Life in the DMZ: Turning a diplomatic failure into an environmental success

Diplomatic History

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 585-611

  Brady, Lisa M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 50249088847     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: 14677709     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00714.x     Document Type: Article

References (161)

1. A note on names: The spelling for Korean place names re.ects that commonly found in English-language documents. For individuals, I follow the Korean convention of placing the surname first, excepting those whose published work lists their names according to Western conventions and prominent figures, like Syngman Rhee, whose name order is typically reversed in English-language sources.
2. David R. Zimmerman, "A Fragile Victory for Beauty on an Old Asian Battleground," Smithsonian 12 (October 1981): 57.
3. Ibid., 60.
4. Ibid., 63.
5. Peter Matthiessen, "Accidental Sanctuary," Audubon 98 ( July-August 1996): 54.
6. Ibid., 106.
7. Ibid., 107. Korea is known as the "Land of the Morning Calm."
8. Ke Chung Kim, "Preserving Biodiversity in Korea's Demilitarized Zone," Science 278 (10 October 1997): 242-43.
9. See also Kwi-Gon Kim and Dong-Gil Cho, "Status and Ecological Resource Value of the Republic of Korea's De-Militarized Zone," Landscape and Ecological Engineering 1 (2005): 3-15. Kim and Cho's study examined the areas in the DMZ and CCZ adjacent to the two railroads that now connect the two countries. Although the study was limited, the results are still suggestive.
10. Norimitsu Onishi, "Does a Tiger Lurk in the Middle of a Fearful Sanctuary?," New York Times (late ed., East Coast), 5 September 2004, sec. 1, p. 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/05/international/ asia/05dmz.html.
11. Joy Drohan, "Sustainably Developing the DMZ," Technology Review 99, no. 6 (August-September 1996): 17.
12. For more on the DMZ issue, see "Maintaining No Man's Land," Environment 39 (December 1997): 24
13. Tom O'Neill, "Korea's Dangerous Divide: DMZ," National Geographic 204, no. 1 (July 2003): 2-26
14. and "Korean DMZ's Environmental Treasures Need Protection," International CustomWire, 13 January 2004.
15. Ke Chung Kim, "Preserving Biodiversity in Korea's Demilitarized Zone," 242-43.
16. The Korean-born Kim has done a great deal to help preserve the DMZ ecosystems, not only by proposing the Korean Peace Bioreserves System to the United Nations but also by founding the international organization the DMZ Forum, which has as its sole mission to preserve the DMZ. Ted Turner, the American media mogul, has joined Kim in his mission. See "Ted Turner: Turn Korean DMZ into Peace Park," USA Today, 18 November 2005; available from http://www.usatoday.com/ news/world/2005-11-18-turnerdmz_x.htm (accessed 27 November 2005).
17. Turner was a keynote speaker at a conference hosted by the DMZ Forum in August 2005, where he delivered an address titled "Nature Conservation and Sustainable Development for Peace in Korea." Information on and the program of the conference can be found at the DMZ Forum website, http://www.dmzforum.org.
18. Drohan, "Sustainably Developing the DMZ."
19. The following list is representative but not comprehensive: Drohan, "Sustainably Developing the DMZ" "Maintaining No Man's Land" "Wild and Wooly in the DMZ," Civilization 3 (October-November 1996): 44-45
20. Michael Schuman, "Bitter No-Man's Land, Korea's DMZ Conceals aHaven for Animals,"Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., 24 August 2000, A1
21. Josie Glausiusz, "Healer of a Divided Land: Interview with Ke Chung Kim," Discover 21 (November 2000): 30
22. Lucille Craft, "Breaking Down the Barriers: A Peace Park, before Peace, on the Korean Peninsula?" Japan Times, 17 September 2001; available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ fv20020917al.html (accessed 27 November 2005)
23. Ke Chung Kim and Edward O. Wilson, "The Land that War Protected," New York Times, Opinion, 10 December 2002
24. and Nick Easen, "Korea's DMZ: The Thin Green Line," CNN.com; available from http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/22/ korea.bio.dmz (accessed 23 February 2005).
