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3
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-
84916443271
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-
See Woozley's introduction to his abridged edition of Locke's, Fontana/Collins, London
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(1964)
Essay
, pp. 24-35
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-
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5
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-
84916441181
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-
Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance, pp. 101–102.
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-
-
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6
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84905537741
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-
It may be, though, that some caution is still required. In his, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Yolton was in fact prepared to allow not only that Locke sometimes ‘writes of ideas as objects’ in a way that ‘appears to lead to a representative theory of knowledge, where ideas as objects stand proxy for things that cannot immediately be known’, but that this is ‘most often’ the case in the Essay (p. 109). Then the suggestion was only that there are other passages involving a different view: that ‘both [concepts] are to be found’ in Locke. In Perceptual Acquaintance the emphasis is changed to the extent that there is no more than a hint that Locke may not have totally escaped the temptation to think of ideas as ‘proxies’. It remains the case that the hint is there.
-
(1977)
The Locke Reader
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-
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7
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84916408104
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-
Quoted by Yolton in Perceptual Acquaintance, p. 109. In fact, though, what Chambers writes here is almost certainly based on a passage in Malebianche's Search after Truth.
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-
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8
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84916393935
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Spinoza, Ethics, Pt II, Prop. XLIII, Note.
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-
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10
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84916424330
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Brown, Lecutres, p. 174.
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-
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11
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77956982942
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“Representative ideas” in Malebranche and Arnauld
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See in particular
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(1923)
Mind
, vol.32
, pp. 449-461
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-
Lovejoy1
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12
-
-
84916443433
-
-
The following year saw a reply in the same journal from John Laird, and a response from Lovejoy. Lovejoy in fact represented, and Laird opposed, what Thomas M. Lennon has recently described as‘the most frequent interpretation’ of Arnauld, according to which Arnauld attacks a more or less Platonic representationalism involving ideas in the mind of God, but himself adheres to a more orthodox representationalism involving a ‘tertium quid’ in addition to the mind and its ‘mediate’ object. I doubt that this is in fact the most frequent interpretation now. Laird was not alone in opposing it earlier this century, and Lennon himself mentions Monte Cook, R.F. McRae and Yolton as more recent commentators who come close to his own view, which is that ‘Arnauld's is a direct, or presentationalist view, rather than representationalist’.
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-
-
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13
-
-
0010774046
-
-
Lennon's contribution will be found in his ‘Commentary’ in Malebranche's, Ohio State University Press, Columbus
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(1980)
Search after Truth
, pp. 793ff
-
-
Lennon1
Olscamp2
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14
-
-
84916425392
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-
A point made very forcibly (against Reid) by Thomas Brown in his Lectures, pp. 175–176, and, recently, by Lennon in his ‘Commentary’ on the Search, pp. 795–796.
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-
-
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15
-
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84916435746
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-
Before leaving the complications, it has to be admitted that it is all too easy to lose one's grip on what would count as ‘orthodox’ (and objectionable) representationalism. For example, must a believer in the ‘tertium quid’ think of it as ‘a mere separate entity which some outside observer might find to be a counterpart of a physical object’ (like Spinoza's ‘picture on a painting canvas’)? Well, that certainly seems a fair enough description of the position as it is often understood and criticised. The trouble is that the quotation comes from Lovejoy, who takes the description to be highly misleading. The ‘latter-day representationalist’, we are told, holds that the ‘datum’ has ‘transcendent reference’; while Arnauld (who for Lovejoy is committed to a tertium quid) is said to believe that the images in the mind carry with them ‘an apprehended relation or reference [[Truncated]]
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-
-
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17
-
-
84972392202
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On being present to the mind a reply
-
For an interesting slant on this see
-
(1975)
Dialogue
, vol.14
, pp. 664-666
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-
McRae1
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19
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84916447212
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-
Berkeley, Third Dialogue (Works, II, p. 244).
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-
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20
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84916407400
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Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries, 405.
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-
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21
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84916433260
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Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, Sect. 44.
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-
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22
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84916430362
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-
Berkeley, Third Dialogue (Works, II, p. 245).
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-
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23
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84916393608
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-
Berkeley, Third Dialogue (Works, II, p. 238).
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-
-
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24
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84916424024
-
-
I thus side-step certain of Yolton's assertions which I find either difficult to understand or to reconcile with each other: for example the claims in one paragraph (Perceptual Acquaintance, p. 142) that ‘[Berkeley] could not have accepted a single-existence ontoly’, and that ‘[Berkeley's] single-existence ontology includes a duality: ideas and things, but the ideas are the things as known’.
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-
-
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25
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-
84916448652
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-
Brown, Lectures, p. 174.
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-
-
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26
-
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84916445953
-
-
Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance, p. 135.
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-
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27
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84916436585
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-
Berkeley, First Dialogue (Works, II, pp. 195–197).
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-
-
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28
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84916442105
-
-
The position Berkeley adopts at this stage is difficult to square with his view of spirit as ‘one simple, undivided, active being’ (Principles, Sect. 27), and with the notion that ideas are indeed wholly distinct from the mind, and not, after all, mental. In effect, Philonous is inviting Hylas to think of ideas, not as acts of course (acts that would require objects) but as states of the mind. It is not the aim of this paper to deny that this is very difficult to square with the robust realism about idea-things that Berkeley professes and which Yolton attributes to him.
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-
-
-
29
-
-
0011635413
-
-
For an examination of the difficulties involved here see, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
-
(1977)
Berkeley
, pp. 189ff
-
-
Pitcher1
-
30
-
-
84916395927
-
-
and my Berkeley, pp. 91ff.
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
84916416877
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-
On this see Monte Cook's paper (note 15, above), pp. 58–60; cf. Lennon's ‘Commentary’ on the Search, pp. 798–800.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
84916405789
-
-
This is perhaps not surprising given the well-documented influence of Malebranche on him, and it will be even less surprising if, as Yolton says in his introduction. Locke was himself ‘generally characterized by [his] contemporaries in the way Reid does at the end of the century’. I cannot discuss here whether Locke was indeed generally read in that way (other passages rather suggest that Yolton sees Reid as the villain of the piece rather than as the victim of a general misunderstanding of Locke that Berkeley might, one would think, have been expected to share). But the influence of Malebranche should certain be noted. In a well-argued passage Charles McCracken relates what he (rightly) sees as the ‘anomalous character’ of Berkeley's ideas to what he takes to be their ancestry in a fusion of Malebranche's ideas and what, strictly speaking, Malebranche regards as ‘sensations’. McCracken does not mention Arnauld in [[Truncated]]
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
84916397172
-
-
Berkeley, Third Dialogue (Works, II, p. 258).
-
-
-
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35
-
-
84916404455
-
-
Pitcher, Berkeley, pp. 191ff.
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-
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36
-
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84916403518
-
-
Berkeley, Principles, Sect. 2.
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-
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37
-
-
84916427560
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-
Brown, Lectures, p. 153.
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-
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