The justification of probability measures in statistical mechanics

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 28-44

  Davey, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 48949101095     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/587821     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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2. Callendar, C. (2004), "Measures, Explanation and the Past: Should Special Initial Conditions Be Explained?", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 195-217.
3. Castell, P. (1998), "A Consistent Restriction of the Principle of Indifference", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 387-395.
4. Earman, J., and M. Redei (1996), "Why Ergodic Theory Does Not Explain the Success of Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47: 63-78.
5. Reichenbach, H. (1956), The Direction of Time. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
6. Sklar, L. (1993), Physics and Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Van Fraassen, B. (1990), Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Winsberg, E. (2004a), "Can Conditionalizing on the Past Hypothesis Militate against the Reversibility Objections?", Philosophy of Science 71: 489-504.
9. _ (2004b), "Laws and Statistical Mechanics", Philosophy of Science 71: 707-718.