Persistence and presentism

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 115-126

  Zimmerman, Dean W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45849142339     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568649609506542     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. David Lewis, On rhe Plurality of worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). p. 202.
2. Cf. William R. Carter and H. Scott Hestevold, ‘On Passage and Persistence’, American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994). pp. 269-283.
3. Trenton Memcks, ‘On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities’, Mind 104 (1995), pp. 523-531.
4. Ned Markosian, ‘The 3D/4D Controversy and Non-Present Objects’, Philosophiral Papers 23 (1994). pp. 243-249.
5. Cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Refemng to Things That No Longer Exist’, Philosophical Perspecrives Vol. 4 (Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind) (1990). pp. 545-556.
6. Chisholm, On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). p. 163.
7. A. N. Prior, ‘The Notion of the Present’, Studium Generale 23 (1970): pp. 245-248.
8. C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949; first publication 1923). p. 59.
9. Cf. Russell, ‘The Ultimate Constituents of Matter’ (1915). in his Mysticism and Logic (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1957). pp. 120-139.
10. Cf. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 202-203.
11. Cf. Chris Swoyer, ‘Causation and Identity’, in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Causation and Causal Theories, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 593-622, esp. p. 596.
12. Cf. Heller, The Ontology of Physical Objects: Fourdimensional Hunks of Matter (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). p. 6.
13. Haslanger, ‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsic?,’, Analysis 49 (1989), pp. 119-125.
14. E. J. Lowe, ‘The Problem of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis’, Analysis 48 (1988). pp. 72-77.
15. Cf. Zimmerman, ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?’. Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 56 (1996). pp. 1-29.