Climate change, constitutional consignment, and the political question doctrine

Denver University Law Review

Volumn 85, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 919-959

  May, James R ^a  

^a Widener Law School ^*

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EID: 47949093363     PISSN: 08839409     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (313)

1. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
2. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
3. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
5. See Climate Change Threatens Existence, Eskimo Lawsuit Says, CNN, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/02/26/ us.warming.ap/index.html.
6. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming Solution" in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 598 (2008)
7. [hereinafter Automobile Emissions].
8. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
9. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing under the political question doctrine private common law cause of action brought by individuals to address effects of climate change), appeal docketed, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. 2007).
10. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-27 (1962) (thoroughly discussing the political question doctrine).
11. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
12. See id.
13. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
14. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
15. For assessment of preemption and climate issues, see generally Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 (2003);
16. Sara A. Colangelo, Comment, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemption Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175 (2007);
17. Sarah Olinger, Comment, Filling the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law to Regulate Carbon Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2007).
18. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. For an analysis of how the dormant Commerce Clause and dormant Foreign Relations Clause apply to California's recent climate legislation, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653 (2007);
20. Peter Carl Nordberg, Note, Excuse Me, Sir, But Your Climate's on Fire: California's S.B. 1368 and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2067 (2007).
21. See generally Hannah Chang, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's Link with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10771 (2007) (discussing the dormant foreign affairs power and California's efforts to combat climate change). Some question the existence of foreign-affairs preemption.
22. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 327-28 (2005) ("If the mere appearance of an issue on the international agenda would result in automatic preemption of state authority under the dormant foreign affairs preemption, a good deal of the police powers of the States would become at risk.").
23. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 10, cl. 3. For a discussion of the interplay between the Compact Clause and multi-state agreements to address the effects of climate change, see generally Katie Maxwell, Comment, Multi-State Environmental Agreements: Constitutional Violations or Legitimate State Coordination? 15 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 355 (2007);
24. Michael S. Smith, Note, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The Compact Clause and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 387 (2007).
25. U.S. CONST, art I, § 10, cl. 1;
26. id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27. See generally Kirk Junker, Conventional Wisdom, De-Emption and Uncooperative Federalism in International Environmental Agreements, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 93 (2005) (discussing the Treaty Clauses, states' rights, and international environmental agreements).
28. For broader commentary on international agreements and federalism, see generally Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001);
29. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003);
30. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE LJ. 1127 (2000).
31. For an overview of standing principles raised in climate litigation, see generally Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005);
32. Nigel Cooney, Note, Without a Leg to Stand On: The Merger of Article III Standing and the Merits in Environmental Cases, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2007).
33. A comprehensive discussion of the evidence surrounding anthropogenic-induced climate change is beyond the scope of this article. For this, the reader is referred to Chapter 1 of the Stern Review from the British government. See generally SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climatechange/stern_review_report. cfm.
34. 2 from preindustrial levels to 560 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st century. This is so because the world's political and economic system cannot respond rapidly enough to make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as gasoline-powered automobiles or coal fired power plants. Some environmentalists, however, believe it is still possible to stabilize GHG at 450 ppm, a level that would limit the temperature increase (in addition to that which has already been caused by human activities) to 1.5 to 2°F during the next 100 years. Virtually nobody believes that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric concentrations below 450 ppm and concentrations could continue growing after that if third-world countries do not implement aggressive reduction strategies, even if the most ambitious proposal currently under consideration were adopted.
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of some of the impacts of climate change, see generally Richard A. Kerr, Latest Forecast: Stand By for a Warmer, but not Scorching, World, SCIENCE, Apr. 21, 2006, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5772/351a;
37. CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR GALBRAITH, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIENT CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/final_ObsImpact.pdf.
38. For contemporaneous impacts, see generally Real Climate: Climate Science from Climate Scientists, http://www.realclimate.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
39. Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1127, 1127, 1179 (2006).
40. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 (2007).
41. Id. at 1456 (quoting declaration of Michael MacCracken, former Executive Director, U.S. Global Change Research Program).
