Corruption, intermediary companies, and energy security: Lithuania's lessons for central and eastern Europe

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 16-28

  Balmaceda, Margarita M ^a,b  

^a SETON HALL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 49549122669     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216550402     Document Type: Review

References (82)

1. While several oil and oil-products intermediary companies have exercised political influence (e.g., Lithuania's Viazga), this article concentrates on gas companies. Because gas intermediaries usually deal with an ostensibly centralized Russian actor, Gazprom, they can be more directly tied into Russian foreign energy policy initiatives. In addition, the fact that oil and gas are very different types of goods with different transportation options, sunk costs, and levels of fungibility affects the structure and access points of profits and "rents of energy dependency" that can be accrued through each of them, which also affects the functioning of intermediary companies dealing with each. Moreover, although neither oil nor gas pipelines can be built and left empty, it may be technically more difficult to have a stand-by, "emergency-use only" gas pipeline than an oil one. On the differences between oil and gas and their effects on rent-seeking, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia's Power, Oligarch's Profits, and Ukraine's Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006 (New York: Routledge, 2008), especially chap. 9. However, this does not mean that these companies are totally independent of Gazprom.
2. For the sake of parsimony, I have thrown together domestic gas distribution companies with intermediary functions (e.g., Ukraine's United Energy Systems in the mid-1990s), gas trade companies with access to "their own" gas resources in Russia (Itera until 2001), as well as intermediary companies dealing with a single supplier (Lithuania's Dujotekana) or multiple suppliers (RosUkrEnergo in Ukraine since 2006).
3. In May 2007, in what was seen as a major setback for the Nabucco project, an agreement was reached to build a new pipeline bringing Central Asian gas to Western Europe via Russia.
4. As stated by Vladimir Socor: "Gazprom seeks to stop the Nabucco project at both ends." Vladimir Socor, "Hungary and the Nabucco Project: Time to End the Ambiguity," Eurasia Daily Monitor (January 16, 2007), www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id= 3974&article_id=2371807. The 2008 news about OMV selling Gazprom 50 percent of the Baumgarten gas terminal and storage facility at the pipeline's expected end-point made many observers wary.
5. Gazprom agreed to raise the price to $110 per 1,000 cm, instead of a much higher price.
6. See Reinhard Veser, "Armenische Abhängigkeiten" (Armenian Dependencies), Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung (April 11, 2006): 7.
7. See Vladimir Socor, "Russia Cements Control of Armenia's Energy System," Eurasia Daily Monitor (November 3, 2006), http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371612.
8. Geographical diversification by itself is of little use in the absence of supplier diversification. On intermediary companies and Central Asian supplies to Ukraine, see Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics, and Corruption, chap. 8.
9. For a 2008 perspective on the role of Ukrainian gas intermediaries in the broader network of Gazprom-related intermediary companies in Europe, see Roman Kupchinsky, "RosUkrEnergo and Its Place in the Ukraine-Russia Gas Trade, 2006-2008";
10. for a theoretical perspective, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Transition, Weak Institutions, and Intermediary Companies: Filling Gaps, Filling Pockets";
11. for an analysis of the factors hindering Ukraine's ability to eliminate intermediary companies from its gas imports operations, see Alla Yeromenko, "Plus ça change . . . : Continuity or Change in Intermediary Company Schemes?" (papers presented at the conference "Reassessing Post-Soviet Energy Politics: Ukraine, Russia, and the Battle for Gas, from Central Asia to the European Union," Harvard University, March 7-8, 2008), available at www.huri.harvard.edu/na/2008_03_07-08_energy_conf.html.
12. Although recent declarations by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine signal that progress is being made in the effort to extend the pipeline to Płock (Poland) and restore the flow to its original direction, carrying Caspian oil to Ukraine and beyond, such political declarations have often remained unfulfilled in the past.
