Controlling the Chinese media: An uncertain business

Asian Survey

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 414-430

  Hassid, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

China; Chinese politics; Control; Media; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; LIBERALIZATION; MEDIA INDUSTRY; MEDIA ROLE; POLITICAL REFORM;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 48949116558     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: 1533838X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. E.g., Ashley Esarey, "Cornering the Market: State Strategies for Controlling China's Commercial Media," Asian Perspective 29:4 (Winter 2005), pp. 37-83.
2. E.g., the testimony of Frank Smyth in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "Hearing on China's State Control Methods and Mechanisms, April 14,2005," First Session, One Hundred Ninth Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 92.
3. The official Chinese name is the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department (Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Xuanchuanbu), but the official English name was recently changed from the Central Propaganda Department to the Central Publicity Department. The Chinese word "xuanchuan" can mean either "publicity" or "propaganda" in English, without the same negative connotation the latter word has in English. An official reason for the change was not given, but it seems likely the change was done in an effort to improve the CPD's image abroad.
4. Indeed, the executive director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School has testified that a "lack of transparency contributes mightily to the climate of self-censorship." See the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "Hearing on China's State Control Methods and Mechanisms, April 14, 2005," First Session, One Hundred Ninth Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 27.
5. Zhou He, "Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug of War: A Political-Economy Analysis of the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily," in Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2000).
6. Ashley Esarey, personal communication, December 17, 2006.
7. He Qinglian, Media Control in China (New York: Human Rights in China, 2004), p. 4 (in Chinese; my translation).
8. Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Xinwen Yanjiusuo (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences News Research Institute), Zhongguo Xinwen Nianjian (China journalism yearbook) (Beijing: China Journalism Yearbook Publishers, 2000).
9. China Data Online, "China Yearly Macro-Economics Statistics (National)," 2006, , accessed April 30, 2006.
10. Jing Wang, Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 1, quoting from Guang Xuan, "2005 Nian Zhongguo Guanggao Ye Tongji Shuju Baogao" (2005 statistics report on China's advertising industry), Xiandai Guanggao (Modern Advertising), no. 4 (April 2006), pp. 38-39.
11. Yuezhi Zhao, "From Commercialization to Conglomeration: The Transformation of the Chinese Press within the Orbit of the Party State," Journal of Communication 50:2 (Spring 2000), pp. 3-26.
12. See Nicholas Kristof, "A Clampdown in China," New York Times, May 17, 2005; or Melinda Liu, "Silent Games," Newsweek, September 19, 2006.
13. Author interview with a former Southern Weekend reporter, San Francisco, April 2005.
14. Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 155.
15. Martin Brendebach, "Public Opinion - a New Factor Influencing the PRC Press," Asien, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft, und Kultur (Asia, German Journal for Politics, Economy, and Culture), no. 96 (July 2005), p. 42.
16. Quoted in Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 149.
17. Esarey, "Cornering the Market," p. 37.
18. Ibid., p. 57.
19. Ibid., p. 58.
20. The monetary consequences Li describes stem from the fact that often the bulk of a reporter's pay comes from article bonuses, not base salary (ibid., pp. 57-60). Thus, if the bonus is cut based on an official's negative reaction to a report, a journalist stands to lose much of his or her wage. Li Datong, "Jiu Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Xin de Kaoping Banfa zhi Li Erliang Zongbianji de Xin" [A letter to editor-in-chief Li Erliang on the new methods for evaluation at China Youth Daily], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 2005. From Greg Distehorst, trans., "Full Text: Li Datong's Memo," Washington Post, February 18 2006, , accessed May 2, 2008.
21. Ibid.
22. Many magazines are seen as more independent than newspapers, but all are still officially subordinated to a relevant government agency
23. Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China, p. 161.
24. Ibid., p. 163.
25. He Qinglian, "Media Control in China," p. 5.
26. The GAPP is the central government bureaucracy's equivalent to the party's CPD, and as such is responsible for licensing and regulating newspapers and other media outlets.
27. Jonathan Hassid, "China's Contentious Journalists: Reconceptualizing the Media," unpublished manuscript, p. 14, quoting from Article 53, paragraphs (2) and (1), respectively, of the Regulations for the Administration of Newspaper Publication, promulgated by the GAPP on September 30, 2005, as Decree no. 32, translated in Jesse T. H. Chang, Isabelle I. H. Wan, and Philip Qu, eds., China's Media and Entertainment Law, vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Trans-Asia, 2006), p. 459.
28. Zhao, "From Commercialization to Conglomeration," pp. 13-19.
