Corporate governance. Voting rights and majority rules

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 20, Issue C, 1988, Pages 203-235

  Harris, Milton ^a   Raviv, Artur ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45549118731     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90045-1     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. A theory of acquisition markets - Mergers vs. tender offers: Golden parachutes and greenmail
2. Cumulative voting The value of minority shareholder voting rights
3. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock
4. Voting in corporate law
5. Evaluating dual class common stock: The relevance of substitutes
6. One share/one vote and the market for corporate control
7. Corporate control contests and capital structure
8. Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980
9. Takeovers: Folklore and science
10. The market value of control in publicity-traded corporations
11. Some theoretical aspects of share voting
12. Mergers and the market for corporate control
13. Changes in ownership structure: Conversions of mutual savings and loans to stock charter
14. Ownership structure and control: The mutualization of stock life insurance companies
15. Property rights and the financial firm
16. The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth
17. Self-regulatory organizations: Proposed rule change
18. Greenmail white knights and shareholders' interest
19. Large shareholders and corporate control
20. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control