Classified information leaks and free speech

University of Illinois Law Review

Volumn 2008, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 881-931

  Kitrosser, Heidi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 45349091675     PISSN: 02769948     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (323)

1. United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2007).
2. See United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 42 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (emphasis added).
3. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 at 42 (order denying motion to dismiss, Aug. 9, 2006); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Steven J. Rosen's and Keith Weissman's Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment at 2-7, 11, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Rosen's & Weissman's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss].
4. See Nat Hentoff, Chilling Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, May 8, 2006, at A19;
5. Scott Shane & David Johnston, Pro-Israel Lobbying Group Roiled by Prosecution of Two Ex-Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at N21 ("Federal prosecutors are using the Espionage Act for the first time against Americans who are not government officials, do not have a security clearance and, by all indications, are not a part of a foreign spy operation.").
6. Rosen's and Weissman's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 11 (citing statement by Attorney General John Ashcroft, Report to Congress on Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (Oct. 15, 2002)). This Article uses the single prosecution figure cited by Attorney General Ashcroft. The Ashcroft reference is to United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), discussed infra at Part II.A.2. There was, however, an additional prosecution brought in the 1970s against Daniel Ellsberg for leaking the Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg was indicted and the case went to trial, but the case was dismissed before a verdict due to government improprieties.
7. See SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS 242, 274 (1972);
8. Eli J. Lake, Trouble for Journalists: Low Clearance, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20051010&s=lake101005.
9. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 at 25-28, 47-49, 58-59 (order denying motion to dismiss, Aug. 9, 2006).
10. Id.; Transcript of Hearing on Motions at 10-11, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2006).
11. For discussion of statute's potential breadth as so interpreted, see infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.C.2.
13. Jack Shafer, A Gitmo for Journalists, SLATE, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2138058/.
14. Lake, supra note 5, at 16.
15. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, A Surge in Whistle-Blowing... and Reprisals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0216/p01s01-uspo. html;
16. Porter Goss, Op-Ed., Loose Lips Sink Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at A25; Hentoff, supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., A Sudden Taste for the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at A26; Hentoff, supra note 4;
18. Walter Pincus, Press Can Be Prosecuted for Having Secret Files, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at A3;
19. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the New York Times Violated the Espionage Act?, COMMENT., Mar. 2006, at 23, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfn?id=10036;
20. Scott Sherman, Chilling the Press, NATION, July 17, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/sherman;
21. Scott Johnson, Did the New York Times Break the Law With its Wire-Tapping Story?, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle= 6631&R=EB9524AED (last visited Jan. 27, 2008);
22. Fred Kaplan, Spies Like Us, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2138277/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2008);
23. Jack Shafer, Bill Keller in Chains, SLATE, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137792/ (last visited Jan 27, 2008).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 40 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss) (citing government's "proposed categorical rule that espionage statutes cannot implicate the First Amendment"); Does the First Amendment's Freedom of the Press Clause Place the Institutional Media Above the Law of Classified Secrets?: Hearing Addressing Obligations of the Media With Respect to Publication of Classified Information Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) [hereinafter Eastman Statement] (statement of Dr. John C. Eastman); Hentoff, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, "Macro-Transparency" as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 (2007).
26. See, e.g., A Sudden Taste for the Law, supra note 13; Hentoff, supra note 4; Pincus, supra note 13; Sherman, supra note 13; Shafer, supra note 13.
27. See Scott Shane, Leak of Classified Information Prompts Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at A10.
28. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Blocked Ethics Inquiry, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2006, at A14;
29. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Bush is Pressed Over New Report on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A1;
30. Scott Shane, With Access Denied, Justice Dept. Drops Spying Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A34;
31. Tap-Dancing as Fast as He Can, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A20.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. See infra Part I.C.
36. See infra Parts I.C. III.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part I.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part III.C2.b.i.
41. See infra Part III.C.2.b.ii.
42. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (quoting George Mason: "The chief advantages which have been urged in favor of unity in the Executive, are the secresy [sic], the dispatch, the vigor and energy ..."); id. at 70 (quoting James Wilson to similar effect);
43. see also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 511-12, 521-22 (2007) (citing these historical points).
44. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
45. Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 511 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30).
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 30, at 392.
47. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 494, 529 (referring to layers of secrets within secrets).
48. A current example of this is the recently revealed use of warrantless surveillance by the National Security Agency, which had been authorized by statute only to carry out warranted surveillance with warrants obtained in a special, secretive process. See, e.g., JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 42-59 (2006). Similar observations have been made about the CIA's evolution.
49. See KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI 13 (1996) (noting that the CIA "had been established with minimal public debate at the dawn of the Cold War era and had taken on unanticipated duties in relative secrecy over the subsequent years").
50. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. at § 2; id. at § 3; see also Kitrosser, supra note 15, at 1167-73.
51. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) ("Executive action that has utterly no policymaking component is rare ...."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.").
52. See supra notes 33, 34.
53. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Mistretta Court permitted too broad a legislative delegation and referring to the inevitability and longstanding acceptance of broad delegations generally).
54. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt. 1, at 10 (1976) (Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Book I).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., OLMSTED, supra note 34, at 96; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 331-32 (1973).
58. See, e.g., OLMSTED, supra note 34, at 43-44; SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 42, at viii-x.
59. See infra Part I.C.
60. Saikrishna Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (1999).
61. Id. at 1154-64.
62. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233-34 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. and eds., 1946),
63. quoted in DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 143 (1998).
64. This observation has been made many times, perhaps most famously by Justice Stewart who observed that "when everything is classified, then nothing is classified." N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at XXXVIII, 5, 11-13 (1997);
66. HAROLD C. RELYEA, SECURITY CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED INFORMATION: HISTORY, STATUS AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES 2-5 (2007); SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 42, at 338-41.
67. See, e.g., NATHAN BROOKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP., THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2 n.7 (2004), available at http:// firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/CRS.security4.pdf ; S. DOC NO. 105-2, at 5, 15, 23-24.
68. RELYEA, supra note 49, at 2.
69. Id.
70. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 42, at 339.
71. Id. at 340. President Truman's executive order also was the first classification order to identify the Constitution as its legal basis. Id. President Roosevelt had attempted, albeit not very convincingly, to claim some statutory authorization for his executive order. Id. at 339. President Truman purported to derive his authority from Article II of the Constitution. Id. at 340. Subsequent Presidents have followed Truman's lead, deeming Article II sufficient authority for them to establish a governmentwide official secrecy program. BROOKS, supra note 50, at 1-2 (2004); SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 42, at 340.
72. BROOKS, supra note 50, at 3.
73. Id. (quoting DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 11 (1997)).
74. S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 12.
75. Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.4, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp. III 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,292] (amending Executive Order 12,958). For a redline version indicating Bush Administration's additions, see Bush Executive Order 13,292 on Classified National Security Information - Additions and Deletions, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ bush/eo13292inout.html [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,292 redline].
76. The Bush Administration added a notation that the national security "includes defense against transnational terrorism." Exec. Order No. 13,292, supra note 58, § 1.1(a).
77. See Exec. Order No. 13,292 redline, supra note 58 (see deleted language at § 1.1).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1.2 (see deleted language).
80. Id. § 1.1(c).
81. Id. § 1.7(c).
82. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004).
83. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 39 (1997).
84. See supra notes 36, 39 and accompanying text.
85. In 1999, the Moynihan Commission Report cited a figure of roughly three million persons with some form of classification authority, including government employees and government contractors. S. DOC. NO. 105-2, Chairman's Foreword, at xxxix. This number very likely has increased since that time, based on the dramatic increase in original classifiers. Compare, e.g., id. (noting that there were 1336 original classifiers as of 1999), with INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2005 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9 (2006) [hereinafter ISOO 2005 REPORT] (noting that there were 3959 original classifiers as of 2005).
