Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1984, Pages 187-221

  Myers, Stewart C ^a   Majluf, Nicholas S ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 48549110620     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. The market for ‘lemons’ Quality and the market mechanism
2. Imperfect information dividend policy and the ‘bird in the hand fallacy’
3. Innovation and communication Signalling with partial disclosure
4. Optimal investment financing decisions and the value of confidentiality
5. Information production market signalling and the theory of financial intermediation
6. Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and financing-related information: Some new evidence
7. Signalling and the valuation of unseasoned new issues
8. The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock
9. The failure of financial contracts and the relevance of financial policy
10. An introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information
11. The allocational role of takeover bids in situations of asymmetric information
12. Tests for price effects of new issues of seasoned securities
13. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure
14. Information asymmetries financial structure and financial intermediaries
15. Determinants of corporate borrowing
16. Some notes on financial-incentive signalling models activity choice and risk preferences
17. The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signalling approach
18. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants
19. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, Part I