Why do school district budget referenda fail?

Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 111-125

  Ehrenberg, Ronald G ^a,d,e   Ehrenberg, Randy A ^b,f   Smith, Christopher L ^c   Zhang, Liang ^a,e  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b North Colonie NY School District

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^d Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^e School of Industrial and Labor Relations   (United States)

^f N Colonie NY Ctrl School District   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget referenda; School district finance

Indexed keywords

EID: 4944238521     PISSN: 01623737     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3102/01623737026002111     Document Type: Review

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