25. Despite its being known as the "forgotten war," numerous volumes (both primary and secondary) examining the military history of the KoreanWar are available. For example: Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ, 1981, 1990)
26. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964)
27. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge (Garden City, NY, 1967)
28. William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ, 1995)
29. William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, NJ, 2002)
30. and U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army in the Korean War 4 vols. (Washington, DC, 1961-1972).
31. Three very useful sources on Korean history generally are Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York, 1997)
32. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (1997; rev. and updated ed., New York, 2001)
33. and Roger Tennant, A History of Korea (London, 1996).
34. Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 1.
35. Ibid., 2.
36. Easen, "Korea's DMZ: The Thin Green Line."
37. Ke Chung Kim, "Preserving Biodiversity in Korea's Demilitarized Zone," 242.
38. For a translation of the Korean nation's origin story, see Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 23-24.
39. See also "Dan-Gun, First King of Korea," in Folk Tales from Korea 3d ed., ed. and trans. Zong In-Sob (Elizabeth, NJ, 1982), 3-4. Tigers are the subjects of thirteen other Korean legends and stories included in Zong's collection.
40. Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 4.
41. This deal was negotiated by President Theodore Roosevelt and is considered by some to be the first betrayal of Korea by the United States. Roosevelt essentially exchanged Japanese recognition of American rights in the Philippines for American acceptance of Japan's claims in Korea. Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 5.
42. See also Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 141-42.
43. For a description of early farming practices, see Tennant, History of Korea, 2.
44. For a description of Korean social strata, see Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 51-53.
45. Peasants were usually either tenant farmers or slaves. The term yangban is applied to the landed gentry of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) and also to a class of scholar-officials. See Tennant, History of Korea, 135-57
46. and John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA, 1998), 5-18, passim.
47. Cumings uses the latter definition, Korea's Place in the Sun, 141.
48. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ, 1981), 39-45.
49. As of 2005, 66 percent of the nation was forested, but colonization, the Korean War, and postwar efforts of reconstruction created a situation in which "these forests had been badly devastated from reckless logging for firewood, reclamation, and slash-and-burn farming methods." Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President), "Natural Environment: Forests and Farmlands," 2; http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/ korea/Korea_03_5_c.html?m_def=5&ss_def=3 (last accessed 18 November 2005). After the Korean presidential election in 2007, the Of.ce of the President web site changed and no longer contains this page. Printed copies of this page, and others cited herein, are in author's collection.
50. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 166.
51. Ibid., 167.
52. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 1: 48.
53. Germany was the other nation, of course, that was divided in two. Vietnam could also fall into this category, but its division was much shorter in duration.
54. Cumings's chapter on the colonial period is excellent, and provides much more detailed analysis of the political and economic rami.cations of Japanese occupation. See "Eclipse, 1905-1945," in Korea's Place in the Sun, 139-84. Quotation from p. 148.
55. For a description of the decision process, see Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 11-12
56. and Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 187. Consideration of the issue began on 10 August 1945, immediately following Japan's first intimations that it would consider surrender. General George Lincoln chose the 38th parallel, Colonels Charles Bonesteel and Dean Rusk confirmed its suitability, and the proposal was submitted to General George MacArthur for inclusion in his General Order no. 1, which outlined the process and terms of surrender. The choice of the 38th parallel was unfortunate for many reasons, not least of which was its historical importance. In 1904, hoping to avoid a military confrontation with Russia over control of the Korean Peninsula, Japan proposed carving the nation into two spheres of in.uence along the 38th parallel. Russia refused, the Russo-JapaneseWar ensued, and Japan won complete control over Korea. Rusk later noted that if he had known of the earlier proposal, he would have argued for a different line of demarcation.
57. See Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 6.
58. Soon Sung Cho, "American Policy toward Korean Uni.cation, 1945-1980," in U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982, IFES Research Series, no. 17, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak et al. (Seoul, 1982), 66.
59. "The Cairo Declaration," in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents, 1943-1953 (Washington, DC, 1953) (hereafter Documents), 1.
