Integrity for hire: An analysis of a widespread customs reform

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 25-57

  Yang, Dean ^a  

^a BUREAU FOR RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 49249125959     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/520007     Document Type: Article

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