Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1983, Pages 101-121

  Barro, Robert J ^a,b   Gordon, David B ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 49049128000     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-X     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy
2. Long-term contracts, sticky prices, and monetary policy
3. Inflationary finance under discretion and rules
4. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural-rate model
5. On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy
6. Long-term contracts rational expectations and the optimal money supply rule
7. Optimal expectations and the extreme information assumptions of ‘rational expectations’ macromodels
8. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames
9. Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach
10. Rules rather than discretion The inconsistency of optimal plans
11. Expectations and the neutrality of money
12. Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs
13. The chain-store paradox
14. Monetary policy during a transition to rational expectations
15. Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts