An empirical approach to the optimal size of the civil service

Public Administration and Development

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 223-233

  Rajaraman, Indira ^a   Saha, Debdatta ^b  

^a NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLICY   (India)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

Civil service; Optimal size; Staff composition; Subnational government

Indexed keywords

CIVIL SERVICE; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; METHODOLOGY; STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT;

ASIA; EURASIA; INDIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 50849136843     PISSN: 02712075     EISSN: 1099162X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pad.494     Document Type: Article

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