86. The exact number as reported in 2005 is 3959. ISOO 2005 REPORT, supra note 68.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 12.
89. See supra note 68.
90. ISOO 2005 REPORT, supra note 68, at 10.
91. "ISOO" is a part "of the National Archives and Records Administration ... and receives its policy and program guidance from the National Security Council...." It "oversees the security classification programs in both Government and industry and reports annually to the President on their status." Id. at unnumbered page immediately following top cover page.
92. Id. at 11.
93. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 15 (1997);
94. Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 85-88 (1992).
95. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
96. See, e.g., S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xxii-xxiv, 11-16; Deyling, supra note 76, at 111-12.
97. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text; see also S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 15 (noting that under the Report's proposed statute, "[t]he President would retain the authority to implement the law ... as long as such procedures remained within the general boundaries of the law").
98. See Deyling, supra note 76, at 67-82.
99. See id. at 67-68, 82-88.
100. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 74 for a description of "ISOO."
102. Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Pseudo-Classification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 45, 50 (2005) (statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records Administration).
103. Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A1.
104. 108 CONG. REC. S9714 (2004) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
105. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xxxii (1997) (internal citation omitted).
106. Id. at xxi.
107. MOYNIHAN, supra note 47, at 125-201; see also S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xl-xliv.
108. S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt. 2, at 292 (1976) (Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book II).
109. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
112. ISOO 2005 REPORT, supra note 68, at 13.
113. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2004 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (2005) [hereinafter ISOO 2004 REPORT].
114. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2003 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 19 (2004) [hereinafter ISOO 2003 REPORT].
115. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2002 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 23 (2003) [hereinafter ISOO 2002 REPORT].
116. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2001 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2 (2002) [hereinafter ISOO 2001 REPORT].
117. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15-18 (2002) [hereinafter ISOO 2000 REPORT].
118. See supra Part I.C.1.c.
119. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 14 (1997).
120. See, e.g., INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF DECLASSIFICATION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (2004); ISOO 2000 REPORT, supra note 99, at 1-7.
121. See supra Part I.B.
122. As reflected in this paragraph and in the case law analysis below, these arguments generally are not couched as "political question" arguments. Nonetheless, one might opine that they effectively invoke the political question doctrine by counseling leaving matters to one or both political branches for reasons of relative expertise or constitutional prerogative. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-17 (1962) (explaining political question doctrine and its major elements). Regardless of the label affixed to the arguments, however, their component elements, as detailed in this Part, remain the same, and thus remain subject to this Article's objections. See id. at 217 (noting the "impossibility of [resolving political question claims] by any semantic cataloguing").
123. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
124. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded and stay continued, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
125. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 714.
127. Id. (per curiam).
128. Id. at 757-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
129. Id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 730.
131. Id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 733-36 (White, J., concurring).
132. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
133. Technically, there was one other prosecution - that of former Defense Department employee Daniel Ellsberg for leaking the papers that sparked the Pentagon Papers case. The Ellsberg prosecution was dismissed on nonmerits grounds at the district court level, however, due to ethical improprieties by the government. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 4, 6-9 (1972) (Columbia Univ. Press., Morningside ed. 1989); see supra note 5.
134. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060-61.
135. Id. at 1062-63.
136. See generally id.
137. Id. at 1068, 1069-70, 1074-75.
138. Id. at 1068, 1069-70.
139. Id. at 1080 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1081-82.
141. Id. at 1082-83.
142. Id. at 1083 (internal citation omitted).
143. Id. at 1084.
144. Id. at 1085-86 (Phillips, J., concurring).
145. United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2007).
146. United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
147. Rosen's & Weissman's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 3-4.
148. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
149. See Rosen's & Weissman's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3.
150. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
151. Rosen's & Weissman's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 40-45. The defendants rested this argument in part on the verbal nature of the prohibited communications. They suggested that conduct, not speech, might have been at issue had documents been transmitted. Id. at 43-14.
