Collusion under yardstick competition: An experimental study

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 7, 2004, Pages 1017-1038

  Potters, Jan ^a   Rockenbach, Bettina ^b   Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ^c   Van Damme, Eric ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

^c OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Collusion; Experiment; Relative performance evaluation; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COSTS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

COLLUSION; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; YARDSTICK COMPETITION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 4544367465     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.05.004     Document Type: Article

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