29. Chin-Chuan Lee, "The Global and the National of the Chinese Media: Discourses, Market, Technology, and Ideology," in Chinese Media, Global Contexts, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 11.
30. Again, this is not strictly true, as even overt post-publication censorship was and remains relatively rare.
31. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "Hearing," p. 92.
32. Zhou He, "How Do the Chinese Media Reduce Organizational Incongruence? Bureaucratic Capitalism in the Name of Communism," in Chinese Media, Global Contexts, ed. Lee, p. 208.
33. Reporters sans Frontièes, Worldwide Press Freedom Index (website) (2006), at , accessed March 8, 2007.
34. Ibid., at , accessed March 8, 2007.
35. Data were obtained from the official GAPP website at , accessed November 20, 2006.
36. Chin-Chuan Lee, "Press Self-Censorship and Political Transition in Hong Kong," Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 3:2 (March 1998), p. 57.
37. Chen Yali, "Statement by Chen Yali, Research Associate, Center for Defense Information, before CECC" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2003), , accessed May 1, 2008.
38. Perry Link, "China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier," New York Review of Books 49:6 (April 11, 2002), , accessed May 1, 2008.
39. Ibid.
40. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 158.
41. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 230.
42. Ashley Esarey, personal communication, December 17, 2007.
43. In a fascinating historical parallel, Cosimo de Medici seems to have used this very strategy to control early 15th century Florence. See John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98:6 (May 1993), p. 1310.
44. Zhongdang Pan, "Improvising Reform Activities: The Changing Reality of Journalistic Practice in China," in Lee, ed., Power, Money, and Media, p. 82.
45. Joseph Kahn, "Police Raid Chinese Newspaper That Reported New SARS Case," New York Times, January 8, 2004. It is unclear, however, whether this crackdown was initiated by the CPD itself or by local or provincial authorities. One reporter at a sister paper claims in an author interview (Beijing, October 2007) that the crackdown was initiated at the highest levels of the provincial government, though this must surely have been with the knowledge and acquiescence of the CPD. Note, again, that without a more thorough knowledge of the CPD it is difficult to disaggregate the government's actions, and this article does not attempt to do so.
46. Sophie Beach, "The Rise of Rights?" Dangerous Assignments (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists: Spring/Summer 2005), p. 32, , accessed May 1, 2008.
47. Several author interviews with current and former print journalism reporters, including staff of the Southern Newspaper Group, publishers of the Southern Metropolis Daily, Beijing and Shanghai, 2005.
48. Author interview with the former editor of a major paper, Shanghai, August 2005.
49. Duan Hongqing, Ye Doudou, and Wang Bing, "Tufa Shijian Yingdui Fa Cao'an 'Tufa Zhengyi'" [Sudden events response law draft causes "sudden controversy"], Caijing (Finance Magazine) (Beijing), June 28, 2006.
50. Posted by David Bandurski (March 1, 2008), China Media Project, "China's Emergency Response Law Quietly Takes the Stage, Targets 'Fake Information'" (2007), at .
51. Cary Huang, "Beijing Tightens Media Grip with Penalty Points System," South China Morning Post, February 9, 2007.
52. Ibid. Although admittedly this might reflect reporter ignorance more than a deliberate effort at obfuscation, the fact that "senior state media executives" have reportedly "not been given details" suggests the latter possibility.
53. Author interview with former editor of a major paper, Shanghai, August 2005.
54. The CCP employed a similar strategy in the pre-revolution days to weed out undesirable members.
55. Moreover, in order to reapply, reporters must attend dozens of hours of study sessions on Marxism, the leading role of the CCP in Chinese society, and other similar topics before their press card is supplied. These sessions thus serve not only to increase the hardship inherent in the application process but may also have an indoctrination effect as well. See Ashley Esarey, "Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China," in A Freedom House Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2006), pp. 3-4.
56. Daniel K. Berman, Words Like Colored Glass: The Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).
57. Andrew Leonard, "Freedom to Be Irresponsible: Taiwan Independence and the Post-Martial Law Taiwan Press" (unpublished Masters thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1991). Magazines were usually more aggressive than daily newspapers in Taiwan because they were often associated with opposition forces (the so-called "dangwai"), while all major newspapers were controlled by pro-government affiliates.
58. Chin-Chuan Lee, "Sparking a Fire: The Press and the Ferment of Democratic Change in Taiwan," in China's Media, Media's China, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 184.
59. Chin-Chuan Lee, "The Paradox of Political Economy: Media Structure, Press Freedom, and Regime Change in Hong Kong," in Lee, ed., Power, Money, and Media, p. 315.
60. Jonathan Hassid, "China's Contentious Journalists."
61. Ibid.
62. Yan Jiaqi, "The Nature of Chinese Authoritarianism," in Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders, eds. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 13.
63. Lianjiang Li and Kevin O'Brien, "Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China," Modern China 22:1 (January 1996), p. 48.
64. For a more contemporary look at rightful resistance in China, see Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).