Agency conflicts and risk management

Review of Finance

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-23

  Morellec, Erwan ^a   Smith Jr , Clifford W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 46749121307     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfm001     Document Type: Review

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