42. This harm also translates into economic costs. See Gateway to the United Nation's Systems on Climate Change, Climate Change at a Glance, http://www.un.org/climatechange/background/ataglance.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
43. See Gateway to the United Nation's Systems on Climate Change, supra note 25.
44. Al Gore, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ gore-lecture_en.html.
45. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D. Vt. 2007);
46. see also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. 2007), 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (companion case challenging California standards); Lincoln Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1:06-cv-00070-T-LDA (filed Feb. 13, 2006) (same for Rhode Island).
47. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
48. Id. at 340-41.
49. See, e.g., id. at 341.
50. Hansen Aff., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, Nos. 2:05-CV-302, 2:05-CV-304, 2006 WL 4761053, at ¶ 65 (D. Vt. Aug. 14, 2006).
51. See, e.g., GUIDO FRANCO, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-103/ CEC-500-2005-103-SD.PDF; Washington State, Department of Ecology, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/effects.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
52. See, Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 445-60 (2008).
53. Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 372 (2006).
54. See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://usclimatenetwork.org/federal/lieberman- warner-bill/ACSA.pdf;
55. Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007).
56. Australia Ratifies Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/asia/03rudd- wire.html.
57. Abate, supra note 34, at 370-72.
58. The White House, Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse. gov/ceq/global-change.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
59. Peter Gelling, Focus of Climate Talks Shifts to Helping Poor Countries Cope, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A31.
60. See Chemerinsky et al, supra note 14, at 10662.
61. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CHAPTER 6, IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION 1, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNQ7Z/ $File/ch6.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
62. See Robert S. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 196, 201-02 (2008).
63. California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, Request for a Clean Air Act Section 209(b) Waiver Preemption for California's Adopted and Amended New Motor Vehicle Regulations and Incorporated Test Procedures to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Support Document, December 21, 2005.
64. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, California, denying Section 209(b) waiver preemption (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219- slj.pdf.
65. Glicksman, supra note 22, at 201-02.
66. Id. ;
67. see also Johnson, supra note 44.
68. Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, California, and 13 Other Governors to Stephen L. Johnson, Adminstrator, EPA, regarding U.S. EPA's denial of California's tailpipe emissions waiver request (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8596/ ("The federal government, with this unprecedented action, is ignoring the rights of states, as well as the will of more than one hundred million people across the U.S.").
69. See California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 2, 2008).
70. Fifteen states have joined the suit, on the basis of § 177. Keith Richburg, California Sues EPA Over Emissions Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2008, at A02, available at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/02/AR2008010202833.html.
71. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces EPA Suit Filed to Reverse Waiver Denial, available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/ 8400/ (suit filed in Ninth Circuit on January 2, 2008);
72. California Sues EPA over Greenhouse Gas Rules, MSNBC, Jan. 2, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22474944/ (arguing EPA ignored legal requirements of CAA).
73. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12, 156 (Mar. 26, 2008).
74. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 177 (2006).
75. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOL. L.Q. 183, 194, 196-97 (2005).
76. For discussions of recent state efforts, see Daniel A. Färber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution 2-3 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research, Paper No. 1081664, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081664;
77. Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 46 (2007).
78. Sarah Krakoff, Essay: Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 925, 925 (2005).
79. See Färber, supra note 54, at 31. Professor Farber states: Courts should not be quick to invalidate state climate regulations, whether or not Congress has legislated. It is much more likely that society will be too timid in responding to climate change than that it will go too far; any fear of over-regulation by states would be largely misplaced. The courts should consequently content themselves with policing against the most obvious potential flaws in state legislation.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 65 (2005);
82. Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative from the Governors of the States of CT, DE, ME, NH, NJ, NY, and VT (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf (capping GHGs from, and agreeing to cooperate with carbon markets for, electric utilities).
83. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 778 (2006).
84. See ROBERT MELTZ, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GROWING PHENOMENON 5, 14, 18, 22 (2007), available at www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jan/ RL32764.pdf;
85. see also JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: A LITIGATION UPDATE 1 (2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/ current_research/documents/GWL_Report.pdf.
