The protection of children during the Liberian peace process

International Journal of Children's Rights

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 179-220

  Cohn, Ilene ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 47749093856     PISSN: 09275568     EISSN: 15718182     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/15718189820494021     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. The author is a Visiting Fellow in the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program. This research was undertaken with the gracious financial support of Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children).
2. All support in Liberia in November 1997 was generously provided by Save the Children/UK staff.
3. I would like to thank SCF/UK staff for their time and patience and, specifically Una McCauley, for her comments on an earlier draft.
4. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/d/a "Dule," No. IT-94-1-AR72, slip op. paras. 86-95
5. (Int'l. Trib. For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l. Human itarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic case].
6. The Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 51/77, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 106, paras. 21, 22, 25, 26, 30, 41, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51/77 (1997) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997)];
7. The Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 52/107, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/52/107 (1998) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 52/107 (1998)].
8. In 1994 the URNG adhered to a human rights agreement (one agreement among many that form the final peace agreement) that obliged them to respect certain human rights and to eradicate the suffering of the civilian population. Most importantly, the agreement provided for UN monitoring of compliance with these obligations, which continued for two and a half years before a lasting peace was achieved.
9. The language of the human rights agreement enabled UN monitors to evaluate alleged violations by the army and the URNG in accordance with traditional humanitarian law principles such as "proportionality" and to apply the concepts of "participant", "civilian" and "hostilities" as defined in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which throughout the conflict was not applicable in Guatemala.
10. th yr., U.N. Doc. A/48/928; S/1994/448, 19 April 1994.
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Confer ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc A/CONF/183/9 (1998), arts. 8(b)(xxvi), 8(e)(vii).
12. Though ratified, Protocol II could not be applied in Liberia simply because it quickly became a failed state and none of the non-state entities met the requirements of article 1.
13. It may be possible, however, to argue that Protocol II, art. 4 (protection of children) constitutes customary international law binding on all parties to an internal armed conflict, based on the decision in the Tadic jurisdiction case in the Appellate Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Tadic case, supra note 2.
14. U.N. Peace-building Support Office in Liberia, Terms of reference, paras. 1, 3,8, December 1997.
15. Throughout this article "children" is meant to indicate persons below eighteen years of age.
16. Alison Brysk, The Politics of Measurement: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in Argentina, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 676, 678 (1994).
17. Max A. Sesay, Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, 67 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 35.
18. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana was Chair from mid-1994 to mid-1996 after which the Chair passed to Nigeria's President Abacha. Until it was clear that Abacha would be granted a second term, there was a major push to end the process on Nigeria's clock, that is by mid-1997. Abacha ultimately did stay on as Chair.
19. Sesay, supra note 11.
20. Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1994).
21. Eric Avebury, Chairman Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Liberia: The role of the United Nations, ROYAL AFRICAN SOCIETY 2-3 (1993).
22. AMNESTY INT'L,LIBERIA:A NEW PEACE AGREEMENT-AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 6 (1995).
23. These reports, which are not public, are said to contain UNOMIL-verified accounts of violations committed by ECOMOG forces.
24. UN to oppose vociferously these ECOMOG abuses and they were almost always downplayed or eliminated from the public reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.
25. UNOMIL investiga tors met with 70-85 persons who had been detained by ECOMOG troops some time after the February 7, 1997 close of the demobilization process. Photos and depositions taken in prison interviews testify to torture of the detainees at the hands of ECOMOG troops.
26. Two detainees died and others sustained serious physical injuries.
27. As the incident came to light, ECOMOG secured the group's release from Monrovia Central Prison and never conducted an internal investigation.
28. UNOMIL's human rights officer reported his findings to UN head quarters and ECOMOG authorities.
29. The latter responded by withdrawing the security they were providing to the UN mission.
30. The June 1997 report comments on another UNOMIL investigation into allegations that ECOMOG killed one detainee and injured others during a cordon-and-search operation.
31. Twenty-third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/1997/478, at para. 32.
32. Absence of a foren sic pathologist made exhumation and further investigation of this case impossible.
33. And the same deficiency curtailed investigations into another allegation that ECOMOG soldiers beat a man to death while questioning him about a weapon. Twenty-fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/1997/643, at para. 33.
