The state as a foundation of private law reasoning

American Journal of Comparative Law

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 567-604

  Wendehorst, Christiane C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 49349103371     PISSN: 0002919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5131/ajcl.2007.0017     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (173)

1. Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 853-56 (2006). Michaels and Jansen point out quite rightly that the state also has a different role and meaning in the United States and in Germany, and probably still further roles and meanings in other Western countries, let alone in other legal traditions.
2. For the intrinsically dichotomic nature of "State" compare CHRISTOPH MÖLLERS, STAAT ALS ARGUMENT 424 (2000).
3. See Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1, at 846-53.
4. At least, the "classic" publications in the field are predicated on this aspect. Compare NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978),
5. and Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Foundation of Legal Reasoning, 12 RECHTSTHEORIE 133-58, 257-79, 423-48 (1981),
6. with ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, GRUNDLAGEN DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION (1983),
7. and ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION 17 (2d ed. 1991).
8. The comparative aspect of legal reasoning has remained largely underexposed by legal theory, though not by comparative law, at least as far as the comparative study of sources of law and legal method is concerned, compare in particular INTERPRETING STATUTES (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) and INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS (Neil MacCormick & Robert Summers eds., 1997). For an overview see Stefan Vogenauer, Sources of Law and Legal Method in Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 869, 889-96 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
9. A few authors have shed light on legislative argumentation, e.g. Manuel Atienza, Practical Reason and Legislation, RATIO IURIS 5 (3), 269-87 (1992);
10. Id., Reasoning and Legislation, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION. ESSAYS IN LEGISPRUDENCE 297-317 (Luc Wintgens ed., 2005) ;
11. A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana, Über die Begründungsfähigkeit der legislativen Argumentation, in VERFASSUNG UND ARGUMENTATION 129-42 (Jan-R. Sieckmann ed., 2005).
12. See Christiane Wendehorst, Von Arbeit im Recht, am Recht und über Recht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CLAUS- WILHELM CANARIS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 1403-22 (Andreas Heldrich, Jürgen Prölss & Ingo Koller eds., 2007), where, however, I identified only three of the four perspectives.
13. A model of four perspectives slightly different from my own has been presented by Aníbal D'Auria, Diskurse im Recht, in VERFASSUNG UND ARGUMENTATION 73-80 (Jan-R. Sieckmann ed., 2005), who distinguishes as contexts of legal reasoning (a) the production of norms, (b) the application of norms, (c) the verifying knowledge of norms and (d) assessing the suitability of persons for positions in the legal sphere.
14. This is probably the most controversial point of my theory, competing with more "fuzzy" forms of analysis like Aarnio, Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 4, at 423, ("a concept with a family resemblance, a sort of cluster of inter-related activities"); Jack M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 112 (1993), ("a network of overlapping and interconnected forms of legal understanding.")
15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88-90 (2d ed. 1994) ("internal point of view"); compare MacCormick, supra note 4, at 275-92,
16. with Norbert Hoerster, Zur Verteidigung des Rechtspositivismus, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 2480, 2481 (1986).
17. ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS 47-8, 51-136 (1992) ("Beobachterperspektive").
18. Generally speaking, it is precarious to use terms like "internal," "external," "normative" or "descriptive" because they are vague and have been overused. For example, the meaning ascribed to "internal" or "participant" ranges from taking part in a discourse over what is legal/illegal, ALEXY, supra note 10, at 47; to making an interpretative or evaluative statement, Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts, 116 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS (ZZP) 3, 8-9 (2003); to feeling and accepting the normative appeal of rules, HART, supra note 9, at 88-90; to knowing what law is like due to a shared cultural background, MACCORMICK, supra note 4, at 275-92;
19. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 2106-14, 2142-46 (1995). My own definition of "internal" is clearly discourse-related and thus most akin to the definition given by Alexy.
20. Cf. HART, supra note 9, at 90.
21. Cf. MACCORMICK, supra note 11; Ewald, supra note 11.
22. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 14 (1983).