86. See Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1613-14 (2007). In advancing ideas about how to compensate for climate change, Professor Farber writes: My purpose is not to offer a fully matured blueprint for compensation. It is to put some basic ideas on the table and to suggest that at least part of the compensation issue is relatively manageable. In the end, the decision of whether to compensate will be driven largely by political decision makers rather than by courts or, even less likely, by scholars. Whether a large-scale compensation plan will ever be adopted, let alone when such a step might be taken, remains unclear. Even at this early stage, however, it is useful to imagine the outlines of a compensation scheme. Doing so may help focus the debate on whether or not to compensate, and it will provide a useful head start on actual programmatic design if the decision is ultimately made to provide compensation.
87. Id. at 1608.
88. See Kaswan, supra note 54, at 52 ("I suggest that the courts remain a vital forum for addressing climate change, particularly in the absence of comprehensive action by the other branches of government.").
89. For other potential remedies, see Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10127 (2008).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
91. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 328-30 (2005) (explaining how courts balance equities in public nuisance cases);
92. Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 448-49 (2005) (discussion of elements of public nuisance cause of action).
93. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 450-55 (discussing liability of defendants whose contributions alone would not have created the nuisance).
94. David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 31 (2003).
95. See id. at 27.
96. Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 421 (1974).
97. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
98. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
99. 284 U.S. 585 (1931).
100. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
101. Kaswan, supra note 54, at 106.
102. For a discussion of a possible framework for compensating the victims of climate change, see generally Farber, supra note 54.
103. Id. at 1655.
104. See also Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1624 (2007);
105. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1677 (2007).
106. See generally Alice Kaswan, supra note 54 (providing an overview of the positive and negative environmental justice implications of a variety of the most significant emerging climate change policies, including cap and trade).
107. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D. Vt. 2007).
108. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
109. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Román & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 1, 45 (2005) (state litigation "is a flexible tool for overcoming regulatory inertia at the federal level").
110. See Daniel A. Färber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (2007). Professor Farber says: Most importantly, we should start thinking about cost allocation now because very soon the world is going to start doing so. As the realization sinks in that climate change will cause billions of dollars of harm even if we do everything feasible to cut back on emissions, the people who are directly harmed are going to start wondering whether they alone should bear the costs.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
113. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
114. Id. at 169-70.
115. Id. at 170.
116. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.
117. Id. at 211.
118. Id. at 217.
119. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
120. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La. 2006).
124. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
125. Id. at 217.
126. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
127. Id.; Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
128. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
129. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
130. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
131. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
132. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La. 2006).
133. Id. (quoting Saldano v. O'Connell, 322 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)
134. (citing Nixon, 506 U.S. at 252-53 (Souter, J., concurring))).
135. 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946).
136. Id. at 552-53 ("[T]he petitioners ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to grant. . . . [T]his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof").
137. Id. at 554.
138. Id. at 556.
139. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1004.
141. 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
142. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 4.
143. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
144. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234-35.
145. Id. at 236.
146. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
147. Id. at 452-55;
148. see also U.S. CONST, art. V.
149. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). For opposing points of view as to how the political question doctrine applies to the constitutional amendment process, compare Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 433-36 (1983),
150. with Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387 (1983).
151. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007);
152. see also U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
153. Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 2, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
154. Id. ¶ 40.
155. Id. ¶ 1.
156. Id.; see also U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
157. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *13;
158. see also U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
159. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *14.
160. Id. at *13.
161. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194-96 (1824)).
162. Id. at * 14.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The defendants are the American Electric Power Company, the Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy and Cinergy Corporation.
168. Id. at 267.
169. The plaintiffs included California, Connecticut, Iowa, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City of New York. Id.
170. Id. at 268.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 270.
173. Id. at 272.
174. Id. at 273.
175. Id. at 274.
176. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
177. Id. at 679-80.
178. Id. at 680.
179. Id. at 682.
180. Id. at 680.
181. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188 (1962).
