Doing the right thing for the right reason - Why dynamic or static approaches should be taken in the interpretation of treaties

International Community Law Review

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 109-141

  Linderfalk, Ulf ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Dynamic interpretation; Inter temporal law; Static interpretation; Treaty interpretation

Indexed keywords

EID: 46049086961     PISSN: 18719740     EISSN: 18719732     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187197308X311272     Document Type: Review

References (131)

1. See e.g. Fuller, L., "Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction", Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 89 (1975), pp. 89-96.
2. See ibid.
3. See ibid.
4. See ibid.
5. UNTS, Vol. 1155, p. 331.
6. "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentary", Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session (UN Dec. A/6309/Rev. 1), ILC Yearbook, 1966, Vol. 2, p. 172, pp. 218-219, para. 5.
7. Ever since 1969, it has been said about Articles 31-33 that they are reflective of customary international law. Today, with few exceptions, this proposition seems unanimously accepted. For further references, see Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 7.
8. See e.g. Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 62.
9. See e.g. Bynon, T., Historical Linguistics (1977), passim.
10. VCLT, Art. 2, para. 1(g).
11. See e.g. Marceau, G., "Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdiction: The Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other treaties", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35 (2001), p. 1087;
12. "Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law", Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Chaired by Martti Koskenniemi, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 58th session, 1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682), pp. 237-239. Henceforth, the report will be referred to as the "ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law".
13. This is a proposition that I have argued extensively elsewhere. See Linderfalk, U., "Who are 'the parties'? Article 31 § 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 'Principle of Systemic Integration' Revisited", forthcoming (2008).
14. Petroleum Development Ltd. V. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Award of September 1951, International Law Reports, Vol. 18, p. 144.
15. French, D., "Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55 (2006), p. 281, pp. 295-300;
16. ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra n. 11, pp. 240-243;
17. McLachlan, C., "The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2005), pp. 279-320;
18. Greig, D.W., Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties (2001);
19. Higgins, R., "Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law", Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, ed. Makarczyk, J. (1996), pp. 173-181;
20. Ress, G., "The Interpretation of the Charter", The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed. Simma, B. (1994), pp. 35-37;
21. Thirlway, H. "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 1960-1989, Part One", British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 60, (1989), pp. 128-143;
22. Thirlway, H., "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989, Part Three", British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 62 (1991), pp. 57-60;
23. Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (1984), pp. 124-126, 138-140;
24. McWhinney, E., "The Time Dimension in International Law, Historical Relativism and Intertemporal Law", Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, ed. Makarczyk, J. (1984), pp. 179-199;
25. Elias, T.O., "The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 74 (1980), pp. 285-307;
26. Jímenez de Aréchaga, Jiménez de Aréchaga, E., "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international, Vol. 159 (1978:1), pp. 48-50;
27. Yasseen, M.K., "L'interprétation des traités d'après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités", Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international, Vol. 151 (1976:3), pp. 26-27, 64-67;
28. l'Institut de droit international, Travaux dans le problème dit du droit intertemporel dans l'ordre international, Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. 55 (1973), pp. 1-116,
29. and Vol. 56 (1975), pp. 339-374, 536-541;
30. Jacobs, F.G., "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1969), pp. 330-331;
31. Bernhardt, R., Die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge (1963), pp. 74-75;
32. De Visscher, C., Problèmes d'interprétation judiciaire en droit international public (1963), pp. 66-69;
33. Fitzmaurice, G., "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points", British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 33 (1957), pp. 225-227;
34. Fitzmaurice, G., "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954: General Principles and Sources of Law", British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 30 (1953), pp. 5-8.
35. See also the rather lengthy discussions had in the ILC with respect to Draft Article 56 ("The inter-temporal law"), suggested in 1964 by Sir Humhrey Waldock in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties: ILC Yrbk 1964, Vol. 1,, pp. 33-40,
36. and ILC Yrbk 1966, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 39-46.
37. See ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra n. 11, pp. 241-243; Higgins, supra n. 14, pp. 173-181; Ress, supra n. 14, pp. 35-37;
38. Dupuy, P-M., Droit international public (1992), p. 221;
39. Oppenheim's International Law, ed. Jennings, R. and Watts, A., Vol. 1, 9th ed. (1992), p. 1275, n. 21, 1281-1282; Sinclair, supra n. 14, pp. 139-140;
40. Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völerrecht: Theorie und Praxis, 3rd ed. (1984), pp. 496-499; Elias, supra n. 14, pp. 285-307; Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra n. 14, pp. 48-50; Yasseen, supra n. 14, pp. 64-67; Jacobs, supra n. 14, pp. 330-331.
41. Cf. Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur (UN Doc. A/CN.4/186 and Add. 1-7), ILC Yearbook, 1966, Vol. 2, pp. 95-96, para. 7, p. 97, para. 13.