152. Id. at 43-44.
153. Id. at 52.
154. Id. at 54-58.
155. See Government's Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment at 22-27, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. March 31, 2006) [hereinafter Government's Supplemental Response].
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 23-24.
158. Id. at 23-24 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)). For reference to these cases' long discredited reasoning and holdings, see, for example, Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217 n.2. Furthermore, as the Eastern District of Virginia points out in its order denying the motion to dismiss of defendants Rosen and Weissman, even Schenck and its progeny "did not adopt a categorical rule that prosecutions under the Espionage Act did not implicate the First Amendment, but carefully weighed the government's interest in prosecuting the war against the defendants' First Amendment interests." Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 43 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
159. Government's Supplemental Response, supra note 137, at 23.
160. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 67 (order denying motion to dismiss).
161. Id. at 40.
162. Id. at 45.
163. Id. at 45 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1082 (4th Cir. 1988)).
164. See id. at 59, 63.
165. Id. at 56 (citing Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (emphasis added by district court); Morison, 844 F.2d at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring)).
166. Id. at 58-59; Transcript of Hearing on Motions at 10-11, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05cr225 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2006). The District Court interpreted this knowledge provision to require the government, when prosecuting defendants for disclosing intangible information, to show a "likelihood of... [a] bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or to aid a foreign government." Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 34 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
167. Rosen, No 1:05cr225, slip op. at 62 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
168. Id. at 63.
169. The "conceivable threat" language is used by the district court, which it quotes from Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion in Morison. See id. at 56 (citing Morison, 844 F.2d at 1085 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
170. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
171. See supra note 148.
172. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 217 (2004) (explaining that even a subjective intent requirement is insufficiently protective of speech when it is not clear what intended harms, and what degree of imminence for the same, must be shown).
173. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
174. See Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 53-56 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
175. Id. at 49-51.
176. Id. at 50-51. Lawrence Franklin, the Defense Department employee who allegedly leaked information to Rosen and Weisman, also had been charged under the Espionage Act. Franklin pled guilty to Espionage Act violations in the fall of 2005. Id. at 2 n.3.
177. See discussion of relevant free speech arguments, infra Part III.C.2.a.
178. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 505-06 (citing arguments to this effect by Mark Rozell).
179. See Prakash, supra note 45, at 1176.
180. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 495, 522, 524-27.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See Joe Garofoli, Fanning the Flames: Melanie Morgan's Swing from Liberal to Right-Wing Radio Shouter May Not Have Happened Overnight, But It's Permanent - And Profitable, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2006, at CM-8.
183. Lake, supra note 5, at 14; Dan Eggen, Little is Clear in Law on Leaks, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2006, at A7.
184. Lake, supra note 5; Eggen, supra note 165.
185. See, e.g., Eastman Statement, supra note 14, at 4-5 (deeming it an "extraordinary claim" that journalists may second-guess the propriety of classifications); id. at 12-13 (citing special need for executive branch secrecy as part of argument for prosecuting journalists who leak classified information); Susan Burgess, The Big Chill: An Espionage Act Case in a Virginia Federal Court Exposes the Murky Standards Governing National Security Discussions, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2006, at 4, 6, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/30-2/cov-thebigch.html (quoting conservative commentator Gabriel Schoenfeld and FBI to the effect that the press should not override government determinations as to what is a legitimate national security secret);
186. Robert G. Kaiser, Public Secrets, WASH. POST, June 11, 2006, at B1 ("Some readers ask us why the president's decisions on how best to protect the nation shouldn't govern us, and specifically our choices of what to publish."); Johnson, supra note 13 ("It is doubtful that even [New York Times Executive Editor Bill] Keller believes that he is in a better position than the president to judge the consequences of the publication ....").
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286, 1311-26, 1336-39, 1347-48 (2005).
192. See infra Part IV (considering judicial standards that should apply to restrictions on classified information leaks).