60. "U.S.S.R. Declaration of War against Japan," in Documents, 1. General Douglas Mac- Arthur's General Order no. 1, issued in Yokohama, Japan on 7 September 1945, was the initial document determining the governance of postwar Korea, but outlined only the U.S. authority on the peninsula. General Order no. 1 stated: "All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38° north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my [MacArthur's] authority."
61. See "Establishment of Boundary at the 38th Parallel," in Documents 2-3.
62. "The Moscow Agreement," in Documents, 4. China's role in the administration of postwar Korea changed dramatically, of course, with the Communist victory in that nation's civil war in 1949. After that point, China allied itself with the Soviet Union, and the ColdWar tensions in the region were increased signi.cantly.
63. Scholars have debated the origins of the war. Bruce Cumings has argued that it was initially a civil war, and only later became part of the larger ColdWar once the Chinese, Soviets, and Americans deployed troops to the peninsula in support of their respective Korean allies. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1. Cumings reinforced this argument in his general history of Korea, Korea's Place in the Sun, 238 ff. Others, like William Stueck and Don Oberdorfer, have suggested that the war had both internal and external origins, neither of which can be separated from the other. According to Stueck, the war "cannot be understood without heavy reference to nations and forces beyond the peninsula." Certainly, the fighting was initially between Koreans, and the war "contained an important civil dimension," but its origins "can only be explained through the interaction of Korean and non-Korean elements and through decisions made in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, as well as in Pyongyang and Seoul." Stueck further argued that although the Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel were "intensely" nationalist, "their fate was so closely tied to the designs of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China that their ability to act independently was severely circumscribed."
64. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 66.
65. See also Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 8-11.
66. Allan Millett bridges these two approaches, suggesting that partisan conflict beginning in 1948 was the actual start to the war, but that these internal con.icts were shaped by international agendas. See Allan Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS, 2005).
67. I characterize the Cold War here as a con.ict between political and economic systems generally, recognizing that there are vast differences among the nations involved. Often, the democratic capitalist states (the United States and Great Britain in particular) supported anti-Communist totalitarian regimes which were neither democratic nor capitalist themselves, but were nonetheless considered part of the "Free World." For a concise history of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A History (New York, 2005).
68. Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York, 2004), 15-28. Cumings suggests that the use of napalm in Korea exceeded that in Vietnam a dozen years later, and that it had greater destructive effect, particularly because of the larger and more concentrated population of North Korea than North Vietnam (ibid., 16).
69. During a visit to Kaesong in 1987, historian Bruce Cumings reflected, "I strolled through the streets of Kaesong in the early morning hours and finally came to a spot where I could gaze upon Mount Song-ak in its fullness: And there on its face were forty-year-old pockmarks, still easily visible, made by the pounding of southern artillery." Kaesong (Gaesong), which sits along the 38th parallel just north of the DMZ, was the capital of the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392), from which theWesternized name for the nation is derived. Korea's Place in the Sun, 237.
70. Cumings, North Korea, 6.
71. Johan Galtung, "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States, and In-Between: The Case of Korea," Journal of Peace Research 9, no. 4 (1972): 347.
72. John Lie suggests that the primary reason Kim succeeded in gaining popular support for his policies in the North (apart from being a revolutionary hero who fought vigorously against the Japanese occupation) was his immediate implementation of land reform. This was an extremely important issue because Korean peasants had been under the thumbs of the yangban landlords for centuries. Conversely, the South Korean government, heavily influenced by the United States, initially opposed any kind of land reform, making for a difficult transition. See John Lie, Han Unbound, 9.
73. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development: A Comparative Study of Principles and Strategies of Capitalist and Communist Third World Development (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 1992), 2. Kim notes that such development is effective only in the short term, when it "can be achieved by expanded utilization of natural resources and unemployed labor," and tends to fall behind in the long term because "productivity must be raised through more advanced technology" and because such rapid changes tend to exhaust motivation (ibid., 3).
