Global law teaching

Journal of Legal Education

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 160-182

  Valcke, Catherine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

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EID: 5044232916     PISSN: 00222208     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (103)

1. "Knowledge tourism is ruled by laws of surface that capitulate at the first signs of rigor" (my translation). René Char, Recherche de la base et du sommet 741 (Paris, 1965).
2. With one exception: several scholars have reflected upon the question whether topics such as "comparative law" or "comparative method" should form the object of self-standing courses. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 49, 50 (1996).
3. This seems to be the case in France as well. See Christian Mouly, L'enseignement du droit comparé en France, 4 R. I. D. C. 745, 746 (1988); Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Réflexions sur l'enseignement du droit comparé, 4 R. I. D. C. 751, 759 (1988).
4. This seems to be the case in France as well. See Christian Mouly, L'enseignement du droit comparé en France, 4 R. I. D. C. 745, 746 (1988); Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Réflexions sur l'enseignement du droit comparé, 4 R. I. D. C. 751, 759 (1988).
5. Catherine Valcke, Teaching Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching in Canadian Schools of Common Law, in Teaching Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching, ed. Gabriel Moens (Brussels, 2004).
6. Strictly speaking, law that is not our own because of temporal, as opposed to geographical, distance - law that is no longer OUT own - could also be termed "foreign." As has often been pointed out, the study of foreign law indeed bears many resemblances to that of legal history. Nonetheless, foreign law here is used in its most common understanding, as referring to geographical otherness only.
7. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
8. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
9. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
10. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
11. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
12. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
13. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
14. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
15. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
16. See generally A. T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law? 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1971); J. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law, in Rechtsvergleichung, eds. K. Zweigert & H.-J. Puttfarken, 361 (Darmstadt, 1978); G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); B. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1990); A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed., 10-16 (Athens, Ga., 1993) ; J. Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 (1998); N. V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 647 (1998); J. H. Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. 771 (1998) ; É. Picard, L'état du droit comparé en France en 1999 4 R. I. D. C. 885, 888-89 (1999); M. Van Hoecke & M. Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 495 (1998).
17. Vivian Grosswald Curran suggests in this respect that comparative law is just the natural extension, beyond domestic boundaries, of the explorations of "otherness" taking place within these boundaries, for example, through feminist or critical race theory. Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potential for Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 657 (1998).
18. John Flood, Legal Education, Globalization, and the New Imperialism, in The Law School -Global Issues, Local Questions, ed. Fiona Cownie, 127 (1999). See, e.g., John E. Sexton, The Global Law School Program at New York University, 46 J. Legal Educ. 329, 330, 331, 334 (1996).
19. John Flood, Legal Education, Globalization, and the New Imperialism, in The Law School -Global Issues, Local Questions, ed. Fiona Cownie, 127 (1999). See, e.g., John E. Sexton, The Global Law School Program at New York University, 46 J. Legal Educ. 329, 330, 331, 334 (1996).
20. Many comparatists also specialize in international law, and vice versa. To wit, the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law and the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law were both published by Max Planck institutes, at Heidelberg and Hamburg respectively.
21. "[R]ules which are avowedly universal in character do not lend themselves to comparison. So far as it exists at all, any relationship or kinship between comparative law and the law of nations must therefore be of a very shadowy nature . . . ." Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research 61 (London, 1971).
22. See, e.g., William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory, 49 Current Legal Probs. II, 1, 9 (1996); M. Delmas-Marty & M.-L. Izorche, Marge nationale d'appréciation et internationalization du droit - Réflexions sur la validité formelle d'un droit commun pluraliste 4 R. I. D. C. 753, 755 (2000).
23. See, e.g., William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory, 49 Current Legal Probs. II, 1, 9 (1996); M. Delmas-Marty & M.-L. Izorche, Marge nationale d'appréciation et internationalization du droit - Réflexions sur la validité formelle d'un droit commun pluraliste 4 R. I. D. C. 753, 755 (2000).
24. See in particular André Jean Arnaud, Entre modernité et mondialisation: Cinq Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit et de l'état 32-33 (Paris, 1998). (Transnational law would amount to "juridical relations that reach beyond the national framework, without for that matter entering the international juridical space stricto sensu" (my translation).)
25. See, e.g., Yearbook of International Commercial Arbitration; Revue de l'arbitrage; American Arbitration Association, Dispute Resolution Journal.
