Missing information: The scientific data gap in conservation and chemical regulation

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 399-406

  Applegate, John S ^a,b   Fischman, Robert L ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Center for Progressive Reform

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47049128000     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (57)

1. "Science," for these purposes, refers to the physical, including the health, sciences.
2. See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004) (detailing a regulatory action in which the authors argue that such a charade occurred);
3. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005);
4. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (suggesting that non-scientific considerations are often at work, despite the nominal reliance on scientific rationales).
5. John S. Applegate, Introduction to 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (John S. Applegate, ed. 2004), at xiii-xxiv;
6. see also Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) ("Science has been seen both as the justification for environmental law and as the means for fairly administering it.");
7. Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 569-75 (1992) (describing the "allure" of science).
8. These are most frequently referred to by Professor Wendy Wagner' s felicitous phrase, the "science charade." See Wagner, supra note 2.
9. Other examples are collected in Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 661 n.7, 682-84 (2005).
10. Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 356-57 (1982).
11. This has been a continuing theme throughout the history of environmental law. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 745-47 (2000) (listing "uncertainty and risk," as well as other characteristics that also contribute to uncertainty such as physically and temporally distant injury);
12. Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208-09 (1978) (describing "ignorance of mechanism" as exemplifying "the uncertainties surrounding environmental risk decisionmaking").
13. The most common formulation of the precautionary principle can be found in the Rio Declaration: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." United Nations Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED], Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (June 14, 1992),
14. reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879;
15. see also John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13 (2002) (providing commentary on the purposes and elements of the precautionary principle).
16. Latin, supra note 5, at 356 (emphasis omitted);
17. see also Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 777-90 (1997) (discussing "preventable scientific uncertainties").
18. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991);
19. Mary Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989).
20. See, e.g., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006);
21. David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. RPTR. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10232 (2002);
22. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619 (2004) [hereinafter Wagner, Commons Ignorance].
23. See John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should Bridge the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation ?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS, supra note 10, at 255, 263-64.
24. A different perspective, emphasizing the amount of information that is available, can be found in James W. Conrad, Jr., Open Secrets: The Widespread Availability of Information About the Health and Environmental Effects of Chemicals, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Data Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998) (enacted as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; also known as the Shelby Amendment);
26. Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2000) (enacted as a rider to the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); see Applegate, supra note 9;
28. Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459 (2000) (suggesting that TSCA embodies an "unprecautionary principle").
29. See Applegate, supra note 11, at 261-75.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). The policy continues, "and that the development of such data should be the responsibility of those who manufacture . . . such chemical[s]. . . ." Id.
31. For example, the EPA is authorized to issue "test rules" that require manufacturers to generate test data. § 2603. Also, manufacturers must report adverse effects data. § 2607; see Applegate, supra note 9, at 315;
32. Conrad, supra note 11, at 143-46.
33. The effectiveness of these devices has been questioned, however. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34. See Applegate, supra note 9, at 308-12 (comparing data availability for licensing and non-licensing systems).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e). TSCA was enacted shortly after it was learned that PCBs-polychlorinated biphenyls, fire retardant chemicals frequently used in large electrical equipment-were potential carcinogens.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000).
37. Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2007).
38. Some versions of the precautionary principle require that the authority invoking the principle will continue to seek to reduce the uncertainty, which muddies the classification somewhat. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 20-21, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000).
39. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 2, at 253-57;
40. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 3, at 17-20;
41. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988);
42. Tai, supra note 4, at 666-69.
43. Some scholars offer trenchant critiques of "sound science" rhetoric. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897 (2004).
44. Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 697 (2007);
45. see also Tai, supra note 4, at 686-98;
46. Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 10.
47. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-41 (1989);
48. see also id. at 469 ("More elaborate procedures are generally regarded as favorable to regulated industries. Because industries possess much of the information relevant to regulatory decisions, elaborate processes give them more power by increasing the importance of that information.");
49. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 268-69 (1987) (offering TSCA as an example);
50. Tai, supra note 4, at 698-709 (criticizing the Information Quality Act).
51. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 779 (1997);
53. Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands I: Air Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1993).
54. But see Lazarus, supra note 6, (describing characteristics common to all of environmental law).
55. See Kristin Carden, Note, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165 (2006);
56. Doremus, supra note 26.
57. ALDO LEOPOLD, ROUND RIVER 147 (Luna B. Leopold ed., 1953).