I am not now, nor have i ever been, a turnip

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-14

  Parsons, Josh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 48349121135     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400500043894     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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5. Hawley, K. 2001. How Things Persist, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6. Kaplan, D. 1989. Demonstratives, in Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Lewis, D. 1983a (1968). Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, in Philosophical Papers T. 26-39.
8. Lewis, D. 1983b (1976). Survival and Identity, in Philosophical Papers T. 55-72.
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12. Sider, T. 2001a. Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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14. Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals, London: Routledge.
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16. Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and Substance Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.