23. This attitude towards the law is also, in my view, truly different from the internal and the external perspective: It is different from the attitude of the external observer because the actor himself is involved, possibly to an even higher degree than any of the others, and because he does not seek to find out "the truth." But it is also different from the internal perspective because the actor is not interested in the "right" interpretation of the law. By contrast, for Hart, the "honourable" individual takes the internal point of view, whereas only certain members of society who refuse to accept its rules take the predictive point of view, cf. HART, supra note 9, at 90. At this point, it once more becomes clear that I am talking about something other than what Hart has in mind.
24. ALEXY, supra note 4, at 269-71; THOMAS DROSDECK, DIE HERRSCHENDE MEINUNG - AUTORITÄT ALS RECHTSQUELLE 82 (1989).
25. For details see, for example, Robert Summers, Precedent in the United States (New York State), in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 355, 366 (Neil MacCormick & Robert Summers eds., 1997).
26. PECZENIK, supra note 4, at 82-83 (denoting the first activity as "descriptive" and the second as "evaluative").
27. For the view that the judge deciding a case is always engaging in a descriptive and an argumentative activity, Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, supra note 11, at 8-9. Nils Jansen, Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im europäischen Privatrecht, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEUP) 750, 754 (2005) reminds us of the fact that legal doctrines ("Dogmatik") always have a descriptive and a normative component. The same holds true for legal theories, id. at 762.
28. Cf. Balkin, supra note 8, at 132 (though from a still more subject-oriented point of view).
29. This is essentially a matter of dispute, and further exploring this point would go far beyond the scope of my paper. The majority view in civil law jurisdictions like Germany seems to be that precedents give rise to a presumption of lightness, e.g. MARTIN KRIELE, THEORIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG 243-58 (2d ed. 1976), that they shift the burden of proof in argumentation, e.g. ALEXY, supra note 4, at 334-41, or that there is a general precedential preference criterion in legal argumentation,
30. e.g. SUSANNE BRACKER, KOHÄRENZ UND JURISTISCHE ARGUMENTATION 239-40 (2000). Interestingly, these authors refer solely to the courts but never say explicitly whether the same holds true for other actors engaging in legal argumentation. If it did hold true, large parts of German scholarly writing would be plainly misguided, as disagreement with the courts seems to be almost a matter of honor for the academy.
31. ALEXY, supra note 10, at 47.
32. Zenon Bankowski et al., On Method and Methodology, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 9, 12 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
33. The idea that there is always one right answer has been put forward mainly by Dworkin, e.g. Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58-84 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977).
34. KARL ENGISCH, LOGISCHE STUDIEN ZUR GESETZESANWENDUNG 14-5 (2d ed. 1960); KRIELE, supra note 21, at 197-200, 203-05.
35. ALEXY, supra note 10, at 139-43.
36. According to Hart, rules of recognition are only one of three main types of what he calls secondary rules - that is, they are accompanied by rules of change, including private power-conferring rules, and rules of adjudication. HART, supra note 9, at 95-98. In my view, the bulk of rules of change cannot be severed from the rules of recognition because to say what should and should not be recognized as a source of law includes saying whether an amending act will or will not derogate the initial act. It is essentially a matter of terminology whether the private power-conferring rules and the rules of adjudication, insofar as the empowered entities are considered to modify the law, ought to be counted among the rules of recognition. With respect to jurisdiction, HART, supra note 9, at 97. I believe that a number of arguments may be put forward in favor of this view.
37. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28, 40-44 (1977).
38. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 40-44.
39. ROBERT ALEXY, RECHT, VERNUNFT, DISKURS 197-98 (1995).
40. The rules of recognition referred to need not be state rules. It is equally possible to refer to the PICC and thus implicitly to the internal "rules" of the relevant UNIDROIT commissions, or, most naturally, to a contractual regime established by the parties to a contract, cf. Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation, 62 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 580, 621 (1998).
