Optimal combinatorial electricity markets

Web Intelligence and Agent Systems

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 123-135

  Penya, Yoseba K ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DEUSTO   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Distributed artificial intelligence; Multi agent systems

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY; ELECTRICITY MARKETS; END USES; ENERGY NEEDS; MULTI ITEM; NEW MODEL; STRATEGIC BIDDING; SUPPLY FUNCTION; WINNER DETERMINATION;

COMMERCE; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; SALES;

ENERGY UTILIZATION;

EID: 48249124219     PISSN: 15701263     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/WIA-2008-0133     Document Type: Article

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