Mechanism design for single leader stackelberg problems and application to procurement auction design

IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 377-393

  Garg, Dinesh ^b   Narahari, Y ^a,c  

^a IEEE

^b IBM INDIA RESEARCH LAB   (India)

^c INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

Author keywords

Bayesian games; Bayesian stackelberg games; Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design; Procurement auctions with reserve prices; Single leader rest follower (SLRF) games; Stackelberg equilibrium

Indexed keywords

AGENTS; APPLICATIONS; BAYESIAN NETWORKS; COMMERCE; DECISION MAKING; ELECTRIC SHIP EQUIPMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MANUFACTURE; MECHANISMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY; PURCHASING; STABILIZERS (AGENTS); SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT; SUPPLY CHAINS; TRANSPORTATION;

(E ,2E) THEORY; APPLIED (CO); BAYESIAN; BAYESIAN GAMES; CHAIN MANAGEMENT; CLASSICAL MECHANISM; DECISION MAKING PROBLEMS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING; ELECTRONIC PROCUREMENT; GAME-THEORETIC PROBLEMS; GENERAL (CO); MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS; MECHANISM DESIGN (MD); MULTI AGENT SYSTEM (MAS); PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS; RESERVE PRICES; STACKELBERG GAMES; STACKELBERG PROBLEMS; TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 46849100017     PISSN: 15455955     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TASE.2007.912717     Document Type: Article

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