26. Most importantly, the New York Convention of 1958.
27. A kind of international organization that is "empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to states." Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 287 (1997).
28. "In search of examples of globalization of law in various areas of cross-border legal interaction, [we] expected to find non-state-produced sets of rules .... In the end, numerous non-state organizations and structured behavioural patterns were found, but almost nothing was observed which can be defined as autonomous lawmaking." Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law 11 (Aldershot, 1998). Even with respect to the European Court of Justice, it was remarked that "the European Community essentially remains an inter-governmental institution in which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice." Mark K. Brewer, Note: The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a European Constitution 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 555 (2001). But see Charles Koch, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 71-72, 88 (2003) (suggesting that it may be desirable for the various international tribunals to merge into a formal, centralized global adjudicative structure).
29. "In search of examples of globalization of law in various areas of cross-border legal interaction, [we] expected to find non-state-produced sets of rules .... In the end, numerous non-state organizations and structured behavioural patterns were found, but almost nothing was observed which can be defined as autonomous lawmaking." Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law 11 (Aldershot, 1998). Even with respect to the European Court of Justice, it was remarked that "the European Community essentially remains an inter-governmental institution in which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice." Mark K. Brewer, Note: The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a European Constitution 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 555 (2001). But see Charles Koch, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 71-72, 88 (2003) (suggesting that it may be desirable for the various international tribunals to merge into a formal, centralized global adjudicative structure).
30. "In search of examples of globalization of law in various areas of cross-border legal interaction, [we] expected to find non-state-produced sets of rules .... In the end, numerous non-state organizations and structured behavioural patterns were found, but almost nothing was observed which can be defined as autonomous lawmaking." Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law 11 (Aldershot, 1998). Even with respect to the European Court of Justice, it was remarked that "the European Community essentially remains an inter-governmental institution in which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice." Mark K. Brewer, Note: The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a European Constitution 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 555 (2001). But see Charles Koch, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 71-72, 88 (2003) (suggesting that it may be desirable for the various international tribunals to merge into a formal, centralized global adjudicative structure).
31. See generally Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London, 1995); Boaventura de Souza Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (NewYork, 1995);
32. See generally Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London, 1995); Boaventura de Souza Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (NewYork, 1995);
33. Mike Featherstone et al., Global Modernities (London, 1995); Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 1-15.
34. Mike Featherstone et al., Global Modernities (London, 1995); Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 1-15.
35. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 8, at 331. W. Michael Reisman indeed attributes to Sexton the view that "the legal curriculum should be based upon a notion of a comprehensive transnational legal system rather than an autonomous national system that connects to other states and an international system through certain formal linkages." Designing Law Curricula for a Transnational Industrial and Science-Based Civilization, 46 J. Legal Educ. 322, 327 (1996).
36. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 8, at 331. W. Michael Reisman indeed attributes to Sexton the view that "the legal curriculum should be based upon a notion of a comprehensive transnational legal system rather than an autonomous national system that connects to other states and an international system through certain formal linkages." Designing Law Curricula for a Transnational Industrial and Science-Based Civilization, 46 J. Legal Educ. 322, 327 (1996).
37. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992).
38. Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 72-95 (Stanford, 1983).
39. See, e.g., the various contributors to Global Law Without a State, ed. Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, 1997).
40. François Ost, Mondialisation, globalisation, universalisation, in Le droit saisi par la mondialisation, ed. Charles-Albert Morand, 5, 8-12 (Brussels, 2001) [hereinafter Le droit saisi].
41. Gunther Teubner, Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-State Actors, in Global Law Without a State, supra note 21, at xiii, xiv.
42. See, in this respect, Kant's contrast of national and international law, where he describes the latter as akin to the law of nature. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, §§ 41, 54 (Cambridge, 1991).
43. On this point, see Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence: The Comparability of Legal Systems, Am. J. Comp. L., note 91 (forthcoming 2004).
44. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
45. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
46. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
47. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
48. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
49. J. Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, 1997, 119 (1998); R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (NewYork, 1998); I. Detter, The International Legal Order 176-78 (Aldershot, 1994); M. G. Kohen, Internationalisme et mondialisation, in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 107; Daniel Jutras, Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langues et traditions, R.I.D.C. 781, 794 (2000); J. C. M. Wachelder, Integration and Differentiation in Legal Education from a Historical Sociological Point of View, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, eds. Bruno de Witte & Caroline Forde, 752 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992);
50. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 3; Twining, supra note 11, at 221; J. Chevallier, Mondialisation du droit ou droit de la mondialisation? in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 37, 57-58.
51. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 3; Twining, supra note 11, at 221; J. Chevallier, Mondialisation du droit ou droit de la mondialisation? in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 37, 57-58.
52. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 3; Twining, supra note 11, at 221; J. Chevallier, Mondialisation du droit ou droit de la mondialisation? in Le droit saisi, supra note 22, at 37, 57-58.
53. Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance 278-79 (Cambridge, 1999).
54. Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics, 21 Millenium 371, 386 (1992).
55. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 6, paraphrasing Hirst & Thompson, supra note 27, at 192-93.
56. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 6, paraphrasing Hirst & Thompson, supra note 27, at 192-93.
57. Gessner & Budak, supra note 16, at 12.
58. See the survey of Canadian law teachers discussed in Valcke, supra note 4. See also the survey of the literature in William Twining, Law in Context 312-15 (NewYork, 1997).
59. See the survey of Canadian law teachers discussed in Valcke, supra note 4. See also the survey of the literature in William Twining, Law in Context 312-15 (NewYork, 1997).
60. This is particularly important in so-called "mixed" systems. On the particular issue of legal education in such systems, see Catherine Valcke, Legal Education in a "Mixed Jurisdiction": The Quebec Experience, 10 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F., 61 (1996).
61. See in this respect John Sexton's explanation that "few significant legal or social problems today... are purely domestic - whether one thinks of labor standards and NAFTA, criminal law and the impact of Asian or Russian gangs in Los Angeles or New York, intellectual property and trade with Japan, or the impact of foreign creditors on United States monetary policy. It is virtually impossible to avoid the transnational implications of almost any subject." Sexton, supra note 8, at 331.
62. Sexton, supra note 8; A. Bernabe-Riefkohl, Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 137 (1995).
63. Sexton, supra note 8; A. Bernabe-Riefkohl, Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 137 (1995).
64. "Where one is immersed in his own law, in his own country unable to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency to consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God things which are simply due to historical accident or temporary social situations." Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1922).
65. As Nicholas Kasirer puts it: "Ultimately, the imperialists [practitioners of law] need the cosmologists [the academics] to make sense of their claims to territory and ... the cosmos is best contemplated with two feet firmly planted on the ground of somebody's empire." Bijuralism in Law's Empire and in Law's Cosmos, 29 J. Legal Educ. 29, 40 (2000). In the same vein, J. C. M. Wachelder suggests that "[t]he lawyer which will be needed in the future is a lawyer with global insights, who knows the relative stable principles and norms, who is familiar with historical backgrounds, with juridical methods and is acquainted with the relationship between law and other aspects of society." Wachelder, supra note 26, at 736.
66. As Nicholas Kasirer puts it: "Ultimately, the imperialists [practitioners of law] need the cosmologists [the academics] to make sense of their claims to territory and ... the cosmos is best contemplated with two feet firmly planted on the ground of somebody's empire." Bijuralism in Law's Empire and in Law's Cosmos, 29 J. Legal Educ. 29, 40 (2000). In the same vein, J. C. M. Wachelder suggests that "[t]he lawyer which will be needed in the future is a lawyer with global insights, who knows the relative stable principles and norms, who is familiar with historical backgrounds, with juridical methods and is acquainted with the relationship between law and other aspects of society." Wachelder, supra note 26, at 736.
67. For a distinction between the standpoint of the "participant" and that of the "expert observer," see Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 57 (New York, 1983). Similarly, William Ewald suggests we adopt the perspective of "participants in a . . . legal system who are in some way professionally engaged in the development or administration of law, . . . not just legal scholars, but also attorneys, judges, legislators, academicians, administrators, and the like." Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat? 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1898, 1944 (1994-95).
68. For a distinction between the standpoint of the "participant" and that of the "expert observer," see Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 57 (New York, 1983). Similarly, William Ewald suggests we adopt the perspective of "participants in a . . . legal system who are in some way professionally engaged in the development or administration of law, . . . not just legal scholars, but also attorneys, judges, legislators, academicians, administrators, and the like." Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat? 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1898, 1944 (1994-95).