74. Ibid., 148. Other incentives were "mass movements, moral exhortations, and political campaigns" (ibid.).
75. Ibid., 127.
76. Ibid., 148. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim noted earlier in his book that the Chollima Movement was responsible for impressive industrial growth in the 1950s and 1960s, supporting "41.7 and 36.6 percent during the Three-Year and Five-Year Plans, respectively" (p. 121).
77. Ibid., 77. Significant resources for iron, steel, zinc, and copper production also support North Korea's heavy industry, the majority of which is fueled by coal-.red power stations.
78. Ibid., 140.
79. Cumings points to published CIA data indicating that the South Korean economy only caught up to the North Korean one in 1978. Cumings, North Korea, 185. This is also evident in John Lie's assessment of the two nations' economic growth in the same period.
80. See Lie, Han Unbound. Both sources state that the South's real economic boom occurred in the 1980s, and at that time overshot the North's capability to catch up.
81. Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington, DC, 2001), 13-14.
82. This has long been a problem for researchers. See Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, DC, 1993), 55.
83. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "State of the Environment: DPR Korea, 2003" (Klong Luang, Thailand, 2003), 23. The report is available from http://www.rrcap.unep.org/reports/soe/ dprksoe.cfm (accessed 10 January 2006).
84. Ibid., 23-24. The report points to this particular incident as the beginning of its "reforestation policy": "Since the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung planted trees on the Moonsu Hill in Pyongyang City on 6 April 1947 in order to publicize the need for reforestation throughout the country, many efforts have been undertaken for afforestation/reforestation each year in DPR Korea" (p. 23).
85. Ibid., 58.
86. Ibid., 65.
87. Ibid., 58.
88. Perhaps the best indication that Kim's Cold War-era development schemes are to blame is to look at its closest neighbor, geographically and ideologically: The People's Republic of China. Judith Shapiro ably demonstrated the problems Mao's Communist policies had for China's environment in Mao's War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (New York, 2001).
89. The Soviet Union also had tremendous environmental problems, as described in Douglas R.Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh, 2000)
90. and Douglas R. Wiener, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, 1999).
91. Lie, Han Unbound, 166. This becomes especially true when Ronald Reagan is elected president in 1980, the same year Park is assassinated and Chun Doo Wan assumes power in South Korea. "Instead of continuing Carter's stress on human rights, Reagan pursued a single-minded anticommunist policy that tolerated repressive but friendly regimes."
92. Lie, Han Unbound, 122.
93. Norman Eder, Poisoned Prosperity: Development, Modernization and the Environment in South Korea (Armonk, NY and London, 1996), 5.
94. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 209-10.
95. Lie, Han Unbound, 4-18; quotation from p. 11.
96. Ibid., 16.
97. Ibid., 60.
98. This summary of Korea's economic rise is adapted from Lie, "Muddling toward a Take-Off," in Han Unbound, 43-74.
99. According to the official website of the Office of the President, the South Korean government instituted a nationwide program on erosion control and reforestation in 1962. CheongWa Dae (Office of the President), "Natural Environment: Forests and Farmlands," 2. (Page no longer available; copy in author's collection. See note 25.)
100. Lie, Han Unbound, 162.
101. CheongWa Dae, "Environment: Overview," 1 http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/korea/Korea_03_5.html?m_def= 5&ss_def=3 (last accessed 18 November 2005). Page no longer available; copy in author's collection (see note 25).
102. Lee Hongkyun, "Environmental Awareness and Environmental Practice in Korea," Korea Journal 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 182.
103. Cho Myung-Rae, "Emergence and Evolution of Environmental Discourses in South Korea," Korea Journal 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 143.
104. Yohei Harashima, "Effects of Economic Growth on Environmental Policies in Northeast Asia," Environment 42 (July-August 2000): 32.
