Ethnic and sectarian violence and the propensity towards praetorianism in Pakistan

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 463-477

  Haleem, Irm ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ETHNIC CONFLICT; SECTARIANISM; VIOLENCE;

ASIA; EURASIA; PAKISTAN; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 5044235828     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0143659032000084410     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. Interviewed by Mubashir Zaidi, 'The loss of strategic depth can be attributed to the unholy shadow of the foreign office', The Herald (Karachi), December 2001, p 49.
2. This is an argument forwarded by the contributing authors in Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
3. Ibid, p xvi.
4. SE Finer, 'The man on horseback', Armed Forces and Society, 1 (1), 1974.
5. Mutiah Alagappa, 'Investigating and explaining change: An analytical framework', in Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, p 34.
6. Finer, 'The man on horseback', p 9.
7. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.
8. Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977
9. and Ayesha Jalal, 'The state and political privilege in Pakistan', in Myron Weiner & Ali Banuazizi (eds), The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
10. Alfred C Stephan, Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Failures, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973
11. and Mehran Kamrava, 'Military professionalization and civil-military relations in the Middle East', Political Science Quarterly, 115 (1), 2000, pp 67-92.
12. Harold D Lasswell, 'The garrison state', American Journal of Sociology, 46, 1941, pp 455-468
13. Lasswell, 'The garrison state hypothesis today', in Samuel Huntington (ed), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York: Free Press, 1962
14. and Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
15. Michael Desh, 'Threat environments and military missions', in Larry Diamond & Marc F Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996
16. and Sattar, 'Pakistan: Return to praetorianism', 2001.
17. Babar Sattar, 'Pakistan's return to praetorianism', in Coercion and Governance, ed Muthiah Alapappa, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
18. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.
19. Larry Diamond, 'Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future?' Journal of Democracy, 11 (3), July 2000, pp 91-106.
20. Samuel Huntington, 'Reforming civil-military relations', in Diamond & Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy
21. and Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
22. Hamza Alavi, 'The state in postcolonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', New Left Review, 74, 1972, pp 145-173
23. and Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia.
24. A sufficient variable is one that always gives rise to a phenomenon. Thus 'x' always causes 'y' (praetorianism) and one can not have 'x' without it causing 'y'. See John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p 132.
25. A necessary variable is one that is important in giving rise to a phenomenon but does not always give rise to it. So, 'x' is important for 'y' (likelihood of praetorianism) but 'x' does not always cause 'y' and in fact 'x' may exist without it leading to 'y'. See ibid, p 132.
26. Lack of democratic consolidation here implies ineffective institutional channels of redress and unaccountable and corrupt civilian leadership.
27. See Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, 'Sri Lanka: Transformation of legitimate violence and civil-military relations', in Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, pp 294-314.
28. Geoffrey Robinson, 'Indonesia: On a new course? in Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, pp 226-256.
29. Pamela Constable, 'Pakistan's predicament', Journal of Democracy, 12 (1), January 2001, pp 15-29.
30. Gino Germani & Kalman Silvert, 'Politics, social structure and military intervention in Latin America', European Journal of Sociology, 2, 1961, pp 62-81.
31. Cynthia H Enloe, 'The issue of saliency of the military-ethnic connection: Some thoughts on Malaysia', Comparative Politics, 10 (2), 1978, pp 251-266.
32. Jalal, 'The state and political privilege in Pakistan'
33. and Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia.
34. The proposition that alliances and counter-alliances legitimise military intervention is an illustration of the broader hypothesis that, as the utility of coercion increases, so does the influence and power of the military as put forth by scholars on Asian civil-military relations. See Alagappa, Coercion and Governance.
35. Ethnic consciousness, though transformed into a nationwide phenomenon in the 1970s, can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s, particularly among the Bengali ethnic group. Bengal had comprised the fifth province of Pakistan until it seceded from West Pakistan to form the sovereign state of Bangladesh in 1971. Lack of Bengali ethnic representation at the level of key institutions such as the central government and the military were primary sources of grievance and demands for secession.