69. A legal sociologist might agree that [the] black-letter approach is too narrow, and urge that we look instead to "law in action," that is, to law as it functions in a broader social context. But if this context is understood in external terms (say, as the observable regularities in the behaviour of the members of the society) then . . . a study of "law in action" falls as short of the target as a study of "law in books." The problem is at bottom the same. The social-context approach gives us external facts about the way people behave; but what we need to understand is the ideas and the reasons for the behaviour. In other words, it seems that what we need to understand is neither law in books nor law in action, but law in minds. Ewald, supra note 37, at 2111.
70. Take the institution of marriage, for example. Say that a sophisticated sociologist or economist turns out to be highly successful at making predictions about people's marriage decisions: whom they will marry, at what stage in their life, and so on. Such predictions would clearly be helpful for the purpose of understanding marriage, but they could hardly be sufficient. A meaningful understanding of marriage would require, in addition, that we investigate the reasons people get married, their ideas, motivations, desires - that we explore what it means to get married to the individuals actually faced with that decision. Only then could we be relatively confident that we truly understand what it means to get married. I owe this example to my colleague Bruce Chapman.
71. Ewald, supra note 37, at 2144.
72. Ronald Dworkin called them "Hercules." Taking Rights Seriously 81-130 (Cambridge, 1977).
73. Unlike language, law is normative in the sense that it prescribes and sanctions behavior. Nonetheless, legal and linguistic utterances alike can be described as "wrong" or "incorrect" insofar as they diverge from the rest of their respective legal and linguistic structures. Law and language both qualify as "normative" in this sense.
74. "Pour apprendre à nager, il faut sauter dans l'eau et non pas lire des traités de natation." Sur l'analyse différentielle des juriscultures, 4 R. I. D. C. 1053, 1060 (1999) (my translation).
75. "Legal system" is here understood in a loose sense, akin to what others have termed "legal culture." See, in particular, Lawrence M. Friedman's definition of "legal culture" as "ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institutions, which some public or some part of the public holds." The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply, in Comparing Legal Cultures, ed. David Nelken, 34 (Aldershot, 1997).
76. For a taste of the debate concerning the extent to which, if at all, the Vattelian model of international law as forming a legal system distinct from national legal systems is still defensible today, see Philip Allott, The Emerging Universal Legal System, 3 Int'l L.F. 12 (2001).
77. "[D]omestic law is 'here' and international law is 'there'. . . ." Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 501, 504 (2000).
78. Whether or not this is the case beyond just didactic purposes is another matter.
79. Of course, greater knowledge of the foreign legal system maybe needed to carry on the prior operation of sifting the relevant from the irrelevant. As any good comparatist knows, all the rules pertaining to, say, contracts may not appear in the "Contract" section of the code of a foreign civilian jurisdiction. In particular, a noncivilian may not think of consulting code provisions on "gifts" when assessing whether consideration is a requirement of a valid contract in that jurisdiction. Yet the fact that gifts may need to be notarized in order to be enforceable is an important qualification to the principle, stated in the code section on "contracts," that gratuitous contracts are enforceable despite the absence of consideration. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that legal texts do not always reflect legal practice: even though some civil codes might provide that specific performance is in principle preferred to a damage remedy where possible, for example, the courts might in practice have interpreted "where possible" so narrowly as to effectively reverse the principle and the exception. Furthermore, the real impact of these provisions cannot be assessed without also considering the means by which judgments are enforced. This impact is bound to differ significantly where judgments are enforced by means of injunctions, as in Quebec, or by means of civil fines (astreinte), as in France.
80. Sexton, supra note 8, at 334, describing the vision underlying NYU's "global law school."
81. Kasirer, supra note 36, at 30 n.2.
82. Jutras, supra note 26, at 81, 792-93 (my translation). On the history of bijuralism at McGill, see Roderick A. Macdonald, The National Law Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, Prospects, 13 Dalhousie L.J. 211 (1990).
83. Jutras, supra note 26, at 81, 792-93 (my translation). On the history of bijuralism at McGill, see Roderick A. Macdonald, The National Law Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, Prospects, 13 Dalhousie L.J. 211 (1990).
84. For a radical view, see Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Devente, 1999). For more nuanced views, see Jutras, supra note 26, at 792-93; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences 5 (Beverly Hills, 1980).