41. An overview of the various approaches is given by Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MLR 1-24 (2005);
42. an overview of what is termed "legal pluralism" by Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM 37-82 (2002).
43. For details, see also Jansen & Michaels, Private Law and the State. Comparative Perceptions and Historical Observations, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 345, 358-77 (2007). For a proponent of the opposite view, i.e., the contention that there can be no private law other than state law, cf. MÖLLERS, supra note 2, at 303, 431.
44. HART, supra note 9, at 94-95.
45. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS (1987); Basil S. Markesinis, A Matter of Style, 110 L. Q. REV. 607-28 (1994);
46. Dirk van Gerven, Bringing European (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 37-78, 41 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006).
47. Cf. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 32, at 385.
48. According to Hart, conflicts rules in general belong to the rules of recognition, cf. HART, supra note 9, at 95. I prefer to view intra-conflicts rules as separate because they do not classify primary rules according to their general normative potential, but rather according to their scope or reach with regard to a specific case.
49. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 22-28.
50. For details see NILS JANSEN, DIE STRUKTUR DER GERECHTIGKEIT 102-62 ( 1998), with further references.
51. Wendehorst, supra note 7, at 1408.
52. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (80/934/EEC).
53. In the future, possibly Article 3a(3) EC (Lisbon Treaty).
54. ECJ, Case 14/83, judgment of 10/04/1984, Von Colson and Kamann / Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Rec. 1984, p. 1891) ECJ, Case 79/83, judgment of 10/04/1984, Harz / Deutsche Tradax (Rec.1984, p.1921); ECJ, Case C-106/89, judgment of 13/11/1990; Marleasing / Comercial Internacional de Alimentación (Rec. 1990, p.I-4135), ECJ, Cases C-204/98 to C-244/98, judgment of 27/06/2000, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores (Rec. 2000, p. I-4941), and others. For an academic discussion, see for example WINFRIED BRECHMANN, DIE RICHTLINIENKONFORME AUSLEGUNG (1994);
55. Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung im System der juristischen Methodenlehre, in IM DIENSTE DER GERECHTIGKEIT. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR FRANZ BYDLINSKI 47-103 (Helmut Koziol & Peter Rummel eds., 2002).
56. See Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, 184 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS (ACP) 201-46 (1984);
57. Id., Grundrechte und Privatrecht - eine Zwischenbilanz (1999);
58. Dieter Medicus, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im Privatrecht, 192 AcP 35, 55-58 (1992).
59. For the role of comparative interpretation, see Konrad Zweigert, Rechtsvergleichung als universale Interpretationsmethode, 15 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 5 (1949/50);
60. Walter Odersky, Harmonisierende Auslegung und Europäische Rechtskultur, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEUP) 1-4 (1994);
61. Reiner Schulze, Vergleichende Gesetzesauslegung und Rechtsangleichung, 37 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG (ZFRV) 183 (1997);
62. id., Auslegung europäischen Privatrechts und angeglichenen Rechts - Einführung, in AUSLEGUNG EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS UND ANGEG LICHENEN RECHTS 9 (Reiner Schulze ed., 1999);
63. Arndt Teichmann, Die "Europäisierung des Zivilrechts" und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Hermeneutik, in FESTGABE ZIVILRECHTSLEHRER 1934/35 629, 644-8 (Walther Hadding ed., 1999);
64. ARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW esp. 296-314 (2001).
65. Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 73, 88 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
66. Id.
67. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 286 (1986);
68. Robert Alexy, Juristische Begründung, System und Kohärenz, in RECHTSDOGMATIK UND PRAKTISCHE VERNUNFT 95-107 (Okko Behrends et al. eds., 1990); BRACKER supra note 21, at 217-43.
69. Supra III. A. (preceding 1.)
70. PATRICK MELIN, GESETZESAUSLEGUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 68-69 (2005).
71. STEFAN VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM KONTINENT, Vol. II, 888-92 (2001).
72. For the connection between "personification" and coherence, see DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 165-68; Balkin, supra note 8, at 169.