105. Ibid.
106. The so-called Onsan disease had similar symptoms to Minimata disease, which had developed in Japan three decades earlier. Several articles discuss Onsan disease as a case study or as a pivotal moment in the development of South Korean environmentalism. See Xuemei Bai and Hidefumi Imura, "A Comparative Study of Urban Environment in East Asia: Stage Model of Urban Environmental Evolution," International Review for Environmental Strategies 1, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 135-58
107. Moon Chung-in and Lim Sung-hack, "Weaving through Paradoxes: Democratization, Globalization, and Environment Politics in South Korea," East Asian Review 15, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 43-70
108. Harashima, "Effects of Economic Growth on Environmental Policies"
109. and Ku Do-Wan, "The Korean Environmental Movement: Green Politics through Social Movement," Korea Journal 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 185-219.
110. For a scientific analysis of the disease, see Chul-Hwan Koh et al., "Analysis of Trace Organic Contaminants in Sediment, Pore Water, and Water Samples from Onsan Bay, Korea: Instrumental Analysis and In Vitro Gene Expression Assay," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 21, no. 9 (2002): 1796-1803.
111. CheongWa Dae, "Environment: Overview," 1; http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/korea/Korea_03_5.html?m_def= 5&ss_def=3 (last accessed 18 November 2005). (Page no longer available; copy in author's collection. See note 25.)
112. On the relationship between democratization and environmentalism in Korea, see Ku, "The Korean Environmental Movement."
113. Cho, "Emergence and Evolution of Environmental Discourses in South Korea," 144.
114. Cho's article is one of several that Korea Journal included in its autumn issue (vol. 44, no. 3, 2004), which was in part dedicated to studies of the development of environmentalism in South Korea.
115. See Cho, "Emergence and Evolution of Environmental Discourses in South Korea," 138-64
116. Lee, "Environmental Awareness and Environmental Practice in Korea," 165-84
117. Ku, "The Korean Environmental Movement"
118. and Moon Tae Hoon, "Environmental Policy and Green Government in Korea," 220-51. Ku Do-Wan generally agreed with the trajectory of environmentalism in Korea described by Cho, but suggested that it can be better explained through the process of democratization, rather than through simple deterioration of the natural environment, as Cho suggested. Cheong Wa Dae agreed with this interpretation, noting that in the 1980s the South Korean government initiated numerous laws protecting the environment.
119. See Cheong Wa Dae, "Environment: Overview,"
120. and Lie, Han Unbound, 163.
121. Harashima, "Effects of Economic Growth on Environmental Policies," 32.
122. Just as in the United States and Europe, the rise of an environmental movement in South Korea was a direct response to local problems and the consequences of development. Although environmentalists in South Korea were certainly aware of a growing environmental ethos and movement elsewhere, it was not until the 1990s that many such organizations turned from local, anti-pollution platforms to broader-based, "global" issues. See Ku, "The Korean Environmental Movement."
123. See also Moon and Lim, "Weaving through Paradoxes."
124. DMZ Forum, 2002 Newsletter; available from http://www.dmzforum.org/ news_events/2002_06.php (accessed 30 March 2007).
125. Ibid.
126. Drohan, "Sustainably Developing the DMZ."
127. For more on the DMZ issue, see "Maintaining No Man's Land"
128. O'Neill, "Korea's Dangerous Divide"
129. and "Korean DMZ's Environmental Treasures Need Protection," International Custom Wire, 13 January 2004.
130. For a brief history of the DMZ shadow war, see William Roskey, "The Second Korean Conflict," Military History 16 (October 1999): 38-44. There have been over seven hundred armed engagements, large and small, along and in the DMZ since the 1953 armistice. There is always the threat, although it is much escalated now with North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.
131. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 186.
132. DMZ Forum, "The DMZ: Description and History." Available from http://www.dmzforum.org. Don Oberdorfer lists the following as the estimated casualties for the war: 900,000 Chinese, 520,000 North Korean, 400,000 United Nations Command casualties, killed and wounded, and 36,000 U.S. deaths. This accounts only for military casualties; civilian casualties are notoriously dif.cult to ascertain, but the estimates are about three million, both sides, killed, wounded, or missing. An additional five million became refugees.
133. See Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 9-10.
134. DMZ Forum, "Description and History."
135. Kwi-Gon Kim and Dong-Gil Cho, "Status and Ecological Resource Value of the Republic of Korea's De-Militarized Zone," Landscape and Ecological Engineering 1 (2005): 3.
