff;
121. George P. Fletcher, Parochial versus Universal Criminal Law, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 20, 23(2005).
122. The ICC's permanent nature and availability has serious ramifications on relationship to other institutions and processes that demand further analysis. There is no general institution that can be applied as a paradigm for all conceivable conflicts, W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public Order, 6 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 175, 185(1995).
123. Danilo Zolo, Peace through Criminal Law, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 727, 731-2(2004).
124. Dominic McGoldrick, Legal and Political Significance of a Permanent ICC, in: McGoldrick, Rowe, and Donnely (eds.), supra note 90, 453, 457.
125. Mirjan R. Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 455, 458-70, 476-77(2001).
126. International scholars have emphasized need to interpret sentencing policies in relation to specific contexts to preserve their moral legitimacy, Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 64, 82-3(2003);
127. For an illustrative example in Nigeria, see Okechuwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes towards a more Pragmatic Approach, 11 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 89, 102-6(2003).
128. The Court should not dismiss out of hand the State's efforts at national reconciliation as unwillingness or inability to prosecute, Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related Issues, 10 Criminal Law Forum 87, 119(1999).
129. A recent study indicates that many Bosnian judges and prosecutors expressed concern about the lack of contact with in-country professionals on the part of the ICTY, Patricia Wald, The International Tribunals For The Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, 5 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 87, 113-8(2001).
130. Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 California Law Review 75-168(2005).
131. Osiel explains that international criminal law doctrine would allow for conviction of many perpetrators through theories of indirect liability that blame them for wrongs beyond their control or contemplation, Marc Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 Columbia Law Review 1751(2005).
132. See Thomas Weigend, Bemerkungen zur Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit im Völkerstrafrecht, 116 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 999, 1024-7(2004). The German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch; abbreviation: VStGB) recognizes this deficit and restricts the applicability of provisions that are constitutionally questionable under domestic law. The German implementation of international crimes does not mirror the respective ICC provisions for that reason. For example, failures to report war crimes or to supervise troops have been extracted from the concept of command responsibility and introduced as separate crimes in section 13 (Verletzung der Aufsichtspflicht) and section 14 (Unterlassen der Meldung einer Straftat) VStGB.
133. Orentlicher explains that customary law would not require prosecution of every person. Prosecution of those who were most responsible for designing and implementing a system of human rights atrocities would seemingly discharge governments' customary law obligation, Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a prior regime, 100 Yale Law Journal 2537, 2599(1991).
134. An informal expert paper submitted to the OTP, available under http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf, at 23, suggests the OTP shall not develop too precise a position but lists critical factors largely consistent with the proposal put forward here.
135. Andrew P. Simester & G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law - Theory and Doctrine § 2. 5 (ii) (2nd ed., Hart, 2003).
136. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws, in: ASIL Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Meeting 65, 66 (ASIL, 1999).
137. Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body?, 3 International Criminal Law Review 87, 141(2003). However, opinions vary in extent of political discretion they would allow.
138. Instructive Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, Introduction 3-11 (Oxford University Press, 2000);
139. for an evaluation of legality and efficacy see Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transitional Justice, 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 357(1999).
140. Helmut Kreicker, Martin Ludwig, Kai Rossig, Antje Rost, and Stefan Zimmermann, Strafrecht in Reaktion auf Systemunrecht, Teilband 2 - Deutschland (Albin Eser, Jörg Arnold (eds.), 2000).
141. Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Mistakes: Key Lessons the Iraqi Special Tribunal can learn from the ICTY, ICTRF, and SCSL, 38 Cornell International Law Journal 911, 919-20(2005).
142. It must be understood that no one expects the ICC, on its own, to deter all crimes, Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 3, 4-5(2001).