73. The quadriga was originally introduced by FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS, ERSTER BAND 213-14 (1840), but in a slightly different version. It is the foundation of statutory interpretation in Germany until the present day; see the leading treatise KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 320-46 (6th ed. 1991), which, however, mentions verfassungskonforme Auslegung as a fifth criterion. For a detailed account from a comparative perspective,
74. see STEFAN VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM KONTINENT, Vol. I 28-231 (2001);
75. ELIN, supra note 49, at 175-303.
76. MELIN, supra note 49, at 76-78, with further references.
77. Eyston v. Studd (1574), 2 Plow. 459, 465; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, VOL. I 61 (1765).
78. VOGENAUER, supra note 50, at 780.
79. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.E.); cf. VOGENAUER, supra note 50, at 969-73.
80. 1769 Lord Willes: Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2332; 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B. 1769).
81. Ernst A. Kramer, Konvergenz und Internationalisierung der juristischen Methode, DIE ZUKUNFT DES RECHTS 71, 74-76 (Christian J. Meier-Schatz ed., 1999);
82. OGENAUER, supra note 50, at 1295-1333;
83. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW. THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY 184-85 (2001).
84. See e.g., Binns v. Lawrence, 12 How. 9, 17; 13 L Ed 871, 874 (1851); Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. 541, 545 (1866); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616,620 (1870); N. Y. Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 663 (1875). For a contemporary scholarly account, compare THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231-32 (1857). In the early nineteenth century, a more liberal approach had still prevailed; for details, see MELIN, supra note 49, at 71-75.
85. MELIN, supra note 49, at 75-77 with further references.
86. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 407 (1842);
87. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-40 (1947);
88. Karl M. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950);
89. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (1958).
90. Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997);
91. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983);
92. id., The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 65 (1988), Kenneth Starr 1987 DUKE L.J. 371;
93. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 7 SUP. CT. REV. 231 (1990). Interestingly, also proponents of this new line explicitly recur to the will of the legislator;
94. compare Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302, 1320 (1991), with Scalia, op. cit., at 17-18.
95. The term "new textualism" was apparently coined by William N. Eskridge in The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
96. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
97. WORKIN, supra note 47, at 228-32 (chain-novel);
98. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH L. REV. 20, 58 (1988);
99. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
100. What I call the "mirror approach" must not be confused with the "mirror thesis" that has aroused so much debate within comparative law theory. For an overview and a critical analysis, see, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 51-132 (2001).
101. RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (1990); id., Legal Formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (I), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 26-34 (1991).
102. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 384-47 (1991).
103. For a different approach to "façade legitimation," see Bankowski et al., supra note 23, at 16-18.
104. From a historical perspective, cf. Thomas Duve, Mit der Autorität gegen die Autoritäten? Überlegungen zur heuristischen Kraft des Autoritätsbegriffs für die Neuere Privatrechtsgeschichte, in AUTORITÄT DER FORM - AUTORISIERUNG - INSTITUTIONELLE AUTORITÄT 239, 242 (Wulf Oesterreicher et al. eds., 2003), who explains how an actor applying the law in the age of early modernity was confronted with a plurality of sources none of which enjoyed absolute authority. For a different understanding of the term "relative authority,"
105. cf. GUDRUN SCHMID, EINHEITLICHE ANWENDUNG VON INTERNATIONALEM EINHEITSRECHT 127-51 (2004).
106. DROSDECK, supra note 16, at 94, 134-36.
107. Wendehorst, supra note 7, at 1411-12.
108. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael Becker, Argumentation und Gesetzgebung - Die "Stammzelldebatte" im Deutschen Bundestag, in VERFASSUNG UND ARGUMENTATION 145, 151-53 (Jan-R. Sieckmann ed., 2005).
109. For a detailed discussion, see Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1, at 860-73, 882-89, with further references.
