Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist court

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 761-793

  Graglia, Lino A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

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EID: 46049103008     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (175)

1. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
2. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987).
3. For a thorough and enthusiastic review of the virtues of federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).
4. Alexander Hamilton said of proponents of a system with both federal and state sovereignty: "They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority without a diminution of state authority . . . . They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio." THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., 1999).
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
6. The principal examples prior to the New Deal (both of which were soon ignored by the Court) are Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895).
7. See The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 354-55 (1903); see also The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1914); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
8. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935).
9. NLRB v. Freidman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
10. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
11. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13. Id. at 552.
14. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
16. Id. at 854-55.
17. Id. at 856-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that he joins the majority opinion on the belief that the Court "adopts a balancing approach [that] does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential").
19. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
20. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
21. Id. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
25. Id. at 463-70.
26. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
27. Id. at 171-77.
28. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988)).
30. Id. at 551 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (Supp. V. 1988)).
31. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
32. The two other members of the panel were Judges Thomas M. Reavley and Carolyn Dineen King.
33. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1365-66.
36. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37. Id. at 557.
38. Id. at 558.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 558-59.
42. Id. at 559.
43. 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
44. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 ("[T]he Court has heeded that warning [not to obliterate the distinction between what is local and what is national] and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.").
45. Id. at 561.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 562-63.
48. Id. at 563 n.4.
49. Id. at 563-64.
50. Id. at 567-68.
51. Id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
53. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
54. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
55. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
56. Id. at 242.
57. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
58. Id. at 156-57.
59. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
60. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
61. Id. at 570-71.
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
63. Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 568, 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 580.
66. Id. at 583.
67. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
69. Id. at 194.
70. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593-96 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 605-06 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
74. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 624.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
79. Id. at 602.
80. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 609 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
85. Id. at 611-12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
86. Id. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
87. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67).
88. Id. at 615 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 614.
93. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) ("The only question [is] whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce . . . ."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
94. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring)).
95. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring).
96. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995).
97. Id. at 560.
98. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
99. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law without the Constitution: The Supreme Court's Remaking of America, in "A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE": THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES 1, 32 (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005).
103. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (homosexuality); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (sex discrimination); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (school prayer); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (term limits).
104. The Rehnquist Court apparently gave conservatives an important victory when it held that the "strict scrutiny" test applies to laws granting preferences to blacks as well as to laws discriminating against blacks. If the rational basis test is one that can hardly be failed, the strict scrutiny test was thought to be one that can hardly be passed. Applying the test, the Court in three cases held the use of racial preferences favoring blacks to be unconstitutional. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 493-94, 505-06 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (plurality opinion). The era of racially preferential "affirmative action," it seemed, was finally over. Liberal constitutional law scholars protested mightily and considered this result so unacceptable that they began to question the value of judicial review. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154, 172-73 (1999). The whole point of leaving the final decision on basic social policy issues to the Supreme Court, in their view, was to produce a more, not less, liberal outcome than obtained in the ordinary political process. Id. Their fear that the Court would abolish "affirmative action" proved to be unfounded when, in 2003, thanks to a switch by Justice O'Connor, the Court upheld the use of racial preferences in law school admissions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
105. In a fifteen-year period between 1987 and 2001, the Court upheld regulatory takings claims in five cases. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). The principal result of these decisions was a rule that a regulation that deprives land of "all economically beneficial use" constitutes a taking and that the government must compensate owners even for temporary takings. Like the other conservative victories, however, the decisions were by narrow five-to-four or six-to-three votes, with the liberal Justices usually in dissent. In 2002, joined by the "moderates," Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the liberals prevailed. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). The result was to overrule the "all economically beneficial" rule in all but name, and to undo most, if not all, of the little that the conservatives had been able to accomplish.
106. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
107. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (unanimously upholding a federal law controlling a state commercial operation).
108. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Au th., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
109. See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding, by a six-to-three vote, a federal cause of action against a state under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
110. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that a small, non-navigable intrastate pond was not covered by the Clean Water Act, despite periodic use of the pond by migratory birds that cross state lines); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (holding that a private dwelling was not "used in" interstate commerce despite its consumption of natural gas obtained out-of-state).
111. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
112. Id. at 7, 12-14.
113. Id. at 5-6.
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. Id. at 7-8.
116. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
117. Raich, 545 U.S. at 9.
118. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
119. Id. at 128-29.
120. Id.
121. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
122. Id. at 345-48.
123. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
124. Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33.
125. Id. at 28; id. at 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (defining the relevant class narrowly); id. at 72 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same).
126. Id. at 32 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 25-27.
128. Id. at 25-26 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
129. Id. at 26-28.
130. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 34.
132. Id. at 5 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
133. Id. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
134. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 50.
136. Id. at 43.
137. Id. at 44.
138. Id. at 53.
139. Id. at 46.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 58-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 64.
143. See id. at 64-66.
144. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
145. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
146. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., 1999) ("[I]t may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same if these clauses were entirely obliterated . . . .");
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 253 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., 1999) ("Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government by unavoidable implication.").
148. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
149. Id. at 419 ("To waste time and argument in proving that, without [the Necessary and Proper Clause], Congress might carry its powers into execution, would be not much less idle than to hold a lighted taper to the sun.").
150. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
151. Id. at 194, 197.
152. Id. at 197.
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
156. See The Shreveport Rates Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914).
157. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620-23 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. 156 U.S. 1 (1845).
159. See id. at 13.
160. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C Cir. 1997).
161. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
162. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
163. See id. at 325; id. at 364 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
164. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
165. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 356-57 (majority opinion). The Court has also upheld pretextual uses of the tax power. See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
166. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363-64.
167. Id. at 371 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (holding that Congress can regulate a retail druggist's relabeling of a package containing pills that have crossed a state line).
170. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (noting that "there is no requirement that [Lopez's] possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce").
171. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (upholding a federal law making it a crime for a felon to possess a gun that has moved in interstate commerce).
172. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
173. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
174. School social segregation, for example, did not end as a result of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided for the withdrawal of federal school subsidies from school districts that did not desegregate.
175. Id. at 207 n.2 ("[T]he Court has more recently questioned whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction [on the spending power] at all.").