13. In 2001, the amount transited was 0.52 bcm, increasing to 0.64 in 2005; and an estimated 1.21 bcm in 2008. The 2008 estimate is based on information in a Gazprom press release of February 5, 2008, available at www.rustocks.com/ index.phtml/Pressreleases/0/8/13738 (accessed June 20, 2008). See also Tomas Janeliunas and Arunas Molis, "Energy Security of Lithuania: Challenges and Perspectives," Research Journal of International Studies, no. 5 (May 2006): 22.
14. However, there are signs that the project may still make a comeback. In February 2008 the German company RWE joined the Nabucco consortium, throwing its weight and influence behind the project.
15. In September 2007 Hungarian prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsany gave an explicit endorsement to the Nabucco project that seemed to contradict earlier comments that Nabucco was an unrealistic "long dream" due to the lack of financial backing. See Judy Dempsey, "Hungary Chooses Gazprom over EU," International Herald Tribune (March 12, 2007).
16. Whether these are best conceptualized as "private" or "personal" interests within the corporation is a matter of debate. I thank Vitaly Merkushev for this observation.
17. The best-known case is Itera, which may have been linked with top Gazprom managers in the mid- and late 1990s. Igor Maskalevich, "Minus 'Iterizatsia' vsei strany" (Minus the 'Iterization' of the Whole Country), Zerkalo Nedeli 2000 No. 21 (446), June 7, 2003, p. 9,
18. and Roman Olearchyk, "Gazprom, Naftogaz Ukrainy Replace Itera with New Firm," Kyiv Post (March 6, 2003): 1.
19. Best exemplified by the 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the subsequent destruction of his Yukos empire, and transfer of many of its assets to majority state-owned companies, including Gazprom.
20. By Russia's de facto energy policy I mean the totality of energy-policy-relevant actions affecting other states, regardless of whether or not part of official state policy.
21. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Some Thoughts on Rents of Energy Dependency, 'Rent-seeking Swamps,' and Political Development: The Ukrainian Case in Comparative Perspective" (paper circulated for discussion at the Workshop on Post-Communist Politics and Economics, Harvard University, March 13, 2006), www.fas.harvard.edu/%7Epostcomm/ papers/2005-06/Balmaceda.pdf.
22. We now also know that the Itera-Gazprom relationship was very complex and by no means transparent.
23. Oleksandr Ivchenko (head of NAK Naftohaz Ukraini in 2005), cited in Oksana Liven, "Kreditnaia dobycha" (Credit Catch), Ėnergobiznes, September 19, 2005, accessed through the ISI Emerging Markets portal, www.securities. com (hereafter "via ISI").
24. For an exhaustive report on this issue as reflected in the Ukrainian-Turkmenistan gas trade, see Global Witness, "It's a Gas - Funny Business in Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade" (April 2006), www.globalwitness.org/ media_library_detail.php/479/en/its_a_gas.
25. In addition to the possibility of private interests, other factors hindering a total break with RosUkrEnergo in March 2008 were Gazprom's unwillingness to let go of the company, as well as the fact that RosUkrEnergo continues to hold long-term gas export contracts with Gazprom. See also Roman Olarchyk, "Ukraine Premier Fails to Oust Gas Group," Financial Times (April 11, 2008).
26. For example, former Ukrainian prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko allegedly misused his office for the benefit of his own gas distribution company. See Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics, and Corruption, chap. 4. In August 2006, a U.S. court sentenced Lazarenko to nine years in prison and fined him $10 million for money laundering, wire fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen goods.
27. If in 2003 gazotreidery sold 10-15 percent of all the gas sold in Ukraine, in 2004-2005 their share had been reduced to less than 2 percent. See Alla Yeromenko, "Buvaie i take. Ta i tse-ne bida" (This Is True, But It Doesn't Matter), Dzerkalo tyzhnia, no. 10 (March 18-24, 2006), www.zn.kiev.ua/nn/show/589/52897.
28. See Vladimir Milov, "Russian Energy Policy in a Broader Context" (paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, March 16, 2006), available at www.energypolicy.ru/files/Marchl6-2006.ppt.
29. See also Konstantin Simonov, Russkaia neft: poslednii peredel (Russian Oil: The Last Repartition) (Moscow: Eksmo, Algoritm, 2005).
30. The actual meaning of "good business" depends on the markets involved. In the case of Lithuania, for example, although the country's relatively small gas trade volumes do not produce significant rents for Gazprom as a corporation, they provide significant benefits to particular groups or individuals.
31. Lithuania's VSD has some of the same functions as the CIA and the National Security Council, combined, perhaps, with some performed by the FBI. While this structure is not unusual for small countries, the VSD is not a "classic" intelligence agency because, so far as is known, it does not engage in covert operations. There is a separate military intelligence service that is much more narrow in scope (author interview with Thomas Klepsys, Vilnius, April 13, 2007).
32. A small note of caution concerning these materials should be raised, however. Despite the great public interest, the approximately 180 pages of testimony published in March 2007, followed by another 400 pages in April 2007, are only a fraction of the 1,500-page total, and many names have been removed. It is also not clear why these testimonies - and not others - were chosen for publication, and whether they are representative of the whole file. The first set of transcripts made public is mainly made up of transcriptions of testimony by VSD employees. The second set contains declarations by VSD head Arvydas Pocius, his deputies Darius Jurgelevicius, Dainius Dabasinskas, and Andrius Tekorius, former VSD director Mecys Laurinkus, relatives of Vitautas Pociunas, other former and current VSD personnel, and Conservative Party Seimas MPs Jurgis Razma and Andrius Kubilius. See Jurga Tvaskiene and Stasys Gudavicius, "Kaunas Found Itself in Scope of Interest," translated in "Lithuania Declassifies 400 Pages of State Security Materials," BBC Monitoring Lithuania (via ISI, May 21, 2007). In the summer of 2007, Dujotekana challenged the declassification of these materials in court.
33. A previous investigation of the death by the Belarusian police found that Pociunas was drunk when he fell from the window; the Lithuanian official investigation, released on December 1,2006, says that he died as a result of an accident and does not mention foul play ("Seim Litvy kopaet pod shefa gosbezopasnosti" [Lithuania's Sejm Is Digging Under the Head of the State Security Service]), Kommersant, www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=727433.
34. Reinhard Veser, "Brüchige Gleise" (Crumbling Tracks), Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung (August 23, 2006).
35. On Mazeiku Nafta's first and second privatizations in 1999-2002, see Terry D. Clark and Keştutis Paulaskas, "When Oil and Politics Mix: The Privatization of Lithuania's Oil Industry," Russia and Eurasia Review 1, no. 11 (December 3, 2002), www.jamestown.org.
36. After the original accident, contradictory Russian assessments of Druzhba continued. While some news from Moscow said that oil supplies would be resumed shortly, other reports said that Russia might build a new pipeline to Primorsk, thus cutting by half the amount oil transited through Belarus to Lithuania. Soon afterwards, it was announced by the Russian organization in charge that defects had been found in 95 percent of the Druzhba pipeline, diminishing hopes that it would ever be fully restored. In May 2007, at the same time as Lithuania was vetoing a new EU-Russia agreement, Valerii Yazev, head of the Duma's Committee on Energy, Transport, and Communications, repeated that it would take one to two years to repair the pipeline, and that "of course, the economic sense of repairing the pipeline in not clear." See Baltic Business News, (April 13, 2007) (via ISI); also www.alfa.lt (April 16, 2007); "Goodbye to 'Druzhba,' " BNS (April 25, 2007) (via ISI, April 25, 2007), and "Na remont uchastka truboprovoda 'Druzhba' v napravlenii Litvy mozhet potrebovatsia 1-2 goda" (Repairs on the Lithuanian-Bound Segment of the Druzhba Pipeline May Take One-Two Years), ELTA Lithuanian News Agency, May 17, 2007 (via ISI). A pattern seemed to be at work here: Russia establishing de facto economic sanctions without calling them as such, as in the boycott of Estonian goods in Russia, the closing of the Narva bridge for trucks, and the computer hacker attacks on Estonian government Web sites in May 2007 in response to the war memorial issue. On Lithuania's energy security situation, see Zeyno Baran, "Lithuanian Energy Security: Prospects and Choices" (Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 2006).
