The downside of gender quotas? Institutional constraints on women in mexican state legislatures

Parliamentary Affairs

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 442-460

  Zetterberg, Pär ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 46349097216     PISSN: 00312290     EISSN: 14602482     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsn016     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. For helpful comments, I would like to thank participants in the workshop 'What is going on in political representation? The substantive representation of women' at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Helsinki, 7-12 May 2007. A special thanks to the workshop directors Sarah Childs and Karen Celis. My deepest gratitude is also sent to Per Adman, Christina Alnevall, Li Bennich-Björkman, Christina Bergqvist, Edmé Domínguez R. and Sara Sjöqvist Monaco, for providing critiques of earlier versions of this article. Last but not least, I thank all interviewees for kindly sharing their experiences and thoughts with me.
2. L. Schwindt-Bayer and W. Mishler, 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', Journal of Politics, 67, 2005, 407-28. This definition of women's substantive representation paraphrases Pitkin's definition of substantive representation: 'Acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them' (H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 1967, p. 209). Whereas Pitkin's definition mainly refers to representative roles, other definitions includes policy output in the definition: the passage of legislation beneficial to women as a group (S. Childs and M.L. Krook, 'Gender and Politics: The State of the Art', Politics, 26, 2006,18-28). Regardless of definition, the point is that focus has been mainly on analysing these policy outputs.
3. See for example A.M. Goetz, 'Women's Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework' in A.M. Goetz and S. Hassim (ed.), No Shortcuts to Power. African Women in Politics and Policy Making, Zed Books, 2003.
4. L. Baldez, 'The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and Let Women In?', Politics & Gender, 2, 2006, 102-09;
5. D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction' in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics, Routledge, 2006.
6. L. Baldez, 'The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and Let Women In?'; D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction'.
7. D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction'.
8. Cf. D. Dahlerup and L. Freidenvall, 'Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is no longer the model', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7, 2005, 26-48;
9. M. Hawkesworth, 'Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions', American Political Science Review, 97, 2003, 529-550;
10. R.M. Heath, L Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures', American Journal of Political Science, 49, 2005, 420-36.
11. See for example N. Kudva, 'Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in Karnataka, India', International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society, 16, 2003, 445-63;
12. A. Ghosh, 'Women's Reservations and Electoral Politics in Urban Local Bodies: An Analysis of Chennai Municipal Corporation Elections, 2001', Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 10, 2003, 117-41.
13. See however G. Abou-Zeid, 'The Arab region: women's access to the decision-making process across the Arab Nation' in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas & Politics, Routledge, 2006, for an alternative conclusion.
14. There are different kinds of legal gender quotas, the two most common arrangements being quotas to candidate lists and reserved seats (see for example D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics, Routledge, 2006). In this analysis, attention is paid to the former. It is, however, possible that institutional constraints on quota women differ across quota systems.
15. There is a huge debate on how to define 'women's interests', or as expressed here; 'the benefit of women as a group' (see for example L. Wängnerud, 'Testing the Politics of Presence. Women's Representation in the Swedish Riksdag', Scandinavian Political Studies, 23, 2000, 67-91). In this paper, no universal answer is suggested. Rather, it suggests that definitions are context-specific, varying from case to case, depending on claims made by women's organisations and so forth. Thus, 'women's interests' may be both feminist and non-feminist, or to put it differently, both 'strategic' and 'practical' (see note 59).
16. K. Beckwith, 'Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40, 2007, 27-49.
17. As women legislators (as others) have multiple identities, they are not assumed to necessarily represent women in the first place. However, it is suggested that if those women who want to work for the benefit of women as a group have a hard time fighting for their basic rights as legislators, they will have greater difficulties in carrying out such reforms (D. Dahlerup, 'The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass', Politics & Gender, 2, 2006, 511-22).
18. A.M. Goetz, 'Women's Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework';
19. see also J. Acker, 'Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations', Gender & Society, 4, 1990, 139-58.
20. As the ambition is to illuminate the different obstacles that women legislators might confront, there is no assumption about correlations between the obstacles. However, it is of course possible that one single legislator might suffer from more than one obstacle at the same time.
21. S. Childs and M.L. Krook, 'Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes', Politics & Gender, 2, 2006, 522-30.