85. For a radical view, see Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Devente, 1999). For more nuanced views, see Jutras, supra note 26, at 792-93; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences 5 (Beverly Hills, 1980).
86. For a radical view, see Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Devente, 1999). For more nuanced views, see Jutras, supra note 26, at 792-93; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences 5 (Beverly Hills, 1980).
87. Ewald, supra note 37, at 1947-48. And at 1949: "[W]hat matters here - in a sense, what gives meaning to the legal enterprise across cultures and over time - is not so much the black-letter solutions as the cognitive struggle itself and the efforts by jurists, over time, to deepen their understanding of law and what it requires."
88. For a persuasive critique of foreign law teaching that aims to transcend all legal systems and convey external knowledge of a number of them - typically self-standing Comparative Law or Topics in Comparative Law courses - see Reimann, supra note 2.
89. System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 719, 733 (1998).
90. Jutras, supra note 26, at 793, refers instead to "discovery" and "revelation" respectively. For a more elaborate description of the experiential and didactic methods, see Valcke, supra note 32, at 121-26.
91. Jutras, supra note 26, at 793, refers instead to "discovery" and "revelation" respectively. For a more elaborate description of the experiential and didactic methods, see Valcke, supra note 32, at 121-26.
92. For an argument that scarce didactic teaching has made it more difficult for American students to understand foreign law, see Joachim Zekoll, Kant and Comparative Law: Some Reflections on a Reform Effort, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2719, 2720-21 (1996).
93. The European ERASMUS program (European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) has been "dramatically successful." Id. at 2722). Adopted by the European Council in 1987 (Council Decision 87/327, 1987 O.J. (L60)), this program counted 1,200 participating institutions by 1991. Id.
94. This combination is quite common in U.K. institutions.
95. This is what I attempt to do at the University of Toronto in my Civil Law: Introduction to the French Law of Obligations.
96. In the National Programme of the University of Ottawa, the first three years of study in either civil law or common law are followed by one additional year in the other system, as was the case at McGill University until 1999. Exchange programs between common law and civil law faculties similarly proceed sequentially. In France foreign law is learned at the level of the maîtrise. In Belgium it is confined to upper years.
97. See, e.g., the program at NYU, discussed in Sexton, supra note 8. Under McGill's new "transsystemic" law program, students receive both the civil law and the common law LL.B. after successfully completing three years of fully integrated civilian and common law studies. The integration is thorough indeed: not only do students take civil and common law courses in each of their three years, but civil and common law are combined within courses, most notably first-year basic courses. The law of different cantons similarly is taught in an integrated fashion in some Swiss law faculties.
98. "[T]he law from all parts of the world is relevant to our program." Norman Dorsen, Achieving International Cooperation: NYU's Global Law School Program, 51 J. Legal Educ. 332, 332 (2001).
99. See, in particular, François Ost and Mark van Hoecke's plea for a most general, academic form of legal education, one that would emphasize Roman law, legal history, philosophy, and sociology. The Harmonisation of European Private Law 911 (Oxford, 2000). Most extreme in this respect is Frederick Pollock's recommendation to his students that they read Homer, Virgil, Dante, Rabelais, and Goethe! Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses 108 (London, 1890).
100. See, in particular, François Ost and Mark van Hoecke's plea for a most general, academic form of legal education, one that would emphasize Roman law, legal history, philosophy, and sociology. The Harmonisation of European Private Law 911 (Oxford, 2000). Most extreme in this respect is Frederick Pollock's recommendation to his students that they read Homer, Virgil, Dante, Rabelais, and Goethe! Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses 108 (London, 1890).
101. Wachelder, supra note 26, at 737-40.
102. It may be possible to become acquainted with a higher number of legal systems that are genealogically related, such as Commonwealth legal systems or French-civilian legal systems, just as Spanish will be more easily learned by an Italian speaker than by, say, a unilingual Anglophone.
103. Even so, George A. Bermann rightly warns: Broadening comparative law's range of concerns does not mean simply multiplying the topics upon which comparative law scholars set their gaze, for if comparative law scholarship is truly too narrow-gauged, or too informational (or "reportorial"), it will certainly not become less so by our subjecting more of the legal landscape to it. Broadening the concerns of comparative law means turning to issues that are themselves qualitatively broader and, yes, even deeper. The Discipline of Comparative Law in the United States 4 R. I. D. C. 1041, 1051-52 (1999).