37. "Seim Litvy kopaet pod shefa gosbezopasnosti" (Lithuania's Sejm Is Digging Under the Head of the State Security Service).
38. Parliamentary Investigation into VSD (Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto atlikto, Valstybės saugumo departamento veiklos parlamentinio tyrimo), "Witnesses VSD officer: Extract from the 15th Session Stenograph," available at www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/130571 (trans. Tomas Klepsys).
39. BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, "Lithuanian Daily: TS Taking Money from Gazprom Intermediary While Attacking It," translation of report in Lietuvos Rytas (November 15, 2007) (via ISI).
40. See declarations of Deputy Prosecutor General Gintaras Jasaitis in Kauno Diena, June 29, 2007, cited in Raimundas Celencevicius and Lauryna Vireliunaite: "Prosecutors Did Not Even Consider the Version of Pociunas's Death That Is Becoming the Most Important Version," Kauno Diena, June 30, 2007, translated in BBC Monitoring (Lithuania), June 30, 2007 (via ISI).
41. Zhanna Skripova, "Stranam Baku smeniat postavshchika gaza" (They Will Change the Gas Supplier for the Baltic States), Biznes i Baltia, October 31, 2001 (via East View Universal Databases CIS and Baltic Periodicals (EVUD CISBP).
42. Zhanna Skripova, "V Litve 'zachistili' detei Rema Viakhireva" (In Lithuania They 'Cleared out' Rem Vyakhirev's Children), Biznes i Baltia, December 3, 2001 (via EVUD CISBP), referring to report in Lietuvos Rytas, no date.
43. See Commentary by Valdas Vasiliauskas, "New Politics Mark 2," translated in "Lithuanian Commentary Sees Gazprom Interests Dividing the Country," BBC Monitoring (via ISI).
44. See Vasiliauskas, "New Politics Mark 2."
45. Galina Molochkova, "Zapakhlo gazom. Tseny na gaz v Latvii mogut vyrasti" (It Smelled Like Gas. Gas Prices in Lithuania May Go Up), Biznes i Baltia (June 14, 2000) (via EVUD CISBP).
46. Gazprom did not transfer all of its Lithuania-related gas contracts to Dujotekana, just the ones that had until then been shared by four or five intermediary companies.
47. "Gazprom poboretsia za Lietuvos dujos" (Gazprom Fights for Lietuvos Dujos), Kommersant, October 24, 2002 (via ISI).
48. See Vasiliauskas, "New Politics Mark 2."
49. This was also the beginning of a five-year confrontation between Uspaskich and Gazprom-Dujotekana, which ended with the leak of corruption evidence against Uspaskich, the order for his arrest, and his flight to his native Russia.
50. The difference in markups between Lietuvos Dujos and Dujotekana peaked in 2004, when gas sold by Dujotekana, not subject to any limit, had a markup of 32 percent, whereas Lituvos Dujos was limited by law to 15 percent. Dujotekana's markup was reduced to 20 percent in 2005 and 17 percent in 2006. See Verslo Zinios, article name not stated, January 22, 2007, translated in "Lithuanian Daily Criticizes Seimas for Indecision on Natural Gas Act Amendment," BBC Monitoring, January 22, 2007 (via ISI).
51. See "Gas Market Regulations Drive a Wedge into Govn't," news2biz LITHUANIA, February 16, 2005 (via ISI)
52. and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefing, "Lithuania Politics: See-saw Politics," May 13, 2005 (via ISI).
53. Roman Kupchinsky, "The Unexpected Guest: RosUkrEnergo" (paper presented at the conference on "The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Crisis and Its Fallout: Domestic and International Implications," Harvard University, February 5-6, 2006, available at www.huri.harvard.edu/newsannals/newsannals. gas_conf_2006.html). In the case of Lithuania, some central actors, such as Rimandas Stonys, were retained, with their responsibilities increased.
