The case for intrinsic theory: X. A phenomenologist's account of inner awareness

Journal of Mind and Behavior

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 97-121

  Natsoulas, Thomas ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Inner awareness; Intrinsic theory

Indexed keywords

AWARENESS; CONSCIOUSNESS; MENTAL HEALTH; PHENOMENOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; REVIEW; SELF CONCEPT;

EID: 4644276353     PISSN: 02710137     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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