Preferences in Game Logics

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 1, Issue , 2004, Pages 152-159

  Van Otterloo, Sieuwert ^a   Van Der Hoek, Wiebe ^b   Wooldridge, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FORMAL LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SET THEORY; SOCIAL ASPECTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC; GAME LOGICS; SOCIAL PROTOCOLS; TRADING PROTOCOLS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 4544221265     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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