54. One of Gazprom's (unsuccessful) strategies for gaining increased control of the company during privatization was to try to combine the percentage of shares originally allowed for a supplier company (25 percent) with an additional percentage of shares controlled by de jure "Lithuanian capital" (25 percent). de facto meaning Gazprom-controlled Dujotekana. This strategy would have allowed Gazprom to de facto control 50 percent of Lietuvos Dujos's shares, but it was thwarted by changes in the privatization legislation that eliminated a separate quota for domestic investors and limited the percentage of shares a supplier could have to 34 percent. For example, see Vladimir Skripov and Aleksei Grivach, "Litovskii gazovyi put: 'Gazprom' i Vilnius zhdut ustupok drug ot druga" (Gazprom and Vilnius Are Waiting for Mutual Concessions), Vremia Novostei (August 8, 2002).
55. Vasiliauskas, "New Politics Mark 2."
56. Daniel Treisman has referred to this process as the "rise of the Silovarchs." See Daniel Treisman, "Putin's Silovarchs," Orbis 51, no. 1 (winter 2007): 141-53.
57. On the argument that Yakunin was tied to Dujotekana, see "Lithuanian Gazprom Intermediary Head: Other Companies 'More Dependent' on Russia," Lietuvos Rytas (November 13, 2006), translated in BBC Monitoring (November 13, 2006) (via ISI).
58. See interview with Rimandas Stonys, where the moderator referred to such versions. TV show Savaite, LTV, no date given, reported by Lietuvos Rytas Internet version November 13, 2006, translated by BBC Monitoring, November 13, 2006 (via ISI). In this interview Stanys conceded that Vojeika had indeed worked for the KGB, but said he no longer owned 49 percent of the company's shares or was the largest shareholder.
59. When asked, Dujotekana head Stanys refused to answer, arguing business confidentiality. See interview with Rimandas Stonys, TV show Savaite. By mid-2002, Dujotekana was owned, in addition to majority-holder Gazprom, by the Industrial Finance Corporation of Western Lithuania, controlled by Antanas Bosas and Rimantas Stonys. See "Gazprom, Dujotekana Submit Bid in Lietuvos Dujos Tender," New Europe (July 21, 2002) (via ISI).
60. As noted by Tomas Klepsys, the evidence currently available does not support assertions of corruption payments to Lithuanian actors. Rather, legal contributions to Lithuanian NGOs were often used to channel Dujotekana's influence, and information collected on various players was used to influence them. See Tomas Klepsys, unpublished note, August 22, 2007, pp. 2, 4.
61. Parliamentary Investigation into VSD (Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto atlikto, Valstybės saugumo departamento veiklos parlamentinio tyrimo), "Witnesses VSD Officer: Extract from the 15th Session Stenograph," www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/130571 (trans. Tomas Klepsys).
62. On the connections between Stonys and Januška, see Parliamentary Investigation into VSD (Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto atlikto, Valstybes saugumo departamento veiklos parlamentinio tyrimo), "Witness Former VSD Officer: Extract from the 8th Session Stenograph," www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/130567 (trans. Tomas Klepsys). The former VSD officer is widely presumed to be Raimundas Burkovskis.
63. See Parliamentary Investigation into VSD (Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto atlikto, Valstybės saugumo departamento veiklos parlamentinio tyrimo), "Extract from 11th Session Stenograph," www.lrt.lt/news.php? strid=5082&id=3687465 (trans. Tomas Klepsys).
64. On corruption under Paksas, see Terry D. Clark and Egle Verseckaite, "PaksasGate: Lithuania Impeaches a President," Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 16-24.
65. Through, for example, the indefinite suspension of oil shipments through the Druzhba pipeline since July 2006.
66. Unattributed editorial, "Up to Our Ears in Democracy," Verslo Zinios (March 22, 2007),
67. translated in "Lithuanian Daily Says State Security Scandal 'Disgrace' for Country," BBC Monitoring, March 22, 2007 (via ISI). One example would be the second-level but crucial energy policy positions at the Ministry of Economics that, according to some of those testifying in the VSD investigation, came under Dujotekana's control.
