Degrees of belief

Journal of Logic and Computation

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 699-719

  Levi, Isaac ^a  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

Credal probability; Full belief; Inductive expansion; Maximizing evidential support; Plain belief; Satisficing evidential support

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ERROR ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; REPAIR; RESTORATION;

CREDAL PROBABILITY; DEGREE OF BELIEFS; FULL BELIEF; INDUCTIVE EXPANSION; MAXIMIZING EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT; NON-MONOTONIC REASONING; PLAIN BELIEF; SATISFICING; SATISFICING EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT; WEIGHTED AVERAGING;

RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 51249119081     PISSN: 0955792X     EISSN: 1465363X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exm096     Document Type: Conference Paper

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