Hawks, Doves and Tote Zonen: A Wehrmacht security division in central Russia, 1943

Journal of Contemporary History

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 349-369

  Shepherd, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 51249104992     PISSN: 00220094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/00220094020370030201     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. For a literature overview, see Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär (eds), Hitler's War in the East 1941-1945 (Oxford 1997).
2. Introductions to the debate include Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford 1989), 1-27;
3. Ben Shepherd, German Army Security Units in Russia, 1941-1943. A Case Study (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 2000), 1-18.
4. Hannes Heer, 'Die Logik des Vernichtungskrieges' in idem and Klaus Naumann (eds), Vernichtungskrieg (Hamburg 1995). On issues and secondary literature concerning the anti-partisan campaign
5. Of interest for its contrasting focus on front-line rather than anti-partisan units is Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45. German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Basingstoke 1985).
6. On mittlere Schicht and rank-and-file case studies, see Shepherd, op. cit., 7-10. Two additions to the literature since I wrote my PhD are: Truman O. Anderson, 'Incident at Baranivka: German Reprisals and the Soviet Partisan Movement in Ukraine, October-December 1941' in Journal of Modern History, 71, 3 (1999), 585-623;
7. Klaus Jochen Arnold, 'Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew durch die Wehrmacht im September 1941: Zur Radikalisierung der Besatzungspolitik' in Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 58 (1999), 23-63.
8. On higher-level 'criminal orders' see Jürgen Förster, 'Das Unternehmen "Barbarossa" als Eroberungs-und Vernichtungskrieg' in Horst Boog et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Frankfurt am Main 1991), 498-538;
9. Timothy P. Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire (New York 1988), 137-46.
10. On the 'leadership principle' in the Third Reich, by which agents on the ground were issued with vague guidelines for achieving radical goals, rather than with specific orders, See Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (London 2000), 69-92.
11. 'Division-level officers' refers to the divisional commander and the heads of various divisionlevel departments (operations, intelligence, quartermaster's etc.), not to officers of subordinate units such as regiments and battalions. John A. Armstrong and Kurt DeWitt, 'Organization and Control of the Partisan Movement' in John A. Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, WI 1964), 89-93;
12. Gerhard Weinberg, 'The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh Area of Smolensk Oblast' in Armstrong, Soviet Partisans in World War II op. cit., 411-22;
13. Kurt DeWitt and Wilhelm Moll, 'The Bryansk Area' in Armstrong, Soviet Partisans in World War II op. cit., 461-2;
14. Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke, 'The Polotzk Lowland' in Armstrong, Soviet Partisans in World War II op. cit., 532-4;
15. Erich Hesse, Der Sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941-1944 (Göttingen 1993 (2nd edn)), chap. 8;
16. Bernd Bonwetsch, 'Sowjetische Partisanen 1941-1944. Legende und Wirklichkeit des "allgemeinen Volkskrieges"' in Gerhard Schulz (ed.), Partisanen und Volkskrieg (Göttingen 1985), 100-1
17. Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde (Hamburg 1999), 862-3. Official Soviet estimates of partisan numbers range between 700,000 and 1.3 million for the entire movement over the course of the war. Contemporary German estimates range between 400,000 and 500,000, but this only accounts for partisans in more organized groups. Earl Ziemke, relying mainly on official Soviet figures, alleges that the partisan movement grew from around 30,000 in early 1942 to 200,000 by summer 1943. His figure for early 1943 is 120,000.
18. Earl Ziemke, 'Composition and Morale of the Soviet Partisan Movement' in Armstrong, Kalkulierte Morde, op. cit., 151.
19. Leonid Grenkevich's recent study cites western and Soviet sources (including the official reports of the Operational Division of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement) which claim that the partisan movement grew to as many as 250,000 fighters during 1943. He adds that the true figure was probably significantly higher, as the CHQPM figures only account for partisans formally enrolled in regular partisan combat units. Leonid Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (London 1999), 227-9.
20. Witalij Wilenchik, Die Partisanenbewegung in Weißrußland 1941-1944 (Sonderdruck aus: Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 34, 1984), 209;
21. Joachim Hoffmann, 'Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion' in Boog et al., Die Partisanenbewegung in Weißrußland 1941-1944, op. cit., 893.
22. Two million hectares of Byelorussia consisted of forests, swamps and lakes. By 1943, although there were 250,000 troops on active duty in the military-occupied rear, a single German security division might be responsible for 10,000 square miles of territory. Schulte, op. cit., 47, 69. On the fighting power (equipment, health, training, discipline and morale) of and conditions faced by security troops, See Schulte, op. cit., 42-52, 69-85, 117-49, 253-76. See also Matthew Cooper, The Phantom War (London 1979), 89-93, 143-61; Shepherd, op. cit., 22-3, 63-6, 83-91, 133-5, 173-9, 211-14, 218-19.
23. US National Archive (USNA), T-501/27, file 31491/6. Der Kommandierende General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte (RHGeb. Mitte) Ia. Monatsberichte, Juni-Dezember 1942 (all other primary source references are USNA unless otherwise stated). On administrative structure of the German-occupied Soviet Union
24. See Alfred Toppe et al., German Military Government (Historical Division, US Army Europe, 1948. Ms. No. P-033);
25. Mulligan, op. cit., 123-35; Jürgen Förster, 'The Relation between Operation Barbarossa as an Ideological War of Extermination and the Final Solution' in David Cesarani (ed.), The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation (London 1994), 94;
26. idem, 'Zum Rußland-Bild des Militärs 1941-1945' in Hans-Erich Volkmann (ed.), Das Rußlandbild im dritten Reich (Cologne 1994), 153;
27. see Ortwin Buchbender, Das tönende Erz (Stuttgart 1978), 272-84;
28. Timothy P. Mulligan, 'Reckoning the Cost of People's War: The German Experience in the Central USSR' in Russian History, 9 (1982), 45, 47. Mulligan estimates that the true figure was probably nearer 300,000. For some qualifications of the accuracy of such body counts
29. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA), 26-201/11. 201. Sicherungs-Division Ia, 27.1., 12.3., 3.4.43. These figures are scrutinized further in a forthcoming article. There can be no doubt, however, that the death toll was horrendous by any measure.
30. See also Wilenchik, op. cit., 201-6; Hans Umbreit, 'Das unbewältigte Problem. Der Partisanenkrieg im Rücken der Ostfront' in Jürgen Förster (ed.), Stalingrad: Ereignis-Wirkung-Symbol (Zürich 1992), 142-6;
31. Timm C. Richter, 'Die Wehrmacht und der Partisanenkrieg in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion' in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds), Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (Munich 1999), 855-7.
32. T-175/236. Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) und SD, 26.2.43, 13-14. See also Alexander Dallin et al., 'Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes' in Armstrong, Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, op. cit., 328-9.
33. Mulligan, Politics, op. cit., 123-46;
34. Theo J. Schulte, 'The German Soldier in Occupied Russia' in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds), Time to Kill (London 1997).
35. See also Bernhard R. Kroener, 'Strukturelle Veränderungen in der Militärischen Gesellschaft des Dritten Reiches' in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung (Darmstadt 1994), 271-5.
36. See Förster, 'Rußlandbild', 157-60.
37. Bernd Wegner, 'Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942/43' in Horst Boog et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Bd. 6, 921;