Abstraction and refinement in protocol derivation

Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop

Volumn 17, Issue , 2004, Pages 30-45

  Datta, Anupam ^a   Derek, Ante ^a   Mitchell, John C ^a   Pavlovic, Dusko ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b KESTREL INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTION; INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE; PROTOCOL DERIVATION;

ABSTRACTING; CONSTRAINT THEORY; CRYPTOGRAPHY; FORMAL LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING; VARIATIONAL TECHNIQUES;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 4944226639     PISSN: 10636900     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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