34. JoMarie Fecci, Gang-bangers: Boy 'Soldiers' bring Terror to Liberia, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Nov. 1997, at 44;
35. Alyson Hyman, Images of the Children: Liberia Before and After the War, NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, July-August 1992, at 36;
36. SHANA SWISS, WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN,LIBERIA:WOMEN AND CHIL DREN GRAVELY MISTREATED, May 1991;
37. The Nissan Patrols and the Boys in the Trenches, THE NEWS, (Liberia) July 24, 1992, at 3.
38. Cotonou Accord, sec. C, art. 4(1), sec. D, art. 5(2)(e), reprinted in ACCORD, AN INTER NATIONAL REVIEW OF PEACE INITIATIVES, THE LIBERIAN PEACE PROCESS 1990-1996, 43 (Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl, eds. 1996).
39. Cotonou Accord, sec. H, art. 9(2), Id.
40. Cotonou Accord, sec. I, art. 10, Id.
41. Cotonou Accord, sec. E, art. 17, Id.
42. Cotonou Accord, sec. F, art. 18, Id.
43. Cotonou Accord, sec. G, art. 19, Id.
44. Akosombo Agreement, sec. F, art. 7, Id. at 54.
45. Akosombo Agreement, sec. H, art. 9, Id.
46. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
47. Nancy Dubrow, currently with the Taylor Institute's International Child Welfare Group in Chicago, adapted a set of measures developed by Columbia University's Project on Children and War. In recent phone conversations
48. Ms. Dubrow explained to this author that she adapted and piloted the POCAW measures on some 20 youth before conducting a wider study on approximately 100 youth between ages 9-15.
49. About one half of the boys were from the WACH program and the remainder were from a CAP graphic arts program.
50. Her findings tended to show that some intervention prior to family reunification was useful in reducing feelings of isolation and withdrawal.
51. UNICEF, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS, prepared for the Task Force on Demobilization and Reintegration by the Subcommittee on Child Soldiers (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION];
52. LIBERIA: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRA-TION (undated copy);
53. REVISED LIBERIA DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PLAN (no date, no title page);
54. UN HACO, LIBERIA DISARMAMENT/DEMOBILIZATION PLAN (Nov. 14, 1996);
55. UNICEF, OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS (undated, missing cover sheet);
56. SAVE THE CHILDREN/UK, Liberia'S EX-CHILD FIGHTERS: A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF SCF/UK IN Liberia (May 1997) [hereinafter Liberia'S EX-CHILD FIGHTERS];
57. THE NEW AFRICAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTAGENCY, FRIENDS OF Liberia, UN DEVELOPMENTPROGRAMME,NGO CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF COMBATANTS (Nov. 2, 1996) [hereinafter NGO CONFERENCE]; UNICEF, AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION OF FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS (undated);
58. UNICEF, CHILD SOLDIERS IN Liberia (undated, missing title page).
59. NGO CONFERENCE, id. at 1-2.
60. SCF/UK run both regional tracing and family reunification programs seeking to docu ment and reunite children scattered throughout Liberia, Guinea and Ivory Coast, as well as vulnerable children's centres that provide for the care, education and basic skills training of ex-combatant children.
61. Participants in the sub-committee (or technical working group) on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers included: UNICEF, SCF/UK, UNOMIL, UNHACO, UNDP, National Reintegration Commission, Don Bosco Homes, AME Zion, and CAP.
62. According to SCF/UK staff, the framework had been under discussion since late July 1996 and had undergone modifications to reflect discussions on encampment, demobilization packages, the attention to be given to child soldiers, etc.
63. Combatants had continuously demobilized on an individual basis and former child fighters were constantly being attended to by, for example, SCF/UK. There were a number of boys in a CAP run home in Virginia.
64. When CAP pulled out during the April 6, 1996 looting, SCF/UK took over the center and eventually expanded it to take in boys demobilized after November 1996.
65. For many months after the official demobilization ended, youth continued to separate from their de facto commanders and request tracing assistance.
66. UNICEF Liberia,THE DISARMAMENT,DEMOBILIZATION & REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN Liberia 1994-1997, THE PROCESS AND LESSONS LEARNED (1998).
67. UNHACO did distribute absolutely worthless vouchers that still cannot be "cashed in" for any educational benefit whatsoever.
68. UNDHA-HACO DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMME, CHILD SOLDIER QUESTION NAIRE, UNHACO Liberia DISARMAMENT/DEMOBILIZATION PLAN, annex VIII (14 November 1996).
