The making of the CAP: Towards a historical analysis of the EU's first major policy

Contemporary European History

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 347-371

  Ludlow, N Piers ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 48749130100     PISSN: 09607773     EISSN: 14692171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0960777305002493     Document Type: Review

References (95)

1. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice For Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press, 1998), 159-237
2. and 'De Gaulle Between Grain or Grandeur: the Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970', Journal of Cold War Studies, 2, 2 and 3 (2000), 3-43, 4-68
3. Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, 'Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study', PhD thesis (European University Institute, 2001)
4. A really detailed analysis of the multiple French archives relevant to the CAP's birth will have to await the publication of Gilbert Noël's forthcoming study. Unfortunately, this is likely to concentrate exclusively on the French role
5. Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 219-82
6. For two pre-archival accounts see Michael Tracey, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe 1880-1988 (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989)
7. and Edmund Neville-Rolfe, The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1984)
8. Memoirs include Michel Cointat, Les couloirs de l'Europe (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001)
9. Robert Marjolin, Le travail d'une vie. Mémoirs 1911-1986 (Paris: Robert Laffond, 1986)
10. Sicco Mansholt, La Crise. Conversations avec Janine Delaunay (Paris: Editions Stock, 1974)
11. The most comprehensive account of the Treaty of Rome negotiations is Hanns-Jürgen Küsters, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982)
12. see also his 'The Treaties of Rome' in Roy Pryce, ed., The Dynamics of European Union (London: Routledge, 1987), 78-104
13. and Edelgard Mahant, Birthmarks of Europe: The Origins of the European Community Reconsidered (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 93-120
14. Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)
15. Quotations from Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1962), part 2, title II
16. Gilbert Noël, Du pool vert à la politique agricole commune. Les tentatives de Communauté agricole Européenne entre 1945 et 1955 (Paris: Economica, 1988)
17. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1992), 224-317
18. Guido Thiemeyer, Vom 'Pool vert' zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft: europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der gemeinsamen europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999)
19. Richard Griffiths, Explorations in OEEC History (Paris: OECD, 1997)
20. Cited in Edgard Pisani, Le Général indivis (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974), 64
21. Couve's prowess as a negotiator was acknowledged by his long-term rival, Paul-Henri Spaak. See P.-H. Spaak, Combats inachevées(Paris: Fayard, 1969), vol. 2, 365-6
22. Council of Ministers archives, Brussels (henceforward CMA), 1666/64, Proces-verbal de la 153ème session du Conseil CEE (30 Nov.-1 Dec. 1964)
23. The SGCI's operation can be traced through the committee's own archives: Archives Nationales Contemporaines, Fontainebleau, (ANF), SGCI files, multiple versements. See also Anne de Castelnau, 'Le SGCI: une réponse administrative aux défis européens de l'après-guerre' in Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson and Piers Ludlow, eds., L'adaptation des administrations nationales à la construction européenne: Une approche historique (1920-1975) (Brussels: Peter Lang, forthcoming 2005)
24. The problem of Bonn's ill co-ordinated aims is discussed further below
25. CMA. R/850/65, Proces verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 172ȩme session du Conseil CEE (28 Jun.-1 Jul. 1965)
26. European Commission Historical Archives, Brussels (ECHA), BDT 214/1980, Coreper reports, multiple documents
27. For de Gaulle's May 1962 press conference that provoked several MRP resignations see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages (Paris: Plon, 1970), vol. 3, 406-9
28. for a discussion of some of the struggles between the French and the Commission preceding the 1965 crisis, see N. P. Ludlow, 'Frustrated Ambitions: The European Commission and the Formation of a European Identity, 1958-1967', in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth and Raymond Poidevin, Institutions europ éennes et identités européennes (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998), 322-4
29. de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4, 128-9; the threat was later reiterated bilaterally to the Germans: Documents Diplomatiques Français 1963 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2000), vol. 2, document 253
30. Le Monde, 22 Oct. 1964
31. French motivations are well analysed in Maurice Väýsse, 'La politique Européenne de la France en 1965: pourquoi "la chaise vide"?' in Wilfried Loth, ed., Crises and Compromises: The European Project, 1963-1969 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 193-214
32. Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets (Paris: Plon, 1985), vol. 9, 174
33. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1965 (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2003), vol. 1, document 271; the contrast is clearest with de Gaulle's comments to the Dutch ambassador earlier in the year, document 112
34. OECD figures make clear that the Dutch sold more farm produce to their EEC partners than did the French throughout the 1960s. The argument that Dutch support for the EEC derived from a desire to make irreversible their access to the German market in particular is in Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 173-96
35. Johan Molegraaf and Ralph Dingemans, 'The Netherlands and the Common Agricultural Policy, 1958-1963' in Anne Deighton and Alan Milward, eds., Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic Community, 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 156-8
36. See for instance Akten zur Auswärtigenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963 (henceforward AAPD 1963), document 78
37. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BAK), Bundeskanzleramt files (BKA), B136, Band 2589, B̈omcke note, 26 Nov. 1963
38. BAK, BKA, B136, Band 2589, Kurzzusammenfassung der Ergebnisse des Ministerrats der EWG vom 16-23 Dec. 1963
39. Luns' memoirs contain a chapter proudly entitled 'My no to de Gaulle'. Joseph Luns, 'Ik herinner mij...', (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1971), 139-63
40. For details see Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, 'For Once a United Front. The Netherlands and the "Empty Chair" Crisis of the Mid-1960s' in Loth, Crises and Compromises, 173-92
41. Cited in Nora Beloff, The General Says No (London: Penguin, 1963), 123
42. for the centrality of the CAP to the enlargement discussions, see N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing With Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 92-104
43. The best public source for Hallstein's vision is Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making (New York: Norton, 1972). Much of its content, however, was set out in innumerable speeches while Hallstein was still Commission President. See ECHA, speeches collection
44. For a discussion of the influence over the early European Commission of neo-functionalist thought, including the belief that a rapport with professional bodies and interest groups was central to the tegration process, see Jonathan P. J. White, 'Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission', Journal of European Integration History, 9, 1 (2003), 111-31
45. See for instance the Italian diplomat's comments cited in Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 223
46. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-8 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995),vol. 13, 112
47. Moravscik, The Choice for Europe, 208-17
48. Knudsen, Defining the Policies, 148-224, 368-76
49. See, for instance, the number of special subsidies that the Germans, Italians and Luxembourgers managed to claim in the course of the final days of the grain price negotiation in 1964: CMA, R/1269/64, Proces-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 154ème session du Conseil CEE (12-15 Dec. 1964)
50. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 210
51. Mansholt's single biggest defeat was the emasculation of his 1968 plan for structural reform - but this came after the rest of the CAP had been successfully put in place
52. N. Piers Ludlow, 'Influence and Vulnerability: the Role of the Commission in the Enlargement Negotiations' in Richard Griffiths and Stuart Ward, Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the EEC 1961-1963 (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1996), 144
53. CMA, 1496/63, Proces-verbal de la 115ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 12-15 Nov. 1963. For the German attack on the CAP, see CMA, 1368/63, Proces-verbal de la 112ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 15 Oct. 1963
54. See by way of example the package deal that brought the May 1966 talks to a successful end: CMA. R/609/66 Proces verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 185eme session du Conseil CEE (4, 5, 9-12 May 1966)
55. See for instance de Gaulle's (grudging) comments in the wake of the December 1964 accords: cited in Alain Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard, 1997), vol. 2, 273. Rather less jaundiced were Boegner's comments a year earlier: ANF, SGCI files, versement 900638, article 25, Boegner to Couve, tel. no. 23/DE, 3 Feb. 1964
56. Cited in Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, 'Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereal Prices' in Loth, Crises and Compromises, 131
57. For the background to Bonn's approach see Thiemeyer, Vom "Pool vert" zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft and Gisela Hendriks, Germany and European Integration. The Common Agricultural Policy: an Area of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
58. See for instance Erhard's comments to the US Ambassador: Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-8 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), vol. 13, 91
59. Knudsen, 'Defining the Policies', 136-8
60. see also Hélène Delorme, 'L'adoption du prix unique des céréales' in Pierre Gerbet and Daniel Pepy, eds., Le decision dans les Communautés européennes (Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles,1969), 269-96
