Disclosure policy: A discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008) on "going dark"

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 2-3, 2008, Pages 209-220

  Coles, Jeffrey L ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Disclosure; Going dark; Going private; Pink Sheets; Regulation; SEC deregistration

Indexed keywords

EID: 46049105746     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.01.002     Document Type: Article

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