Moral autonomy, civil liberties, and Confucianism

Philosophy East and West

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 281-310

  Chan, Joseph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 46949100318     PISSN: 00318221     EISSN: 15291898     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2002.0012     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. - For powerful contemporary challenges along this line, see Randall Peerenboom, "Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought: The Right to Think versus Right Thinking," in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds., Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chap. 13
2. and Ci Jiwei, "The Right, the Good, and the Place of Rights in Confucianism" (unpublished paper, 1998)
3. For an argument that Confucianism is compatible with the idea of human rights (although not necessarily with all the specific rights), see Joseph Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 212-237
4. - This line of argument can be found in works by Mou Tsung-san and T'ang Chun-i. See also Lin Yu-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," Monumenta Serica (Journal of Oriental Studies) 31 (1974-1975): 172-183, and "Reflection on the 'Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition,'" forthcoming in a conference volume, ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl (Leiden: E. J. Brill), which appeals to the Confucian concept of moral autonomy in arguing that Confucianism can accept human rights
5. - A clear statement of this occurs in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics 1110a-1111b
6. - This is especially true if morality is objective and hence admits of true or false understanding of it. But even if morality is not objectively valid, but is, as a Humean would say, a projection of human feelings, there might still be room for rational reflection and hence a possibility of error. For example, Simon Blackburn claims that one's reflection of one's feelings and desires, which are the basis of morality, can admit of rational scrutiny, and hence it is possible that a person may make improper - that is, irrational or subrational - moral judgments. See his Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chap. 6
7. - For some theories, objective morality not only does not undermine one's autonomy or freedom, it serves as a basis of it. Autonomy or freedom in spite of morality is license, as Locke famously puts it
8. - For discussions of the contrast of these two views in moral philosophy, see Raymond Guess, "Morality and Identity," in The Sources of Normativity, by Christine Korsgaard, with commentary by G. A. Cohen, Raymond Guess, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, ed. Onora O'Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 192-193
9. and especially Lewis Hinchman, "Autonomy, Individuality, and Self-Determination," in James Schmidt, ed., What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions (London: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 488-516
10. - Analects IV.2, 6; XV.9. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of The Analects and The Mencius are taken from D. C. Lau's translations
11. - For an illuminating discussion on this point, see David B. Wong, "Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?" Philosophy East and West 41 (1991): 31-44
12. - Xunzi's view on the connection between human nature and moral motivation raises many interpretative and philosophical difficulties. See David B. Wong, "Xunzi on Moral Motivation," in Philip J. Ivanhoe, ed., Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), pp. 202-223
13. - I thank Lee H. Yearley for drawing my attention to the discussion of honest village people in the Mencius. See his illuminating analysis of Mencius' view in his Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 67-72
14. - Chad Hansen, "Punishment and Dignity in China," in Donald Munro, ed., Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1985), pp. 361-363
15. - For a good discussion on this point, see A. S. Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), p. 257
16. - Xunzi III.3.13, in John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 180. Except when otherwise stated, all translations of Xunzi are from Knoblock
17. - The clearest statement on this point is in the Zhongyong, bk. XX
18. - On Confucius' view on this point, see the succinct analysis of Wm. Theodore de Bary in The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 35-37, 83
19. - "If one learns from others but does not think, one will be bewildered. If, on the other hand, one thinks but does not learn from others, one will be in peril" (Analects II.15). "Learn widely and be steadfast in your purpose, inquire earnestly and reflect on what is at hand, and there is no need for you to look for benevolence elsewhere" (XIX.6). "When I have pointed out one corner of a square to anyone and he does not come back with the other three, I will not point it out to him a second time" (VII.8). "Do I possess knowledge? No, I do not. A rustic put a question to me and my mind was a complete blank. I kept hammering at the two sides of the question until I got everything out of it" (IX.8)
20. - "The gentleman, knowing well that learning that is incomplete and impure does not deserve to be fine, recites and enumerates his study so that he will be familiar with them, ponders over them, and searches into them that he will fully penetrate their meaning" (Xunzi I.1.14)
21. Burton Watson's translation in his Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 20
22. - For discussions on Mencius' views on moral thinking and development, see Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, pp. 62-66
23. Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 149-153
24. Wong, "Is there a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?" and Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 473-493
25. - For an illuminating analysis of this, see Zhou Jizhi, Lun Zhongguo gudai shehui yu chuantong zhexue (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), pp. 260-279
26. - See de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, chap. 1
27. - See Xunzi, bk. XXIX, and Book of Filial Piety, chap. 15
28. - See Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, p. 36
29. - Meir Dan-Cohen, "Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy," Ethics 102 (1992): 226
30. - See his Introduction, in Munro, Individualism and Holism, pp. 12-13; italics added
31. - This claim has been argued for by many scholars. See, for example, Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972)
32. and Peerenboom, "Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought," p. 245. However, they did not consider the possibility of taking "willing" as an alternative conception of moral choice
33. - Xunzi, bk. XXIII: "You have said, someone may object, that the sage has arrived where he has through the accumulation of good acts. Why is it, then, that everyone is not able to accumulate good acts in the same way? I would reply: everyone is capable of doing so, but not everyone can be made to do so. The petty man is capable of becoming a gentleman, yet he is not willing to do so" (Watson, Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings, p. 167)
34. - To get a sense of the power of the challenge, try the chapter "The Rebellion."
35. - This argument is indebted to Jeremy Waldron, "Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution," in his Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
36. - Note that there are different forms of political perfectionism, Confucianism being just one. For a defense of a modern, moderate form, see Joseph Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 5-42
37. - Xunzi is even more hostile to what he regards as "heresies." See, for instance, Xunzi, bks. V, XIV, XXII
38. - Just as Mencius' criticism of Gaozi and Xunzi's criticism of Mencius have deepened and enriched the later generation's understanding of the issues concerning human nature and morality
39. - Note that this is not a utilitarian argument, but merely a consquentialist one that takes the moral environment of a community as an important condition of the development of moral life
40. - I owe this point to Chan Sin-Yee
41. - See his Introduction, in Munro, Individualism and Holism, p. 16
42. - For an interesting comparison of Kantian and expressivist conceptions of respect for persons, see John E. Atwell, "Kant's Notion of Respect for Persons," Tulane Studies in Philosophy 31 (1982): 17-30
43. - See Stephen Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 128
44. See also Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 14
45. - Here I follow Raz, The Morality of Freedom, chap. 14
46. - For a similar understanding of the difference between personal and moral autonomy, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 370 n. 2
47. and Donald Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz," Southern California Law Review 62 (1989): 1075. Notice that personal and moral autonomy are both what I. Berlin would classify as ideals of positive freedom. The first and second conditions of personal autonomy go beyond the requirement of negative freedom
48. - Of course, many liberal justifications of civil liberties also appeal to consequentialist considerations such as the promotion of truth, the prevention of corruption, and the improvement of public policy. These considerations are no less important than personal autonomy in a full justification, and they could be accepted and employed in a Confucian justification. I emphasize personal autonomy to stress the central difference between liberal and Confucian justifications
49. - I should qualify this, for the content of X is still in one way relevant. If X is an act that would seriously harm others, then liberals might think there should be no freedom to do X. So when I say the liberal justification of the freedom to do X is content-independent, I am assuming that the pursuit of the X in question does not violate the liberal harm principle
50. - See, for example, John Garvey, What Are Freedoms for? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
51. - For a detailed argument for the intrinsic and practical value of personal autonomy, see Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, chap. 6
52. - Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)
53. - Although a contemporary version of Confucianism would favor as much as possible noncoercive public means of promoting the good life (such as subsidizing valuable activities and pursuits and promoting them through school education and mass media)
54. - Jeffrey Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 3
55. - This is a general statement. Under exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary and appropriate to strongly interfere with grown-up children's lives if they fail to develop the necessary capacities for autonomy or if they make autonomous but disastrous decisions
56. - For a detailed analysis of the meaning of filial piety in Confucianism, see Chenyang Li, "Shifting Perspectives: Filial Morality Revisited," Philosophy East and West 47 (1997): 211-232
57. - The Master said, "Nowadays for a man to be filial means no more than he is able to provide his parents with food. Even hounds and horses are, in some way, provided with food. If a man shows no reverence, where is the difference?" (Analects II.7). There is still a lot of truth in this famous passage today