The phenomenological role of affect in the Capgras delusion

Continental Philosophy Review

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 195-216

  Ratcliffe, Matthew ^a  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Affect; Belief; Capgras delusion; Feeling of unfamiliarity; Horizons; Possibilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 48449090794     PISSN: 13872842     EISSN: 15731103     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9078-5     Document Type: Article

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