61. For an example of French suspicions see de Gaulle's comments as reported in Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, vol. 2, 263
62. BAK, BKA, B-136, Bd. 8319, Hüttebräuker to Sachs, 25 Feb. 1966
63. For the presentation of the German timetable see CMA. R/295/63 Proces-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 100ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 1-2, Apr. 1963
64. CMA. R/850/65, Proces verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 172ème session du Conseil CEE (28 Jun.-1 Jul. 1965)
65. Herbert Müller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik. Wege und Umwege zur politischen Union Europas (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974)
66. Ulrich Lappenküper, '"Ich bin wirklich ein guter Europ̈aer" Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 1949-1966', Francia, 18/3 (1991), esp. 110-11
67. See, for instance, Lahr's description of the cereals price accord as the 'key' to Kennedy Round progress: Rolf Lahr, Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg. Private Briefe 1934-1974 (Stuttgart: Albrecht Knaus, 1981), 412
68. Auswärtiges Amt archives, Ref. 200 (IA2), Bd. 1152, Aufzeichnung 'Stärkung der europäischen Gemeinschaften', 8 Feb. 1965
69. For one of the many German documents acknowledging the link between the CAP and GATT see BAK, BKA, B-136, Bd. 2589, Auswärtiges Amt note, 'Europäische Gemeinschaft', 12 Nov. 1963
70. For an extract from the rather unconvincing German cabinet discussions of this see BKA, B-136, Bd. 8319, Kurzprotokoll für die 20. Kabinettsitzung des Bundesregierung, 25 Mar. 1966
71. See Archives Nationales, Pompidou papers, 5AG2/1035, Gaucher to Lemerle, 14 Sept. 1969
72. The most detailed recent study of Italy and the CAP ends its analysis too early to take account of the mid-1960s shift in the Italian stance: Giuliana Laschi, L'agricoltura italiana e l'integrazione europea (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2000)
73. Rosemary Galli and Saverio Torcasio, La partecipazione italiana alla politica agricola communitaria (Bologna:Il Mulino, 1976), 30-1
74. See, for instance, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS),Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica (MBPE), vol. 93, Moro to Hallstein, 6 Jun. 1964
75. For an analysis of Italy's role in this see N. Piers Ludlow, 'Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966', Contemporary European History, 8, 2 (1999), esp. 245-7
76. ACS, MBPE, vol. 93, Venturini to Rome, 12 Jan. 1964
77. For an example of Italian awareness that Bonn was better placed to counter de Gaulle see Attilio Cattani (Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1987), 114
78. ECHA, BDT 144/92, SEC(66)871, Sigrist note on Coreper meeting, 16 Mar. 1966
79. CMA, R/609/66, Proces-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 185ème session du Conseil CEE, 4-12 May 1966
80. The Italians retrospectively acknowledged their lack of closeness to Bonn on these issues: ACS, MBPE, vol. 94, Resoconto sommario della 66a riunione ristretto dei direttori generali incaricato dei problemi CEE e delle relazioni con i paesi terzi, 13 May 1966
81. Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1962 (Washington, US Department of Commerce, 1962). This figure is for western Europe as a whole, rather than for the EEC. Given, however, that the largest western European country not within the EEC, Britain, had applied to join and seemed likely to be a member by 1963 or 1964, these western European figures give a reasonably accurate impression of how much US trade appeared to be at stake
82. Foreign Relations of the United States. Western Europe & Canada, 1961-3. (Washington, United States Printing Office, 1995) vol. 13, 97-100, 113-6, 128-34
83. Le Monde, 21 Nov. 1962
84. FRUS 1961-3, vol. 13, 194-8
85. Geir Lundestad, Empire by 'Integration': The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13-28
86. Ernest H. Preeg, Traders and Diplomats. An analysis of the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington: Brookings, 1970), 140
87. Thomas Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 217-45
88. Ludlow, Dealing With Britain, 103
89. For Labour's realisation of this, see Helen Parr, Harold Wilson and Europe, (London: Routledge, forthcoming)
90. Con O'Neill, Britain's Entry into the European Community. Report on the Negotiations of 1970-1972 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 38-41
91. British frustration at the difficulty of keeping the EEC's relations with the UK 'at the foreground of Community thinking' is well-captured by PRO, FO371 182299; M1063/1, O'Neill to Gordon Walker, Annual Report on the European Communities for 1964, 2 Jan. 1965
92. Morten Rasmussen, 'Joining the European Communities. Denmark's Road to the EC Membership, 1961-1973', PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004, 143-5
93. N. Piers Ludlow, 'Too Rich, Too Stable and Too Far Away. The EC and Trade with Australia during the 1960s', Australian Journal of Economic History, 41, 3 (2001)
94. FRUS 1964-8, vol. 13, 91
95. The most famous neo-functionalist analysis predates the CAP: Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) but his ideas were picked up and applied to the early EEC by Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration