The divides of environmental law and the problem of harm in the endangered species act

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 661-693

  Fischman, Robert L ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 47149108515     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (263)

1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 703 (2000).
3. Id. at 744-48.
4. Howard Latin, Fundamental Dilemmas of Environmental Law (Nov. 5, 2001) (unpublished thematic essay, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
5. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (1990).
6. Indeed, one of the leading environmental law casebooks begins with an authors' preface quoting this famous Muir phrase. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB & ROBERT L. GRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY xxxi (2d ed. 1998).
7. Peter J. Fontaine, EPA 's Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 100 (1993);
8. Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 463, 480 (1989);
9. st Century, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 705, 737 (1999);
10. Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1317 (2001).
11. U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (1990);
12. Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REV. 299, 341 (1995);
13. John R. Nolon, Summary of the United States Seminar on Our National Environmental Laws, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996);
14. see also Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1991) (arguing that an integrated framework should be utilized to solve environmental issues).
15. Joseph A. Hoffman, Negotiating Settlements at New Jersey's Contaminated Sites: Navigating an Unchartered Sea, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 988, 988 (1991);
16. see also Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands I: Air Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. POL'Y 1, 5 (1993).
17. Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 779, 784-85 (1997);
18. Glicksman, supra note 8, at 1-5;
19. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 317-18.
20. See generally Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717 (2007).
21. On "integrated, holistic" management of the Chesapeake Bay, see Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'YREV. 379, 380, 387 (2000).
22. More generally, Barnett M. Lawrence persuasively argues that "national coastal policy, however, requires greater coordination of pollution control efforts with land use management and preservation programs." Barnett M. Lawrence, Towards a National Coastal Policy, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,404, 10,411 (1987).
23. C. Facemire, T. Augspurger, D. Bateman, M. Brim, P. Conzelmann, S. Delchamps, E. Douglas, L. Inmon, K. Looney, F. Lopez, G. Masson, D. Morrison, N. Morse & A. Robison, Impacts of Mercury Contamination in the Southeastern United States, 80 WATER AIR & SOIL POLLUTION 923, 925-26 (1995).
24. For other examples of pollution problems faced by public land managers, see Glicksman, supra note 8, at 5-6.
25. David S. Wilcove, David Rothstein, Jason Dubow, Ali Phillips & Elizabeth Losos, Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998).
26. TOM HORTON & WILLIAM M. EICHBAUM, TURNING THE TIDE: SAVING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 174-78 (1991);
27. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, DEVELOPMENT OF A SUSPENSION FEEDING AND DEPOSIT FEEDING BENTHOS MODEL FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 3-1 (2000), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/ subcommittee/mdsc/hqi_benthos_model.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (E.D. CaI. 2001) (noting that the Garcia River water quality standard was not attained because of sedimentation from logging). Siltation is the leading cause of impairment of rivers and streams in the United States. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION'S WATER 11 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/92report/92summ.pdf. In its 1992 inventory, the EPA attributed impairment through silviculture as the source of 7 percent, and resource extraction as the source of 11 percent, of the assessed river miles impaired by pollution.
29. Id. at 12. Prescribed burning for agriculture and silviculture contributes to air pollution problems in many parts of the country.
30. JANICE PETERSON & DAROLD WARD, AN INVENTORY OF PARTICULATE MATTER AND AIR TOXIC EMISSIONS FROM PRESCRIBED FIRES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1989 (USDA Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station).
31. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through ", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 79-80 (1959);
32. Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 518 (1979).
33. The term "environmental law" is often used to refer solely to the pollution control side of the divide. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ix-x (2d ed. 1994). In this Article, I use the term in its more comprehensive, inclusive meaning. On course content and the AALS,
34. see Fischman, What is Natural Resources Law?, supra note 9, at 717, 723-727.
35. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119 (1991) (discussing some of these dangers).
36. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail, supra note 9, at 784-85 (noting that "fruitful cross-fertilization may result from efforts to reweave" pollution control and resource management law);
37. David J. Hayes, Cross-Pollination, ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 1998, at 28.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
39. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000).
44. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.12 (2000). Sulfur dioxide is the only ambient air pollutant with a different secondary standard. Carbon monoxide has a primary but no secondary standard.
45. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (2000).
46. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2000).
47. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (2000).
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000).
49. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (2000).
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-ee (2000).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000).
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2000).
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2000).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
55. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
58. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEPOSITION OF AIR POLLUTANTS TO THE GREAT WATERS: THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/gr8water/3rdrpt/execsum.html.
59. D.W. Schindler, Biotic Impoverishment at Home and Abroad, 39 BIOSCIENCE 426 (1989). Other studies have blamed the decrease in sunfish and small mouth bass populations on the destruction of food chains by airborne acid deposition.
60. D.W. Schindler, Effects of Acid Rain on Freshwater Ecosystems, 239 SCIENCE 149, 154 n.43 (1988).
61. Jon R. Luoma, Black Duck Decline: An Acid Rain Link, AUDUBON, May 1987, at 19, 22 (citing studies showing that acidification's impacts on the food chain account for a sixty percent decrease in the growth rate of young ducks).
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314(b) (2000).
63. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 325-27 (2002);
64. Fischman, What Is Natural Resouces Law?, supra note 9, at 717.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (NFMA); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000) (FLPMA).
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1a-7 (2000) (national park plans); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2000) (national wildlife refuge plans).
67. See, e.g., 43 CF.R. § 3809 (2000).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (2000) (CZMA); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (NEPA).
69. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 11 (1997);
70. THE NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 35-43 (2003).
71. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION WORKGROUP, TOWARD A PLACE-DRIVEN APPROACH: THE EDGEWATER CONSENSUS ON AN EPA STRATEGY FOR ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION (March 15, 1994 draft).
72. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION (1995);
73. U.S. FOREST SERV., A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK: ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1994).
74. See R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994).
75. ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE 274-99 (2003).
76. See John S. Applegate, Introduction to 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (John S. Applegate ed., 2004).
77. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 43-46 (1988).
78. Id. at 47.
79. See, e.g., STEPHEN FOX, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 289 (1981).
80. See STEPHEN FOX, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (2d prtg. 1981).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). This belies the general historical rule that associates utilitarian approaches with the Progressive Era. Another version of the two views is described by Professor Sax as the transformative (utilitarian) economy versus the (categorical) economy of nature. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442-46 (1993).
83. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 259.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000). This is the provision on which the Forest Service based its famous 1982-2001 management requirement to ensure the maintenance of minimum viable populations of most vertebrate species. That regulation proved to be the single most important factor in the judicial suspension of old-growth logging in the Pacific Northwest.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (2000).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i) (2000).
87. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16U.S.C. § 1604(g) (2000) (incorporating the multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services obtained from the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000)).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(m) (2000).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d) (2000).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(3)(A)(i), (a)(4)(B) (2000).
92. Clean Water Act, ch. 758, § 316, 86 Stat. 876 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000)); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Seacoast AntiPollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1978).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(2) (2000); see also Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 526-38 (2002).
94. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (2000).
95. See, e.g., In re Pac. Coast Molybdenum Co., 90 Interior Decisions 352 (1983).
96. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) ("[P]roperty is required to come in standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost.");
97. see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (analyzing the theoretical and practical features of the numerus clausus). The categorical thrust of property law may also be articulated as a preference for rules over standards.
98. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 51-55 (1992).
99. Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 407 (1994); .
100. see also Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119 (2003) (discussing the difference between technology-based and risk-based environmental standards).
101. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1314(b) (2000).
102. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-12 (2000).
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(m), 1313(d) (2000).
104. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
105. Applegate, supra note 53, at xii-xxi.
106. JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE, at back cover (1989).
107. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
108. 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (2000).
109. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 326-27 (1991). Lazarus generally ascribes congressional distrust to the "seemingly never-ending onslaught of impossible agency tasks" from Congress as well as administration-created implementation problems and institutional limitations.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
112. Id.
113. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, MAXINE I. LIPELES & MARK S. SQUILLACE, AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 131 (1996).
114. 1962 Refuge Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 87-714, § 1, 76 Stat. 653 (1962).
115. See STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY 149-50 (1982) (providing an excellent description of the way the Fish & Wildlife Service, in its regulatory capacity, favored clear, prohibitive guidelines because they give unambiguous direction and allow the Fish & Wildlife Service to deflect criticism by maintaining that its hands are tied by a statute).
116. The legislative history of the Recreation Act indicates that Fish and Wildlife Services had been diverting funds in this manner. S. REP. NO. 87-1858 (1962),
117. as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2725-26 (report of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior);
118. see also Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1994).
119. Inadequate funding for the full range of determinations under the Endangered Species Act is a particularly acute implementation constraint today. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons From a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 348 (2007);
120. Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 471-75 (2004).
121. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 822 (1988).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)-(f) (2000). "California-list" wastes were regulated at the time under a California state land disposal program. Id.
123. Clean Air Act of 1990 § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000). The EPA can modify or accept petitions to modify the list. Id.
124. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 135-37.
125. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 822.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(4)(A); see also Shaprio & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 837 n.86 (discussing the practical application of the U.S. Code provisions).
127. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 837.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1) (2000).
129. Id. § 6924(c)(2).
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000).
131. Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 3 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 16.5 (2007).
132. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1910).
133. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
134. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail, supra note 9.
135. The establishment legislation for Haleakalā National Park illustrates this bare-bones approach. 16 U.S.C. § 396(b)-(c) (2000).
136. The establishment legislation for Great Basin National Park, for instance, discusses zoning waters for fishing and limiting grazing. 16 U.S.C. §§ 410mm(a), 410mm-1(a)-(e) (2000).
137. The establishment legislation for Channel Islands National Park, for instance, provides a deadline for a management plan, requires consultation with certain interested parties, mandates certain contents of the plan, requires public hearings in particular locations to discuss certain issues, specifies low-intensity and limited entry management, prohibits entry fees, and mandates certain studies. 16 U.S.C. § 410ff (2000).
138. Nat'l Park Serv., Management Policies 2:6 (1988) ("[C]ongressionally directed plans will be given a priority.").
139. See NAT'L PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASS'N, NATIONAL PARKS: FROM VIGNETTES TO A GLOBAL VIEW 6-8 (1989) (calling for broad-based, ongoing research by the NPS.);
140. NAT'L PARK SERV. STEERING COMM., NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA 36 (1993) ("The National Park Service must engage in a sustained and integrated program of natural, cultural, and social science resource management and research aimed at acquiring and using the information needed to manage and protect park resources.");
141. Dennis J. Herman, Note, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6-11 (1992);
142. Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n, Parks in the Next Century, NAT'L PARKS, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 18 (calling for "a threefold increase in natural, cultural, and social science research staff").
143. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 228b(c) (2000) (Grand Canyon National Monument).
144. See 16 U.S.C. § 160f(b) (2000) (Voyageurs National Park);
145. id. § 410ff-5 (Channel Islands National Park);
146. id. § 410gg (Biscayne National Park);
147. id. § 410aaa (Death Valley National Park);
148. id. § 431 (note) (Congaree Swamp National Monument).
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 160j (2000) (discussing roads in the Voyageurs National Park);
150. id. § 228g (discussing solutions for dealing with the dangerous or detrimental use of aircrafts around the Grand Canyon National Park);
151. id. § 271c (discussing construction of roads in the Canyonlands National Park);
152. id. § 272c (discussing use of driveways around Arches National Park).
153. See 16 U.S.C. § 79k (2000) (discussing erosion and sedimentation in reference to the pending Redwood National Park); id. § 273(b) (discussing the effects of grazing in the Capitol Reef National Park);
154. id. § 410ff-2 (discussing depletion of natural resources in the Channel Islands National Park);
155. id. § 431 (note) (discussing rock art at the Petroglyph National Monument).
156. Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 251).
157. Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002).
158. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-ee (2000).
159. Id. § 5(a)(4)(B).
160. Id. § 5(a)(4)(G).
161. Id. § 5(a)(4)(N).
162. See generally Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,527 (1996);
163. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998);
164. Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, "Improving" Project XL: Helping Adaptive Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155 (1998);
165. Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA 's Project XL, 17 UCLA ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67 (1998).
166. The Vail Agenda was a Park Service self-evaluation on the occasion of its 75th anniversary. The Agenda cited "new, costly, and sometimes ill-conceived responsibilities" that thwart the Service's ability to set funding priorities. NAT'L PARK SERV. STEERING COMM., NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA 36 (1993).
167. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 302 (1994).
168. See, e.g., Al U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
169. Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3536 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C § 230).
170. But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (noting that the President, who controls agency appointees, is elected to serve the national interest, not parochial legislative districts);
171. Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 332 (1987) (commenting that statutory details are created in "a submerged micropolitical process without open and regular procedures").
172. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (5) (establishing statutory goals to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters), and 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining ''discharge of a pollutant" to mean the addition of any pollutant to "navigable waters"), with 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States").
173. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
174. U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
175. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without Limitation ": The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the Property Clause).
176. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
177. 531 U.S. 159(2001). More recently, the Court divided over the question of whether the CWA regulates wetlands without continuous surface connections to navigable waters. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). Questions remain about whether the Court's limited reading of statutory jurisdiction in these wetland cases applies to the NPDES program. Robin K. Craig, Which Way Federalism Under Section 402?, 11 Natural Resources and Environment, Summer 2007, at 20.
178. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
179. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
180. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-47 (1976).
181. Id. at 540;
182. see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (explaining that the Court will not assume that Congress will use its power over federal property to cause injustice to the states).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
184. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, at 559-60.
185. John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-first Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2004);
186. see, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (holding that a federal conservation easement preempts hostile state law).
187. See, e.g., GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 271-328 (6th ed. 2007).
188. See Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, supra note 9, at 725.
189. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470W-6.
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
191. See Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, supra note 9, at 725, 727.
192. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 9(A)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000). For a discussion of data gaps and the ESA administrative programs, especially listing, see Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165 (2006);
193. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004);
194. Holly Doremus, Listing decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997).
195. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 3(14), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
196. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-703 (1995).
197. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
198. See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from the Past Quarter Century, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,701 (1988) (reviewing lower court decisions); Steven G. Davidson, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter:
199. Modification of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 541 (2003);
200. Steven P. Quarles, John A. MacLeod & Thomas R. Lundquist, Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife "Take " Under Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003 (1996);
201. Ray Vaughan, Proof of "Prohibited Takings " Under the Endangered Species Act, in 11 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 421 (3d ed. 1994).
202. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1989).
203. RONALD W. CLARK, EINSTEIN: THE LIFE AND TIMES (1972).
204. The stochastic, non-equilibrium paradigm is explained by DANIEL B. BOTKTN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990);
205. DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 388-420 (2d ed. 1994);
206. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1994).
207. Compensation is payment of damages or any other act that a court orders to be done by a party who injures another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004). Restitution is disgorgement of benefit wrongly taken.
208. Id. at 1309.
209. Courts may also provide injunctions as equitable relief for claims of potential future harm.
210. The preponderance of the evidence standard is equivalent to the more likely than not standard, and reflects a burden of fifty-one percent.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000).
212. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that plaintiffs face a "high bar" when challenging the Forest Service).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
214. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
215. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 718 (1995) (explaining that it is obvious that the meaning of the word "take" is "deeply embedded" in the common law).
216. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997);
217. Paul Boudreaux, Understanding "Take " in the Endangered Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 734 (2002) (explaining that the take provision of the ESA should not be read "in isolation from" the common law);
218. Quartes et al., supra note 146, at 10003;
219. James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595 (2003).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
221. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1873).
222. DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOW 8 (1999);
223. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 253 (1992).
224. WILCOVE, supra note 161, at 8.
225. On harm in environmental law, see generally Albert C Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897 (2006).
226. 50 F.3d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1995).
227. See, e.g., United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707 (D. Or. 2000).
228. 50 C.F.R. 17.3(2006).
229. Rosboro, 50 F.3d 781.
230. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996).
231. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS 443 (2001).
232. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995).
233. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51-52 (1991) (citing two prominent treatises giving conflicting definitions of proximate cause).
234. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 155 n. 104 (1992) (giving examples of confusion between proximate cause and probability in the medical context);
235. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 111-12 (2001) (explaining that high-cost, low-probability events create trouble for decision making);
236. Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1988) (explaining that confusion exists between the concepts of responsibility, risk, and responsibility).
237. Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 617 (2005).
238. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 8.11 (1992);
239. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Improving Laws, Declining World: The Tort of Contamination, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1249, 1259 (2004).
240. Rasband, supra note 158, at 630-37 (advocating a form of proportionate liability in take cases in the environmental context);
241. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law " Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 866 (1984) (explaining that proportionality is ideally suited to resolving problems of causal indeterminacy).
242. Boudreaux, supra note 158, at 770.
243. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
244. Craig M. Pease, Viewpoint: In Defense of N > 1, 55 BIOSCIENCE 100 (2005)
245. (quoting United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at * 5 (D. Or. 2000) (denying the plaintiff federal agency an injunction against a clear-cut for failure to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that the timber harvest would result in a take of a northern spotted owl)).
246. Joel A. Tickner, The Role of Environmental Science in Precautionary Decision Making, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4-5 (Joel A. Tickner ed., 2003).
247. 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000).
248. Id.
249. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, 2000 WL 298707, at *5.
250. Id.
251. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (D. Haw. 2000).
252. Id. at 1134.
253. The strength of the seal's dependence on lobster as a food source would be a parameter in a model used to estimate risk.
254. Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 432 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
255. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P 'ship, 2000 WL 298707, at *5 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1994)).
256. See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 512-13 (10th Cir. 1985) (refusing to overturn an agency determination that a reservoir project failed to qualify for automatic approval despite attenuated causation).
257. Michael E. Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Concept from Its Beginning to Its Culmination in the Endangered Species Act, 21 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 459-64 (1984).
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2000).
260. In fact, the Interior and Commerce Departments pledged to do something very close to this in 1994, when they announced a joint policy to provide greater certainty under section 9 by identifying at the time of listing activities that would or would not likely constitute a take. Notice of Cooperative Policy for Endangered Species Act Section 9 Prohibitions, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,373-01 (July 1, 1994).
261. Cf. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 298 (1990) (discussing the similar problems with detailed SEC rules).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Alean Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-65 (3d Cir. 1992);
263. Robert L. Glicksman, CERCLA Reauthorization and Natural Resource Damage Recovery, 9 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 313, 318-19 (1993-94).