22. D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction'.
23. M. Hawkesworth, 'Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions'. It should be emphasised that these pressures for loyalty are not necessarily restricted to women politicians. For instance, loyalty in terms of party discipline is crucial for the functioning of representative democracy in most countries. But more importantly, in clientelist systems personal ties to dominant leaders are of vital importance also for male politicians' (re)nomination (see for example D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction'). However, the suggested difference is that these men as well as nonquota women are less dependent on such ties, and also earn their nomination and election thanks to their strong position within the political party or elsewhere.
24. S. Childs and M.L. Krook, 'Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes'.
25. R.M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures', p. 420.
26. R. M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures'.
27. See for example M. Hawkesworth, 'Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions'.
28. See for example P. Norris, 'Legislative Recruitment', in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris (ed.), Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, Sage, 1996.
29. D. Dahlerup, 'Introduction'.
30. S.M. Rai, F. Bari, N. Mahtab and B. Mohanty, 'South Asia: gender quotas and the politics of empowerment - a comparative study' in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas, and Politics, Routledge, 2006. It could be argued that women who come from 'political families' are more strongly politically socialised and therefore more efficient. If this is so, however, we would expect such women to be integrated in the political party also prior to acceding to political office and thus already have a power position within the party. Therefore, the indicators of tokenism should be looked at jointly and not separately.
31. R.M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures'.
32. See also T. de Barbieri, Género en el trabajo parlamentario: la legislatura mexicana a fines de siglo XX, Clacso, 2003. Of course, we cannot expect everyone to have their first preference. Therefore, it is important to compare quota womens' perceptions with those of other women, as well as with their male colleagues' perceptions.
33. See for example S. Childs and M.L. Krook, 'Gender and Politics: The State of the Art'.
34. Quota Project, Global Database of Quotas for Women, http://www.quotaproject.org, downloaded on March 21, 2006.
35. The 31 state legislatures (and the legislature of The Federal District of Mexico City) have 20 to 75 seats (R. D. Hecock, 'Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999-2004', American Journal of Political Science, 50, 2006, 950-61). All state legislatures employ a mixed electoral system, using both a 'first past the post' system of single member districts and proportional representation.
36. R.D. Hecock, 'Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999-2004'. A limitation with choosing the Mexican case, however, is the no-reelection principle, dating back to the Mexican revolution in the early twentieth century. Therefore, there are no legislators who were both in the legislature during the quota reform and immediately after its implementation.
37. UNDP, Indicadores de Desarrollo Humano y Género en México, United Nations Development Program, 2006.
38. Ideally, a comparative case would be to prefer which has no writing at all about gender equality in parliament. However, such states are rather few in Mexico, and Michoacán is suitable in many other aspects. The advantages are therefore considered more important than the disadvantages. Moreover, with very few exceptions, the interviewees claimed that the recommendation has had no effect whatsoever on political parties' rules for candidate selection. It should, however, be added that two of the major political parties, PRI and PRD, have introduced so-called party quotas (50% and 30%, respectively). However, in the election to the state legislature of Michoacán in 2004 only PRD complied with these rules, and to proportional representation only.
39. The average rate of women in Mexican state legislatures was 20.4% in 2005 (D. Reynoso and N. D'Angelo, 'Las leyes de cuota y su impacto en la elección de mujeres en México', Política y Gobierno, XIII, 2006, 279-313).
40. By that time, the legislators had served about two-thirds of their three-year term.
41. These were selected with the ambition to interview co-ordinators of the party group by the time of entering parliament, in order to know more about the process of committee assignments, as well as to have variation in political party, committee, and age.
42. Cf. N. Kudva, 'Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in Karnataka, India'. Perhaps there is one exception from this pattern, as one of the quota women in Zacatecas is the sister-in-law of the former governor.
43. A very limited number of women legislators, quota women and others, has a political background in civil society, prior to involve in party politics. Thus, leadership experiences from other political organisations are generally scarce.
44. Interviews were done with four of them, of which three openly expressed that it is very unlikely that they would have been asked, had there been no quota legislation.
45. Interview with Sara Guadalupe Buerba Sauri, Zacatecas, 1 November 2006, author's translation.
46. Interview with Eugenio Torres, Morelia, 6 December 2006, author's translation.
47. Interview with María Lucila Arteaga Garabay, Morelia, 27 November 2006, author's translation.
48. Interview with Minerva Bautista Gómez, Morelia, 23 November 2006, author's translation.
49. Quite ironically, running for single member districts is rare among Mexican women, relatively proportional seat candidacies. Low self-esteem, very expensive campaigns and discriminatory attitudes among the constituency are some of the reasons for not doing so (see for example V. Rodríguez, Women in contemporary Mexican politics, University of Texas Press, 2003).