36. Amir Mir, 'Unholy crusade', Newsline (Karachi), October 1999, p 69.
37. For example, when in the early 1990s the military was called in by the civilian government to crack down on the criminal activities of some of the members of the MQM (an ethnic Mohajiri political party) in the province of Sindh, the entire Mohajiri community blamed the military for being simply anti-Mohajiri and even called for a secession. The subsequent violence only served to justify further military operations.
38. Ayesha Jalal, State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
39. Samina Ahmed, 'Centralization, authoritarianism, and the mismanagement of ethnic relations in Pakistan', in Michael E Brown & Sumit Ganguly (eds), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp 83-127.
40. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985, pp 41-54.
41. It should be noted that, while the provinces pride themselves on their own cultural languages, Urdu remains the formal national language of Pakistan. As such, it is understood by all and spoken by most.
42. Hasan Mujtaba & Mohammed Hanif, 'Sindh: Divide and rule?, Newsline, March 1994, pp 27-41.
43. Michael Brown, 'Causes and implications of ethnic conflict', in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed Michael Brown, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.
44. Shahzada Zulfiqar, 'The ethnic factor', Newsline, September 1993, pp 130-132.
45. Zahid Hussain & Hasan Mujtaba, 'Crime and politics', Newsline, August 1992, p 25.
46. Mohammed Hanif, 'Karachi's killing fields', Newsline, May 1994, p 26.
47. Zulfiqar, 'The ethnic factor, pp 130-132.
48. Mir, 'Unholy crusade', p 68.
49. Hussain & Mujtaba, 'Crime and politics', p 25.
50. Mir, 'Unholy crusade', p 66.
51. Where East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan to form the sovereign state of Bangladesh.
52. Maleeha Lodhi & Zahid Hussain, 'Pakistan's invisible government', Newsline, October 1992, pp 23-34.
53. Mushahid Hussain, 'Among the believers', The Herald, September 1992, pp 36-41.
54. Talat Aslam, 'Resurgent Islam: Can it conquer Pakistan?, The Herald, September 1992, pp 25-35.
55. Ibid, p 27.
56. See also Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-I-Islamic of Pakistan, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1994, pp 188-205.
57. Vali Reza Nasr, 'International politics, domestic imperatives, and identity mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998', Comparative Politics, 32 (2), 2000, pp 171-190.
58. Mujtaba, 'Sindh: Divide and rule?, pp 27-41.
59. Lodbi, 'Pakistan's invisible government', p 30.
60. Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, p 206.
61. Hussain & Mujtaba, 'Crime and politics', p 25.
62. Massoud Ansari, 'Coup, counter coup', Newsline, October 1999, p 41.
63. Interview with Major General Rashid Qureshi, Press Secretary of Chief Executive of Pakistan, Army Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 26 December 2000. See also Zahid Hussain, 'Day of the General', Newsline, October 1999, pp 22-25.
64. Interview with Major General Rashid Qureshi, 26 December 2000.
65. Zahid Hussain, 'Dead end?, Newsline, September 1999, p 22.
66. Ansari, 'Coup, counter coup', p 41.
67. Mir, 'Unholy crusade', p 69.
68. For detailed analysis of the Kargil war see Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp 114-133.
69. Sattar, 'Pakistan: Return to praetorianism', p 404.
70. Ibid.
71. See also Ganguly, Conflict Unending, p 119
72. and Hussain, 'Dead end?, p 22.
73. Hussain, 'Dead end?, p 22.
74. Roger Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 25.
75. Ironically, Prime Minister Sharif, the army's own creation, was ousted in the October 1999 military coup. In addition to the aforementioned popular multi-ethnic and sectarian anti-Sharif sentiments in the country, analysts suggest that Sharif had also become the Frankenstein that the army was no longer able to control, thus leading to his ouster. That Sharif had become a de facto civilian dictator is a fact documented by numerous, and varied, sources and complements this 'Frankenstein thesis'.
76. Ahmed, 'Centralization, authoritarianism, and the mismanagement of ethnic relations in Pakistan', pp 83-127.
77. Nasr, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan', p 185.
78. Ibid, pp 171-190.
79. Ibid, p 186.
80. Ahmed, 'Centralization, authoritarianism, and the mismanagement of ethnic relations in Pakistan', pp 83-127.
81. A notable illustration of unaccountable and unrepresentative civilian leadership was Prime Minister Sharif's denial of any responsibility for the Kargil debacle and his popular discriminatory allocation of national resources to provinces, respectively. Notable illustrations of irresponsible leadership in Pakistan point to the divide and rule strategies of both Gen Zia ul-Haq and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (during both her terms in office), which resulted in the fomentation of ethnic and sectarian polarisation and violence.
82. Luttwak, Coup d'Etat.
83. Ikram Sehgal. 'Before the referendum: Interview with the President', Pakistan Defence Journal, May 2002.
84. MM Ali, 'The revival of democracy in Pakistan - an historical perspective', Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, XXI (8), 2002, p 55.