110. See in particular Christian Joerges, Die Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der Nationalstaat, in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN DER BONNER REPUBLIK 311, 351-63 (Dieter Simon ed., 1994); Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1, at 861-64.
111. Cf. Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 149-96 (2004); Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1, at 862-63.
112. See supra note 42.
113. A detailed analysis has recently been presented by ILKA KLÖCKNER, GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE BINDUNG AN ZIVILGERICHTLICHE PRÄJUDIZIEN 170-211 (2006).
114. For a variety of examples and a detailed discussion, see the various contributions to GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
115. GÉRALD SIMON, PUISSANCE SPORTIVE ET ORDRE JURIDIQUE ÉTATIQUE (1990);
116. THOMAS SUMMERER, INTERNATIONALES SPORTRECHT VOR DEM STAATLICHEN RICHTER IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, SCHWEIZ, USA UND ENGLAND (1990);
117. James R. Nafziger, International Sports Law as a Process of Resolving Disputes, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 130-49 (1996).
118. Http://www.fia.com/resources/documents/17844641_WMSC_Decision_130907.pdf .
119. Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1, at 849.
120. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980).
121. Compare, for example, KLAUS PETER BERGER, FORMALISIERTE ODER "SCHLEICHENDE" KODIFIZIERUNG DES TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS (1996).
122. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (UNIDROIT ed., 2004).
123. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); PART III (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003).
124. See, e.g, Duve, supra note 68.
125. Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europäischen Privatrecht, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT 213-37, 223 (Christian Joerges & Günther Teubner eds., 2003).
126. But cf. Marc Amstutz & Vaios Karavas, Rechtsmutation, 8 Rechtsgeschichte 14, 27-30 (2006),
127. referring to Robert M Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4-68 (1983);
128. id., Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. & RELIGION 65-74 (1987);
129. Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text. The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813-94 (1993). These authors contend that interpretation of transnational law will be radically different from the "Roman- Christian" model and instead resemble the Jewish interpretational tradition for religious texts. Lacking a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure and a single authoritative interpreter the Jewish tradition is largely a (re)construction of meaning by the individual interpreter, who remains bound not by the intention of the author of the text in question, but by the interpretational commitments of a "nomic community."
130. Reiner Schulze, Ein Jahrhundert BGB - deutsche Rechtseinheit und europäisches Privatrecht, 75 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG (DRIZ) 369, 372-76 (1997);
131. Katja Langenbucher, Vorüberlegungen zu einer Europarechtlichen Methodenlehre, in 10 Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 65 (Thomas Ackermann ed., 1999);
132. Jürgen Basedow, Anforderungen an eine europäische Zivilrechtsdogmatik, in RECHTSGESCHICHTE UND PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK 79, 92-100 (Reinhard Zimmermann et al. eds., 2000);
133. Thomas M.J. Möllers, The Role of Law in European Integration, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 694-704 (2000);
134. Klaus Peter Berger, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Gemeinrecht der Methode, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEUP) 2001, 4-29, 23;
135. Axel Flessner, Juristische Methode und europäisches Privatrecht, 57 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 2002, 14-23;
136. Stefan Vogenauer, Eine gemeineuropäische Methodenlehre des Rechts - Plädoyer und Programm, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEUP) 2005, 234-63.
137. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 58, at 109. Generally speaking, my model of legal reasoning may be much too simplistic, as it maintains the rule-oriented approach that has been dominating our thinking for the past centuries, cf. the vigorous challenge recently formulated by ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM (2006), who insists that a legal system consists of a great deal more than just legal precepts.
138. Cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory Tool, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 107-48.
139. Supra III.A.2.a.
140. On the techniques of incorporation, deference, and delegation as far as non-state law is concerned, see Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209-59 (2005).
141. Supra III.A.2.b.
142. Alexy, supra note 30, at 177-212.
143. Amstutz, supra note 86, at 216-18, 223-28, 234, speaks of "normative compatibilities" and describes the doctrine of directive-conform interpretation in the E.U. as an evolutionary concept, akin to a conflicts rule.
