Economic grid resource management for CPU bound applications with hard deadlines

Proceedings CCGRID 2008 - 8th IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 258-266

  Vanmechelen, Kurt ^a   Depoorter, Wim ^a   Broeckhove, Jan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS; CHLORINE COMPOUNDS; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS;

CLUSTER COMPUTING; GRID RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM;

GRID COMPUTING;

EID: 50649087570     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CCGRID.2008.11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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