193. Cf. Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 847-18, 872-73 (2005) (discussing very fine line between unprotected speech and fully protected, deeply valued speech).
194. Volokh, supra note 172, at 1315-16.
195. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 127-29 (2004).
196. See id.; see also id. at 129 nn.184-85.
197. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
198. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940).
199. Id. at 104; see also id. at 102 ("In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.").
200. Id. at 102.
201. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51(1936).
202. Id. at 250.
203. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001).
204. Id. at 518.
205. Id. at 525.
206. Id. at 527 (internal citation omitted).
207. Id. at 533-34.
208. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-18 (2006).
209. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-09, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (dismissing in a footnote Snepp's contention that such an agreement is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech).
210. See generally id. While the Court's dismissive approach to Snepp's claim is very troubling, it suffices for our purposes to note that even this approach does not preclude the possibility of a speech-protective response to a different type of restriction, such as postpublication prosecution.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 118-23.
213. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 42, at 331 (stating, to describe the mindset borne of the "secrecy system," "[w]e must trust the President because only he knows the facts").
214. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
215. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
216. Id. at 447-48.
217. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (reference to fatal absence of congressional authorization for the prior restraint sought by the government); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (same); id. at 732-33 (White, J., concurring) (same); id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).
218. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 154, at 185 (referring to 1918 Sedition Act as "most repressive legislation in American history").
219. See supra text accompanying note 47.
220. See supra Part I.A-B.
221. See supra Part I.C.
222. Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 537-41 (internal citations omitted).
223. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
224. For discussions to this effect, see, e.g., STONE, supra note 154, at 195-98, 203-07; Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1166-69 (1982).
225. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
226. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 154, at 194; Redish, supra note 205, at 1166.
227. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
228. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
229. Id. at 668-71.
230. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
231. Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). See also sources cited in Landmark Commc'ns, 435 U.S. at 843-44.
232. This point is illuminated by juxtaposing this doctrinal evolution, see, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 227-36 (Jamie Kalven ed.) (1988) (describing liberalizing evolution from Schenck to Brandenburg); Kitrosser, supra note 174, at 853 n.43 (same), with the historical consensus as to the dramatic, speech-infringing abuses wrongly permitted by decades of wartime judicial deference, see, e.g., STONE, supra note 154, at 179, 303-07; supra note 205 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
234. It is true that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally counsels judicial deference in courts' review of agencies' factual and policy conclusions. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). There are, however, two important caveats to this general rule. First, some agencies' organic statutes supplant the APA's judicial review standards with heavier scrutiny levels. See, e.g., 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 11.2, 11.3 (4th ed. 2002). This suggests that the APA's standards largely reflect a judgment that agencies should have leeway to effectuate their own statutory mandates, not a judgment that courts lack the expertise to heavily scrutinize agency actions. Second, the Supreme Court has stated that courts must take a thorough and probing look at agency actions to determine whether even the relatively lenient APA standards are met. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
235. The major incitement cases have involved relatively straightforward fact patterns that courts approached from essentially common sense perspectives, assessing perceived potential harms in light of the articulated judicial test. See generally, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
236. STONE, supra note 154, at 179; see also, e.g., id. at 160, 170-80, 192-98, 297-307.
237. See Kitrosser, supra note 174, at 871-72 (describing relative speech protectiveness of certain types of standards).
238. See id. at 872, 853 n.43.
239. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Kitrosser, supra note 174, at 853 n.43.
240. Or that this notion, "at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
241. See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 156-63 (2006) (discussing judicial review of FOIA exemption claims based on information classification); see also text accompanying supra note 80 (explaining how such claims arise).
242. See Fuchs, supra note 222, at 167-68 (discussing judicial review of state secrets claims); see also, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007) (describing state secrets doctrine);
243. William G. Weaver & Robert M. Palitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 86-87 (2005) (same).
244. See Fuchs, supra note 222, at 163-68.
245. Id. at 170.
246. Id.
247. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
248. Fuchs, supra note 222, at 170.
249. For discussion of the very rushed nature of the litigation, see N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 752-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
250. Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 764 (1988).