68. See Parliamentary Investigation into VSD (Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto atlikto, Valstybes saugumo departamento veiklos parlamentinio tyrimo), "Witnesses VSD officer: Extract from the 15th Session Stenograph." www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/130571 (trans. Tomas Klepsys).
69. Darius Kuolis (director, Civil Society Institute), "Moving Towards Putin-Style Governance," Verslo Zinios (April 6, 2007),
70. translated in "Lithuania Moving Towards 'Putin-style Governance, - Pundit," BBC Monitoring, April 6, 2007 (via ISI).
71. Margarita M. Balmaceda, "State, Corporate and Private Interests in Russian-Belarusian and Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations: What Have We Learned from the January 2006 Ukrainian-Russian Crisis?" in The Future of Energy Security, ed. Leszek Jesien (Krakow: Tischner European University, 2006), p. 150.
72. The 2005 Ukrainian figure is based on imports of 37 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan at $44 per 1,000 cm and 30 bcm of Russian gas at $50 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2005. Data from Ferdinand Pavel, German Institute for Economic Research, "The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Agreement: Analysis and Alternatives" (paper presented at the conference on "The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Crisis and Its Aftermath: Economic, Political and International Ramifications," Harvard University, February 5-6, 2006), streaming video available at www.huri.harvard.edu/na/na_gas_conf_2006.html. The Lithuanian figure is based on imports of 2.916 bcm of gas from Russia at $85 per 1,000 cm. in 2005.
73. See CIA World Factbook for volumes (www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2182.html),
74. and Tatiana Manenok. "Nam i mirovaya tsena na gaz nipochem?" (What Does the World Gas Price Matter to Us?), Belarusskii Rynok (August 1, 2005) for prices.
75. Although Lithuania's relatively small gas market cannot produce significant rents for Gazprom as a corporation, activity in this market can provide significant rents and benefits to particular groups or individuals, as well as produce a continuous amount of income that could be used to influence local politicians. Thus, as stated by Lithuanian commentator Stasiukynas, Dujotekana "was established in order to make money and to use it [emphasis added]" (Gediminas Stanisauskas, "In the Mud of Secret Interests," Kauno Diena [September 18, 2006], translated by BBC Monitoring Europe: Political [September 20, 2007], http://web.lexis-nexis.com. ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m=f95e4750432c00b5e200bda1bba3fb37&
76. See comments by Paul D'Anieri and Margarita M. Balmaceda (Conference on "The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Crisis and its Fallout: Domestic and International Implications," Harvard University, February 5-6, 2006).
77. Although Rada investigations took place in 1997 and 2006, either they were not fully carried out or their results not made public.
78. Russian "state" interests in Lithuania may include the geopolitical goal of controlling port infrastructure in the Baltics.
79. These "private" interests may include the attempt to control some or all gas imports to Lithuania in the pursuit of individual profit.
80. Such differences have recently become obvious through the open discussion in these states of their new national energy infrastructure projects, which cast into doubt their real commitment to building a joint Lithuanian-Latvian- Estonian-Polish nuclear power plant, as announced in 2006. On these policy differences, see Mart Laar, "Baltic Countries Need More Cooperation on Energy," Baltic Times (March 19, 2008) (via ISI).
81. See Vladimir Skripov, "Kupi rynok" (Buy the Market), Ekspert Severo-Zapad (February 2, 2004) (via ISI).
82. See Andrei Konoplyanik, "Russia-Ukraine Gas Trade: From Political to Market-Based Pricing and Prices" (paper presented at the conference "Reassessing Post-Soviet Energy Politics: Ukraine, Russia, and the Battle for Gas, from Central Asia to the European Union," Harvard University, March 7-8, 2008), available in streaming video at www.huri.harvard.edu/na/ 2008_03_07-08_energy_conf.html.