50. Interview with Sonia de la Torre Barrientos, Zacatecas, 8 November 2006, author's translation.
51. See also V. Rodríguez, Women in contemporary Mexican politics.
52. See for example P. Norris, 'Legislative Recruitment'.
53. After a discussion within the party's parliamentary group, party coordinators from different parties negotiate the assignments. They could be appointed either by party leadership, being therefore a somewhat more centralised system (for example PAN and PRD in Zacatecas, PRI in Michoacán), or in election within the party's parliamentary group (for example PRD in Michoacán). For all parties, in both states, coordinators were men.
54. Interview with José Chávez Sánchez, Zacatecas, 9 November 2006, author's translation.
55. This is an argument against those claiming that women are socialised to have lower ambitions in politics.
56. Interview with María del Rocío Luquin Valdes, Morelia, 28 November 2006, author's translation.
57. Among the most prestigious and heavily negotiated committees are the committees on vigilance, interior, finance, budget and justice, and to a slightly minor extent, those on education and constitutional issues, as brought up by both male and female interviewees.
58. One woman did not succeed in having any of the committees she solicited. Being a lawyer, this might on the one hand be another indication of the importance of professional background, as none of the committees that she solicited were related to her academic career. On the other hand, it might also be an example of marginalisation. From this analysis, it is difficult to have a closer idea.
59. Unfortunately, the analysis gives no general answer to the question why so few women requested the most prestigious committees. It might be due to a lack of interest, but also due to an impression that they were not going to get the assignment.
60. As one of them puts it: 'I have found some allies who help me to carry through some of my [legislative] projects. [...] The male colleagues in my committee have been especially helpful' (interview with Aída Alicia Lugo Dávila, Zacatecas, 6 November, 2006, author's translation).
61. Interview with Mary Cruz Campos Días, Morelia, 6 December 2006, author's translation.
62. Interview with Ana Lucía Medina Galindo, Morelia, 29 November 2006, author's translation.
63. Interview with María del Rocío Luquin Valdes, Morelia, 28 November 2006, author's translation.
64. Interview with Martina Rodríguez, Zacatecas, 16 November 2006, author's translation.
65. These reports of invisibilisation problems within political parties, are arguments against the thought that quota women might not want to admit to themselves, or to an interviewer, that they suffer from male domination. Thus, they are arguments against the thought that the results might be biased.
66. Cf. M. Molyneux, 'Mobilization without emancipation? Women's interests, the state, and revolution in Nicaragua', Feminist Studies, 11, 1985, 227-54, in which she distinguishes between strategic and practical gender needs/interests. Bills introduced by women in Zacatecas concern e.g. economic support for single mothers and a law regarding the Women's Agency of Zacatecas (INMUZA).
67. Various of the women interviewed emphasised that efficiency, and showing good results, are important for women legislators who want to be an example for other women; in any kind of area, and not only in gender equality issues. As one of the quota women from the majority party puts it: 'When there is a woman governing I want people to say that "that's a good government!"; not because she is a woman but because there are reconstructions, services, social welfare. Those are the results [I want]; good organization of the government, good administration of the public finances' (interview with Aída Alicia Lugo Dávila, Zacatecas, 6 November 2006, author's translation). See also C. Bacchi, 'Arguing for and against quotas: theoretical issues' in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas, and Politics, Routledge, 2006.
68. As noted by a woman of the PRD executive committee in Zacatecas: 'If you aspire for a seat [...] it is a disadvantage [to focus on gender equality issues]. [...] Male colleagues support women that are attached to them, so they could decide what to do through her' (interview with María Luisa Sosa, Zacatecas, 21 November 2006, author's translation). If this is the case, it is a bad career strategy in Mexican politics to focus on issues that benefit women as a group. See also G. Abou-Zeid, 'The Arab region: women's access to the decision-making process across the Arab Nation'.
69. Cf. K. Beckwith, 'Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women'.
70. See, for example, G. Abou-Zeid, 'The Arab region: women's access to the decision-making process across the Arab Nation'.
71. L. Baldez, 'The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and Let Women In?', p. 106.
72. See however L. Baldez, 'The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and Let Women In?', who shows that handpicking of candidates decreased at federal level in Mexico after quotas were introduced, as political parties did not have to meet the quotas in cases where they had primary elections.