182. Id. at 195.
183. Id. at 196-97.
184. Id. at 209.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 210.
187. The Guaranty Clause reads: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST, art. IV, §4.
188. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
189. Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
190. 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2005).
191. The Clause gives Congress the authority "to establish [a] uniform rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
192. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
194. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
195. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
196. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2007).
197. Id.
198. Id. at *8 (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at *15.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *14 (alteration in original) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922-02 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
207. Id. at *1.
208. Id. at *8.
209. Id. at *15 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
210. Id. at *16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Oswego Barge Corp., 654 F.2d 327, 333 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
213. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
214. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 272.
219. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).
220. 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
221. See id. at 239; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
222. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
223. Id. at 271 n.6.
224. Id. at 272.
225. Id. at 274.
226. Id. at 273.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 274.
231. Id.
232. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 322 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
233. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690, 1692 (1970).
234. For a helpful discussion of this period, see Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 345-46 (2003); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 492 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting role of catalytic converter technology in helping to achieve national air quality standards).
235. 84 Stat. 1676.
236. This happened incrementally. Congress's initial foray into regulating vehicle emissions, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), explicitly recognized the need for, but did little to unseat state primacy concerning motor vehicle licensing and operation, and did not preempt state efforts respecting emissions. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation (MVMA III), 17 F.3d 521, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1994); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A. (MEMA I), 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
237. The Air Quality Act of 1967 set forth the framework for establishing national standards. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). Yet it also preserved state authority, such as California had already exercised, to establish more stringent standards, provided it could show a compelling need and that its standards were consistent with the Act. Id. at 501.
238. 42 U.S.C.A. §7543(a) (West 2008).
239. §7543(b).
240. 42 U.S.C.A. §7507 (West 2008). Fourteen states have adopted California's emission limitations. See generally CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE EMISSION REDUCTION STANDARDS FOR VEHICLES (2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ccfaq.pdf.
241. MEMA I, 627 F.2d at 1109.
242. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emission from New Motor Vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.icta.org/ doc/ghgpet2.pdf. The International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA) is a non-profit, bi-partisan organization committed to providing the public with full assessments and analyses of technological impacts on society. CTA is devoted to fully exploring the economic, ethical, social, environmental and political impacts that can result from the applications of technology or technological systems. International Center for Technology Assessment, About Us, http://www.icta.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
243. 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 59,933.
244. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
245. Id. at 1438. For a captivating account of her role in this case, see Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
246. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453.
247. Id. at 1454-55.
248. Id. at 1462 (majority opinion).
249. Id. at 1462-63.
250. Id. at 1478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally Amendment to Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §301, §§501-12, 89 Stat. 901, 901-16 (1975).
252. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975); see also Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167 (discussing EPCA's legislative history).
253. §2(5), 89 Stat. 871.
254. §301, §502(a)(1), 89 Stat. 901; Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167.
255. Delegation to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator, 49 C.F.R. §1.50 (2008).
256. See S. REP. No. 94-516, at 119, 153-54 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956, 1959-60, 1994-95.
257. 49 U.S.C.A. §32902(f) (West 2008).
258. §32902(b)(4)(A).
259. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, and 537).
260. Id. at 17568. "Reformed" standards, which take into account a light truck's wheelbase and track width, are 22.7, 23.4 and 23.7 mpg for model years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. Id. at 17624.
261. 49 U.S.C.A. §32919(a) (West 2008). Section 32919(a) provides that When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.
262. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24, »27, *29 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
263. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *24, *29.
264. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
265. Id. at 1453, 1456-57.
266. Id. at 1455.
267. Id. at 1456.
268. Id. at 1457.
269. Id. at 1458.
270. Id. at 1466.
271. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
272. Id. at *33-34 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote: Underpinning the Supreme Court's standing analysis is the concept that the authority to regulate carbon dioxide lies with the federal government, and more specifically with the EPA as set forth in the CAA. Also inherent in the Supreme Court's reasoning is the principle that any State that is dissatisfied with the federal government's global warming policy determinations may exercise its "procedural right" to advance its interests through administrative channels and, if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious." Thus, such an approach emphasizes that initial policy determinations are made by the political branches while preserving a framework for judicial review of those determinations. Id.
