Expanded deterrence broadening the threat of retaliation

Policy Review

Volumn , Issue 149, 2008, Pages 43-59

  Colby, Elbridge A ^a  

^a United States Regarding weapons of Mass Destruction

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EID: 47349098325     PISSN: 01465945     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (22)

1. The word "catastrophic" is used advisedly here. It includes catastrophic weapons of mass destruction attacks but also other strikes of equivalent or greater magnitude that do not use NBC weapons. The emphasis is not on the means but on the damage done. Smaller-scale terrorist attacks that do not threaten the functioning of an advanced society are more susceptible to more traditional modes of response, though an aggregated campaign of such attacks might constitute a "catastrophic" attack. For one sobering study of the possible consequences of a catastrophic attack, see Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander, "Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack," RAND Technical Report (2006).
2. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (John Wiley & Sons, 2007).
3. See also Fred Ikle, Annihilation From Within: The Ultimate Threat to Nations (Columbia University Press, 2006) and
4. Martin Reese, Our Final Hour (Basic Books, 2003).
5. For a recent report on these possibilities, see David Ignatius, "Taking Stock of the War on Terror," Washington Post (May 22, 2008).
6. This is a paraphrase of Lawrence Freedman's summation of the experience of the early Cold War: "If there could be no escape from the presence of terror, then terror had to be respected." Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (St. Martin's Press, 1983), 207.
7. "Material support" is defined in the U.S. Code under 18 U.S.C. 2339. Complicity, or acting as an accomplice, is defined as "[o]ne who knowingly, voluntarily, and with a common interest with others participates in the commission of a crime as a principal, accessory, or aider and abettor." Ballantine's Law Dictionary (1969). The Texas Code defines criminal negligence as: "A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Texas Penal Code, Title 2, Section 6.03, http://tloz.tlc.state.tx.us/stamtes/docs/PE/ content/htm/pe.002.00.000006.00.htm (accessed May 22, 2008). Clearly negligence with respect to a catastrophic terror attack would constitute criminal negligence.
8. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton University Press, 1976), 733.
9. See http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/the_war_we_need_to_win.php (accessed May 19, 2008).
10. The author emphasizes that he does not pretend to U.S. government or other institutional authorization. For the author's closer analysis of Hadley's speech, see "The New Deterrence," Weekly Standard online (April 10, 1008). http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/ooo/ooo/014/ 959tnykn.asp (accessed May 20, 2008).
11. Al Qaeda may not have been effectively deterred, however, in the sense of not understanding that its attacks would incur such a serious response. See Jonathan Schachter, The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-terrorism Policy-Making (RAND, 2002), Chapter 4.
12. For more on this point, see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, 2002).
13. For an exemplary analysis of this idea, see Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (RAND 1002), esp. Chapter III and 47-49. The key, they note, is to understand that even such terrorists as al Qaeda can be deterred from doing specific things. As they point out, "everyone can be influenced sometimes" (22). The National Security Strategy of 2006 also takes promising steps in this direction, particularly in Section III, Part C, which discusses deterring terrorist networks, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ sectionin.html (accessed May 19, 2008).
14. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5369198.stm (accessed May 19, 2008).
15. Thanks to Robert Zarate for this point. For further elaboration on this issue, see Mark Smith, Janine Davidson, and Peter Brooks, "Micro- Foundations of Insurgent Violence: Implications for Iraq," unpublished working draft, presentation prepared for the Pentagon's Irregular Warfare Forum (Center for Adaptive Strategies & Threats, Hicks & Associates, Inc., October 5, 2005). Zarate points out that decisions the deterred would make fall along a spectrum, and that it pays to ease the ability to make decisions in our favor as well as threatening retaliation if they do not. Efforts in this direction include the expansion of lawful government control - or sovereignty - to areas such as the Northwest Frontier Provinces.
16. It is often said that groups such as al Qaeda cannot be deterred because they are not rational, meaning presumably that they do not have plausible objectives they are pursuing through a strategy of employing means to achieve ends. This is a highly questionable conclusion. The November 29, 2007 attempt by Osama bin Laden to break off European allies from the United States was only one of the more recent examples rebutting this argument. This followed a similar offer in April 2004. More broadly, see, e.g., Christopher M. Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," CRS Report for Congress. (July 9, 2007); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005), esp. Chapter 7; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004) and "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006); Jonathan Schachter, The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-terrorism Policy-Making (RAND, 2002), 94-96; Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," International Security 30:3, (Winter 2005/06); Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (St. Martin's, 1990), 117-120; and Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization 56:2 (Spring 2002); Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. (Brassey's, 2002).
17. See Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, and Pape, Dying to Win, esp. Part I.
18. See, for instance, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy (July 2007). The handbook states: "A belligerent reprisal is an enforcement measure under the law of armed conflict consisting of an act that would otherwise be unlawful but which is justified as a response to the previous unlawful acts of an enemy.... Reprisals may be taken against enemy armed forces, enemy civilians other than those in occupied territory, and enemy property" (6-4).
19. 18 U.S.C. 2339.
20. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, Chapter 9.
21. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book I, Chapter 9.
22. Thanks to Paul K. Davis for this point. Thomas Schelling emphasizes the importance of automaticity, impetuosity, and even (from certain standpoints) irrationality in an appropriate retaliatory response. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), esp. Chapter 2, "The Art of Commitment."