136. Hiroyoshi Higuchi et al., "Satellite Tracking of White-Naped CraneMigration and the Importance of the Korean Demilitarized Zone," Conservation Biology 10 (June 1996): 809-10. The natural marshlands in and near the DMZ and the agricultural areas in the CCZ served as the primary habitat and feeding grounds for the migrating cranes.
137. Ibid., 806. Nine of the fifteen cranes tracked over a three-year period used the DMZ as a long-term (more than ten days) stopover site each year, with five of them spending over half their migration period in the DMZ.
138. Ibid., 810. The "Team Spirit" maneuvers were designed as defensive and "show-offorce" actions intended to deter North Korean aggressions across the DMZ. They were conducted annually for eighteen years until they were suspended in hopes of encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and engage in talks. Although Team Spirit continued to be scheduled through 1996, the last one was conducted in 1993.
139. Ibid., 810. Construction on the road was not completed until 2003, after a decade of heightened tensions. Both a highway and a railroad now exist at this point between the two Koreas. Whereas South Koreans take advantage of them, few North Koreans go south on the road.
140. See Tom O'Neill, "Due North: A Brief Visit above the DMZ," National Geographic (July 2003): 22
141. and James Brooke, "Crossing the Line to Korean Détente," International Herald Tribune, 24 October 2005; available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/24/news/dmz.php (accessed 4 May 2007).
142. Kun H. John, Yeo C. Youn, and Joon H. Shin, "Resolving Conflicting Ecolocial and Economic Interest in the Korean DMZ: A Valuation Based Approach," Ecological Economics 46 (August 2003): 174.
143. Ibid., 174.
144. Ibid., 175.
145. Ibid., 175. In 2004 the National Tourism Organization in South Korea proposed an ecotourism center in Cholwon, an area renowned for its bird life. Development associated with such a tourist destination has already begun.
146. See Onishi, "Does a Tiger Lurk."
147. Andrew Pollack, "At the DMZ, Another Invasion: Tourists," New York Times (late ed.), 10 April 1996, A10.
148. See also Colin Woodard, "DMZ Holiday," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54 (May-June 1998): 12-14
149. and Chester Dawson, "Popping up to the DMZ," Business Week, 27 October 2003, 136.
150. O'Neill, "Due North." O'Neill suggested that North Korea developed this ironic partnership in order to attract much-needed foreign currency.
151. Brooke, "Crossing the Line."
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid. Invest Korea is a South Korean government agency designed to promote foreign investment in the nation.
154. Kwi-Gon Kim and Cho, "Status and Resource Value," 4.
155. DMZ Forum, "Description and History."
156. Ke Chung Kim and Wilson, "The Land that War Protected."
157. Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President), "Environment: Overview."
158. This position is supported by Kurkpatrick Dorsey's conclusions in his book The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era (Seattle, 1998), 239.
159. Cheong Wa Dae, "Environment: Policy Framework - International Cooperation" http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/korea/ Korea_03_5_b.html?m_def=5&ss_def=3 (last accessed 18 November 2005 and 16 January 2007). Page no longer available; copy in author's collection (see note 25).
160. Cheong Wa Dae, "Environment: Natural Environment - Human-Nature Symbiosis" http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/korea/ Korea_03_5_c.html?m_def=5&ss_def=3 (last accessed 18 November 2005 and 19 January 2007). Page no longer available; copy in author's collection (see note 25).
161. Onishi, "Does a Tiger Lurk." In 2006, the NASA Earth Observatory published a satellite image of the DMZ on its website. The article associated with the image indicated that although the official line still lists the Siberian tiger as extinct on the Korean Peninsula, "some wildlife watchers have found pug marks in the snow and trees scratched in a manner much like tigers marking territory. Local farmers have reported finding animals mauled by a large predator... The current unconfirmed estimate puts the southern population of tigers at perhaps ten animals." NASA Earth Observatory, "Korean Demilitarized Zone" available from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/NewImages/ images.php3?img_id=15362 (accessed 7 July 2006 and 16 January 2007).