42. Island of Palmas Arbitration (Netherlands/USA), Award of 4 April 1928, UNRIAA, Vol. 2, p. 829.
43. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment of 19 December 1978, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3.
44. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16. Henceforth, the decision will be referred to as the "Namibia Advisory Opinion".
45. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16.
46. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 837.
47. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, pp. 837-838.
48. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 845.
49. See e.g. Thirlway, 1989, supra n. 14, p. 129.
50. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 845.
51. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 846.
52. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 845.
53. Island of Palmas Arbitration, supra n. 16, p. 846.
54. See e.g. Art. 12 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the UNGA, on 12 December 2001 (UNGA res. 56/83, annex).
55. See e.g. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (UK/France), Award of 30 June 1977, International Law Reports, Vol. 54, p. 6, pp. 35-36, para. 38.
56. See e.g. Case Concerning the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7.
57. It should be clearly understood that when the meaning of a treaty will have to be established through interpretation, two issues may arise. First, there is the issue whether, in fulfilling her task, the interpreter should apply the law of interpretation in force at the time of interpretation, or the law that was in force when the treaty was concluded. Secondly, there is the issue whether, in an application of the appropriate international law of interpretation, the interpreter should turn to the contemporary language and the contemporary international law, or the language and law that existed when the treaty was concluded. The two issues are sometimes confused. See, for instance, the following passage taken from the Ijzeren Rijn Arbitration: "Article 31, paragraph 3, subparagraph (c) of the Vienna Convention also requires there to be taken into account 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties'. The intertemporal rule would seem to be one such 'relevant rule'. By this, regard should be had in interpreting Article XII to juridical facts as they stood in 1839." (Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (The Kingdom of Belgium/The Kingdom of the Netherlands), Award of 24 May 2005, available through the web-page of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: 〈http://www.pca-cpa. org〉, p. 36.)
58. See e.g. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 1045.
59. Cf. Wróblewski, J., The Judicial Application of Law (1992), pp. 30-35.
60. Cf. Wróblewski, J., The Judicial Application of Law (1992), pp. 30-35.
61. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17.
62. LNTS, Vol. 93, p. 343.
63. Note that this is a translated version of the reservation, which was originally in French. Both language versions can be found in the decision of the ICJ. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, pp. 20-21.
64. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, p. 32.
65. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, p. 32.
66. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, p. 33.
67. See e.g. Oppenheim's International Law, supra n. 14, p. 1282, n. 35; Sinclair, supra n. 14, pp. 125-126; Elias, supra n. 14, pp. 296-302.
68. See e.g. Fishery Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), ICJ Reports 1998, p. 432, p. 453.
69. For further discussions of this particular issue, see Fitzmaurice, M., "The Optional Clause System and the Law of Treaties: Issues of Interpretation in Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 20 (1999), p. 127 et seq.
70. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, p. 33.
71. Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition.
72. Further on the concept of referring expressions, see below, Section 5.
73. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n. 17, p. 32.
74. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18.
75. Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22, para. 6.
76. See International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 128.
77. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18, p. 28.
78. Art. 22, para. 1, of the League Covenant reads as follows: "To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war has ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant."
79. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18, p. 30.
80. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18, pp. 31-32. In the sentence beginning with "Moreover", italics have been added.
81. See e.g. ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra n. 11, p. 242; Sinclair, supra n. 14, p. 140; Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra n. 14, pp. 48-50;
82. Elias, T.O., The Modern Law of Treaties (1974), pp. 77-78.
83. Similarly, Waldock, Sir H., "The Evolution of Human Rights Concepts and the Application of the European Convention of Human Rights", Le Droit International: Unité et Diversité, ed. Gross, A. (1981), pp. 540-541.
84. See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18, p. 31: "[T]he Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant - 'the strenuous conditions of the modern world' and 'the well-being and development' of the peoples concerned - were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 'sacred trust'. The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such."
