Enhancements, easy shortcuts, and the richness of human activities

Bioethics

Volumn 22, Issue 7, 2008, Pages 355-363

  Schermer, Maartje ^a  

^a ERASMUS MEDICAL CENTER   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Borgmann; Easy short cut; Enhancement; MacIntyre; Practices; Technology

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOTECHNOLOGY; ETHICS; HUMAN; HUMAN ACTIVITIES; HUMAN CHARACTERISTIC; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; METHODOLOGY; MORALITY; PERSONHOOD; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT;

BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT; BIOTECHNOLOGY; HUMAN ACTIVITIES; HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS; HUMANS; MORALS; PERSONHOOD;

EID: 49549112943     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00657.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. President's Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy. New York: Dana Press: 328.
2. M.J. Farah. Emerging Ethical Issues in Neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience 2002 5 : 1123 1129
3. A. Chatterjee. The Promise and Predicament of Cosmetic Neurology. J Med Ethics 2006 32 : 110 113
4. A. Chatterjee. Cosmetic Neurology. Neurology 2004 63 : 968 974
5. K. Dahlsgaard, M.E.P. Seligman C. Peterson. Shared Virtues: The Convergence of Valued Human Strengths Across Culture and History. Review of General Psychology 2005 9.
6. Perhaps with the exception of the President's Council's concern about loss of humanity - empathy, compassion, etcetera - when artificial mood enhancement would be a viable option.
7. I assume that the moral value of the virtues depends on their causal relationship to the good life: certain virtues greatly increase one's chances of leading a good and happy life. I am aware that one could argue against this position by insisting that virtues themselves are constitutive of the good life. That position, however, would require an explanation of why certain virtues are considered to be constitutive of the good life.
8. A society in which none of these virtues would be needed, and no effort or endurance would be needed to achieve anything, would indeed be post-human, and would require a totally revised post-human morality.
9. F. Fukuyama. 2002. Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the biotechnology revolution. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux: 66.
10. Moreover, not every social practice or tradition that gives meaning to pain or suffering needs to be accepted. Once we have the means to prevent it, for example, we do not need to accept pain in childbirth merely because the Bible tells us that: 'in pain you will bring forth children', or because 'that's how it has always been'.
11. J.M. Olsen. Depression, SSRIs, and the Supposed Obligation to Suffer Mentally. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2006 16 : 3.
12. See also President's Council op. cit. note 1.
13. C. Freedman. 1998. Aspirin for the Mind? Some Ethical Worries about Psychopharmacology. In: E. Parens, ed. Enhancing Human Traits. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.
14. President's Council op. cit. note 1: p. 293.
15. M.J. Mehlman. Cognition-Enhancing Drugs. Milbank Q. 2004 82 : 483 506
16. Schermer. On the argument that enhancement is 'cheating'. J Med Ethics 2008 85 88.
17. A. Borgman. 1984. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
18. A. Borgman. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Ibid: 219.
19. A. Borgman. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Ibid: 219.
20. A. Borgman. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Ibid: 208.
21. P.P. Verbeek. 2005. What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
22. Borgmann, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. op. cit. note 28, p. 209.
23. Borgmann, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. Ibid: 208.
24. Verbeek, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. op. cit. note 32.