69. There was a health survey completed at the demobilization sites but that information was never analyzed. It would have been very interesting to be able to compare the physical sequelae of youth to those of older combatants.
70. It is unclear how UNHACO defined a child for purposes of these statistical analyses.
71. I doubt that all of the self-reported ages of the demobilized combatants can be relied on with complete certainty.
72. SCF/UK family tracing records indicate that the factions with the highest ratio of child fighters were also those renowned for kidnaping and abducting children.
73. Lutheran World Service staff present at one demobilization site report, anecdotally, that most children said they wanted to start a business after demobilization.
74. LWS doubts the validity of the responses to the UNHACO questionnaire indicating that the majority planned to return to school. Respondents may have been influenced by what they thought the inter viewer wanted to hear, or by their own aspirations in response to the educational coupons they received (which turned out to be worthless).
75. Liberia'S EX-CHILD FIGHTERS, supra note 34.
76. Author's interview with a UNDP staffer, formerly of CHAL, in Monrovia, Nov. 1997.
77. UNICEF Liberia, AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION OF FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS (undated mimeograph).
78. The National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (NDDC) was a UN partner in preparation of the demobilization plan but currently has no clear role.
79. Implementers of the WAYS projects include CAP, Don Bosco Homes, Sustainable Devel opment Promoters, Community and Human Development Agency, AME Zion Community College.
80. Mona S. Macksoud and J. Lawrence Aber, The War Experiences and Psychosocial Development of Children in Lebanon, 67 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 70 (1996).
81. FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION, supra note 34.
82. Liberia'S EX-CHILD FIGHTERS, supra note 34, at 13.
83. Author's interview with staff at UNICEF/Liberia, in Monrovia, Nov. 1997.
84. Liberia'S EX-CHILD FIGHTERS, supra note 34, at 14-15.
85. The Parliamentary Human Rights Group claims that US contributions to ECOMOG were running at $26 million a quarter in 1993. Avebury, supra note 18, at 7.
86. The Parliamentary Human Rights Group asked Under Secretary-General Jonah "to take action without waiting for Dr. Gordon-Somers to return [from vacation], emphasizing that children's lives were being sacrificed for political reasons and agreeing with the ICRC's description of Dr. Gordon-Somers' conduct as a grave violation of international humanitarian law." Id. at 9.
87. Cotonou Accord, supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
88. FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION, supra note 34.
89. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, EASY PREY: CHILD SOLDIERS IN Liberia (1994).
90. AMNESTY INT'L, Liberia: TIME TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1997);
91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, EMERGING FROM DESTRUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES FACING THE NEW LiberiaN GOVERNMENT (1997).
92. Graca Machel, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108, at para. 49, U.N. Doc. A/51/306, 26 August 1996 [hereinafter Machel study].
93. G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997), supra note 3, at para. 21.
94. Unfortunately, according to one NGO worker, former child soldiers already "form a large proportion of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and associated security bodies.
95. No international group (including World Bank and US Embassy) has been able to prevent the President from recruiting whoever (sic) he likes into his forces and there is no check on the related security bodies he creates."
96. In November 1997 SCF/UK and Don Bosco were setting up a community monitoring project to address community-level child welfare issues and gain insight into how such youth are reintegrating into families and society. Monitors for each sector or community will put together a local group to define and address their community's concerns.
97. G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997), supra note 3, at para. 28;
98. G.A. Res. 52/107 (1998), supra note 3 at para. 12.
99. G.A. Res. 52/107 (1998), supra note 3, at para. 16.
100. The 1997 resolution merely invited Governments to integrate such training into their military programmes. G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997), supra note 3, at para. 34.
101. G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997), supra note 3, at para. 31; G.A. Res. 52/107 (1998), supra note 3, at para. 14.
102. G.A. Res. 51/77 (1997), supra note 3, at para. 21.
103. Machel study, supra note 68, at paras. 281-300 (spelling out a full range of ways in which the components of the UN system can help ensure that children are better protected during and after conflicts.)
104. G.A. Res. 52/107 (1998), supra note 3, at para. 9.
105. Macksoud & Aber, supra note 52, at 71.
106. Id. at 85.
107. Machel study, supra note 68, at para. 62(c)