85. As a consequence of this understanding, what we need to explain is the following passage: "Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation" (Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18, p. 32). What the Court literally says is that treaties must be interpreted with consideration only for such rules of international law that are applicable at the time of interpretation. That would imply an adoption of "the categorically dynamic approach". (See supra, in Section 1 of this article.) However, if the passage is inserted into its proper context, it seems pretty clear that this was not the message intended. Clearly, an adoption of "the categorically dynamic approach" would be incompatible with the overall point made by the Court. If the Court were of the opinion that treaties must be interpreted with consideration only for such rules of international law that are applicable at the time of interpretation, then why would the Court so strongly emphasize the development of law as such? On the more probable understanding of the Opinion, the Court merely wishes to call our attention to the prevailing legal state-of-affairs. The Court wishes to remind us that today, in contrast with the earlier international law doctrine, a worldwide consensus has come to favour the flexible approach.
86. For further references, see Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 30.
87. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 30.
88. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), pp. 28-29.
89. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistic Semantics (1995), p. 234 ..;
90. Blakemore, D., Understanding Utterances (1992), pp. 3-10.
91. It should be noted that in linguistics, this term is not used consistently.
92. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 177.
93. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 177.
94. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), pp. 177-197.
95. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 178.
96. See Guinea - Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case, Award of 14 February 1985, International Law Reports, Vol. 77, p. 636. It should be noted that this is a translated version of the Special Agreement, which was not authenticated in English, but in French and Portuguese. The English translation derives from the International Law Reports. See ibid., p. 643.
97. See Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 178.
98. See Guinea - Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case, supra n. 67, p. 642. It should be noted that this is a translated version of the Special Agreement, which was not authenticated in English, but in French and Portuguese. The English translation derives from the International Law Reports.
99. UNTS, Vol. 1833, p. 3.
100. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), pp. 193-197.
101. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 194.
102. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 194.
103. See e.g. Lyons, J., Linguistics (1977), p. 680.
104. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), pp. 47-52.
105. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), pp. 47-52.
106. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 61.
107. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 191.
108. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra n. 18.
109. Young Loan Arbitration (The Kingdom of Belgium, The French Republic, The Swiss Confederation, The United Kingdom and The United States of America v. The Federal Republic of Germany), Award of 16 May 1980, International Law Reports, Vol. 59, p. 495.
110. Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence ("La Bretagne") (Canada/France), Award of 17 July 1986, International Law Reports, Vol. 82, p. 591.
111. Guinea - Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation, supra n. 67.
112. Case Concerning the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra n. 30.
113. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Joint Complaint by India, Pakistan, and Thailand (WT/DS58), Report adopted by the Appellate Body of the WTO, on 12 October 1998, available through the web-page of the WTO: 〈http://www.wto.org〉.
114. Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. The United Kingdom), Award of 2 July 2003, available through the web-page of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: 〈http://www. pca-cpa.org〉.
115. Ijzeren Rijn Arbitration, supra n. 31.
116. See e.g. Ekelöf, P.O., "Teleological Interpretation of Statutes", Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 2, ed. Schmidt, F. (1958), pp. 76-117.
117. See e.g. Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), pp. 204-207.
118. I have earlier referred to the telos of a treaty in the plural as the teloi. (See e.g. Linderfalk. U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), Ch. 7.) As I have now come to realise, the correct way to inflect telos in the plural (when transcribed from the Classical Greek) is tele or possibly telê.
119. Cf. In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-origin Agricultural Products (CDA-95-2008-01), Award of 2 December 1996, International Law Reports, Vol. 110, p. 543, pp. 579-58; Case of Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 23 March 1995, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Ser. A, Vol. 310, pp. 25-28.
120. See Summers, R., Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982).
121. See Summers, R., Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982), pp. 60-80.
122. See Summers, R., Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982), pp. 69-70.
123. It should be noted that, according to VCLT, Art. 32, supplementary means of interpretation may also be used by the interpreter, whenever she finds that the meaning resulting from an application of VCLT, Art. 31, requires confirmation.
124. See above, Section 1.
125. Italics are added.
126. Using the terminology established in the earlier Section 5, we may say that "supplementary means of interpretation" is a generic referring expression - one that assumes an alterable referent.
127. For further references, see Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), pp. 255-259.
128. Some times, an agreement in pari materia may be considered part of "the circumstances of [the interpreted treaty's] conclusion". This is the case where it is established that the latter treaty was designed on the basis of the former. For further discussions of this issue, see Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 255.
129. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), p. 217.
130. See Linderfalk, U., On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), pp. 265-269.
131. Cf. Zoller, E. La bonne foi en droit international public (1977), pp. 202-244.