273. Id. at *35-36 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote: The underpinnings of the Supreme Court's rationale in Massachusetts only reinforce this Court's conclusion that Plaintiff's current tort claim would require this Court to make the precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the political branches, and to the extent that such determination falls under the CAA, by the EPA. Because the States have "surrendered" to the federal government their right to engage in certain forms of regulations and therefore may have standing in certain circumstances to challenge those regulations, and because new automobile carbon dioxide emissions are such a regulation expressly left to the federal government, a resolution of this case would thrust this Court beyond the bounds of justiciability. Plaintiff has failed to offer an adequate explanation of how this Court would possibly endeavor to make the initial policy determinations that would be both necessary and antecedent to a resolution of this case. Id.
274. Id. at *36.
275. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004). Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary directs the reader to the term "public policy," which means "[b]roadly, principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society." Id. at 1267.
276. The White House, News & Policy, Policies in Focus, Energy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/energy/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing U.S. policy in "confronting climate change" and energy security).
277. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS, ENERGY SECURITY, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96165.pdf (addressing domestic and international U.S. policy on climate change) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
278. EPA, Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/ global-change.html#2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing domestic U.S. climate change policy); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003). In explaining why it should not regulate automobile emissions, the EPA stated that President Bush has "established a comprehensive global climate change policy designed to . . . take sensible steps in the interim to reduce the risk of global climate change." Id.
279. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 461.
280. The fact that the United States does not agree with the proposals made under the Kyoto Protocol does not inveigh the premise that the Unites States has an overall emissions reduction policy. Federal policies can be inferred. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Administrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) ("given the Executive Branch's repeated condemnation of international terrorism, we believe that any initial policy that might conceivably be required has already been made.").
281. 127 S. Ct. 1464 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
282. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, 28 No. 5 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. *12 (2007). Professor Kaswan explains that our country has a "long tradition of relying on the courts to make important policy determinations" when courts are faced with common law claims.
283. Id. at *15 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
284. Id. at *15-16 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
285. U.S. CONST, art. III, §2, cl. 1.
286. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 624-25 (1976).
287. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 131-32 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (2d ed. 1988) ("The highest mission of the Supreme Court ... is not to conserve judicial credibility.").
288. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
289. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 132.
290. Id.
291. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146-47.
292. U.S. CONST, amend. X.
293. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
294. Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, supra note 244 at *12 ("The very complexity of the issues at stake, and the power of the affected interest groups, could hobble political responses for some time. Courts do not have the luxury of delay.").
295. Id.
296. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
297. Id.
298. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
299. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *36-37 (internal citations omitted). The court observed: [T]he Supreme Court's analysis on the issue of standing counsels with convincing force to the contrary. As noted above, a State has standing to pursue its "procedural right" through administrative channels, and if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious" as did the plaintiffs in Massachusetts. Unlike the procedural posture of Massachusetts, the current case is not before the Court by way an administrative challenge to an EPA's decision, but rather as an interstate global warming damages tort claim. Plaintiffs argument essentially ignores this procedural distinction. Id.
300. Id. at *37 (internal citations omitted). Here, the court says: Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff's attempt to equate this Court's decision on justiciability with the EPA's decision on whether to regulate carbon dioxide emissions to be problematic. The EPA's global warming carbon dioxide policymaking determinations are statutorily governed by the CAA, and are therefore not analogous the justiciability principles which govern the issues now before the Court. Id.
301. Brenner, supra note 67, at 421.
302. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273 n.9.
303. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 2007) ("As the case appears to be an ordinary tort suit, there is no impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.") (internal quotations omitted); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Administrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The fact that the issues before us arise in a politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a nonjusticiable political question.").
304. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
305. Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
306. Id. at 301.
307. Id. at 300; see also Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49 (distinguishing between political assessment of terrorism and allocation of liability).
308. 703 F.2d 464, 465 (10th Cir. 1983).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 470.
311. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
312. Id. at 1332.
313. Id.