251. See supra note 223.
252. Chesney, supra note 223, at 1285-86.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 1313; Fuchs, supra note 222, at 173-74.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
256. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 501-04 (discussing executive privilege cases).
257. See id. at 499-500 (elaborating on this example).
258. See id. at 501-02, 505-06, 505 n.70.
259. See Kitrosser, supra note 15, at 1195-99.
260. Prakash, supra note 45, at 1176 (internal citations omitted).
261. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 522-27.
262. Id. at 524-26.
263. See Kitrosser, supra note 15, at 1167-78.
264. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
265. See Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 524-26.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
267. Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 523-24.
268. See id. at 515-20.
269. See id. at 520-22.
270. See id. at 522.
271. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
274. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88-89 (1948).
275. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 644 (1977).
276. Id. at 645.
277. Id. at 608.
278. Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search
279. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
280. Blasi, supra note 255, at 562.
281. See id. at 541, 605.
282. Indeed, separation of powers is addressed mainly in a paragraph in Blasi's checking theory paper. While Blasi notes in this paragraph that public and press checks can help to bolster separated powers, the paragraph's main point is that the existence of separated powers does not undermine the need for additional checking by the public and the press. See id. at 539.
283. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 79-81 (1975); BeVier, supra note 258, at 513-14.
284. BeVier, supra note 258, at 514 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 263, at 80).
285. See id. at 513.
286. See BICKEL, supra note 263, at 80-81.
287. See id. at 78-79.
288. Bickel confronts the issue somewhat indirectly and in passing, noting that the distinction between press and source may blur where that person is one and the same or close, as with Daniel Ellsberg. See id. at 67. Bickel also confronts this indirectly in discussing the matter of press privilege and the fact that a qualified such privilege should exist to protect a degree of newsgathering while not insulating the press completely from legitimate government investigations. See id. at 82-85.
289. See supra Parts I.A., I.B.
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
292. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
293. See supra Part I.C.2.
294. See supra Part I.C.1.c.
295. See supra Part I.C.2.
296. See supra Part III.C.1.
297. See supra Parts III.C.2, III.C.2.a.
298. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing Congress's constitutional ability to impose structural checks on executive secrecy).
299. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
300. JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM 7 (1988).
301. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 512-14.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 516.
304. Id. at 517.
305. See, e.g., supra note 262 (citing Vincent Blasi's discussion of the parallel relationship between the two).
306. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at Chairman's Foreword, xxxvii-xxxviii (1997) (proposing statutory control of the classification system); id. at 11-15.
307. See RELYEA, supra note 49 at 27-29 (citing executive order provision for internal review of classification decisions); Fuchs, supra note 222, at 158-63 (citing statutory provision for judicial review of classification decisions).
308. See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, supra note 167 (noting reporters must assemble a story "brick by brick").
309. For example, in addition to the prosecutions of Rosen and Weissman, their alleged Defense Department source, Lawrence Franklin, was charged and pled guilty under the Espionage Act. See supra note 158.
310. Supra p. 908.
311. See supra text accompanying note 284 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 516).
312. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 433 (2006) (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam)).
313. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (citing the Brandenburg standard).
314. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
315. See supra notes 213, 215-17 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
317. See generally STONE, supra note 154.
318. This point is somewhat parallel to that made by Bickel and BeVier about the desirability of an ongoing "contest" between press and government. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
319. For background on existing statutory protections for national security whistleblowers, see generally LOUIS FISHER, CONG. SERVICE REP., NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005).
320. See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2328-29 (2006) (discussing importance of internal dissent channels within executive branch).
321. See Johnson, supra note 13.
322. See supra p. 924-25 (explaining that "[e]ven with strong First Amendment protections, the people and the press remain at a substantial disadvantage relative to the executive branch" and that judicial protection is not absolute).
323. Fit and Unfit to Print, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006.