144. According to Berger, supra note 88, at 24-27, Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (equality before the law) provides a sufficient basis for shifting the burden of proof in argumentation to the courts if they want to deviate from a precedent in another Member State.
145. See, e.g., URS P. GRUBER, METHODEN DES INTERNATIONALEN EINHEITSRECHTS (2004). The role of comparative law is explained at 188-224, 297-302.
146. See WALTER WILBURG, ENTWICKLUNG EINES BEWEGLICHEN SYSTEMS IM BÜRGERLICHEN RECHT (1950). In this printed version of his famous inaugural lecture on being elected Rector of the University of Graz in 1950, Wilburg sketched the outlines of what was to become a most influential contribution to legal theory. According to Wilburg, a rigid system would be a rule where the legal consequence follows if and only if the fixed elements A, B, C and D are fulfilled. By contrast, a flexible system is a rule where the legal consequence follows if the elements A, B, C and D together are fulfilled to a sufficient degree and where, for instance, a lower degree of fulfilment of A can be outweighed by a higher degree of fulfilment of C.
147. For a brief description see also Bernhard A. Koch, Wilburg's Flexible System in a Nutshell, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2001, 545-48 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2002).
148. LOTHAR MICHAEL, DER ALLGEMEINE GLEICHHEITSSATZ ALS METHODENNORM KOMPARATIVER SYSTEME (1997);
149. Axel Flessner, Europäisches Privatrecht und Bewegliches System, 125 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER (JBL) 2003, 205-12, id., supra note 88, at 18.
150. See e.g., Kramer, supra note 58, at 80-83;
151. Ernst A. Kramer, Nationale Privatrechtskodifikationen, internationale Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung und Privatrechtsvergleichung zu Beginn des neuen Jahrhunderts, 124 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT (ZSR) 2005, 421, 431-33;
152. Berger, supra note 88, at 8-12.
153. For references, see supra note 21.
154. KLÖCKNER, supra note 76 at 178-79, 211, referring to Article 234 EC and the so-called C.I.L.F.I.T.-criteria formulated by the European Court of Justice.
155. For an example, see supra note 43.
156. Compare the idea of directive-conform interpretation, supra III.A.2.b.
157. Mangold v Helm, ECJ Case C-144/04, Judgment of 22 Nov. 2005.
158. Wendehorst, supra note 7, at 1412-13.
159. This was originally a quotation from Oliver Wendell Holmes, cf. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. Cf. the "conventionalist approach" put forward by TAMANAHA, supra note 64, at 194-200.
161. Arguably, this was the situation in early modern Europe, cf. Duve, supra note 68.
162. The outcome might resemble what Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 87, predict for the interpretation of transnational law.
163. Compare BERGER, supra note 82, at 92.
164. According to DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 42, this is not possible; according to HART, supra note 9, at 236, it is a "useless reduplication." I do not agree because different actors are involved: an actor who is faced with a problem of adjudication is not necessarily identical to the actor who, through prior adjudication or other rule-conforming behavior, has added to the binding character of a rule.
165. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT esp. 38-123 (1993);
166. GÜNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM esp. 13-46 (1993); Gunther Tuebner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 153 (1997).
167. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG (1992);
168. NIKLAS LUHMANN, supra note 113; Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185, 195-96 (2002).
169. Teubner, supra note 113, at 162-65 ("re-entry"), citing MICHEL VAN DE KERDROVE & FRANÇOIS OST, LE DROIT OU LES PASACHOTES DU JEU 188-89 (1992);
170. Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 763, 777 (1997).
171. For the context of Europeanization, compare Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny's Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 L.Q. REV. 576 (1996);
172. Reinhard Zimmermann, Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 539, 546-47 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006);
173. Basedow, supra note 88, at 96-98; NILS JANSEN, BINNENMARKT, PRIVATRECHT UND EUROPÄISCHE IDENTITÄT 87 (2004); Jansen, supra note 19.