Capturing the ghost: Expanding federal rule of civil procedure 11 to solve procedural concerns with ghostwriting

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 92, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1246-1288

  Justman, Jeffrey P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 44849127389     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (273)

1. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
2. The term "pro se" means "on one's own behalf" and describes litigants who appear in court without any attorney representation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). Some jurisdictions also refer to this representation alternatively as "in propria persona," State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Ethics Op. 05-06 (2005) [hereinafter Ariz. Ethics Op. 05-06], or as "in pro per" representation, L.A. County Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 502 (1999) [hereinafter L.A. County Formal Op. 502].
3. Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *4.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Under the traditional full-service model, legal services are a single product, including "advice, fact investigation, legal research, drafting correspondence and pleadings, negotiation, representation at hearings, formal discovery, and trial." Helen Hierschbiel, The Ethics of Unbundling: How to Avoid the Land Mines of "Discrete Task Representation," OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2007, at 9, 9, available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07jul/barcounsel.html.
7. Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *4.
8. Id. at *4 n.3.
9. Id. at *17-18.
10. Id. at *12-18 (explaining that ghostwriting violates a state ethics rule requiring a lawyer's candor and honesty to tribunals, and also offends Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
11. Id. at *15.
12. Id. at *18.
13. See, e.g., Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (explaining that an attorney evidently provided "substantial assistance" to a putative pro se litigant); Anderson v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 3:06cv399, 2007 WL 4284904, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2007) ("[I]f counsel is preparing the documents being filed by the Plaintiff in this action, the undersigned would take a dim view of that practice."); Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2007) ("The level of sophistication, polish and legal research contained in plaintiff's filings strongly suggest that they were ghostwritten by counsel."); Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007) (noting that the complaint "appears to have been ghostwritten").
14. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, 1208 (2002);
15. John C. Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of "Ghostwriting" for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2728 (1999).
16. See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 373, 376-77 (2005) (noting the increasing frequency of pro se litigation).
17. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *14-18 (arguing that ghostwriting violates ethics rules requiring attorneys to be candid to courts); Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1334-35 (2000) (discussing how courts and ethics boards in several states condemn ghostwriting).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2004) (indicating that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
19. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *14-18; Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2696-720.
20. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *15-17; Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2716-20.
21. E.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.
22. E.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *12 (listing synonyms for unbundled legal services as "discrete tasks legal services" and "limited scope legal assistance"); Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 565 (2007) (describing these services alternatively as "unbundled legal services" or "limited scope representation");
23. see also N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 713 (2008) [hereinafter N.J. Ethics Op. 713], available at www.judiciary.state.nj. us/notices/ethics/ACPE713.pdf (dubbing this kind of representation "short-term limited legal services").
24. Farley, supra note 21, at 565.
25. Rochelle Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services in New York State Litigated Matters: A Proposal to Test the Efficacy Through Law School Clinics, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 653, 654 (2006); Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2691.
26. Klempner, supra note 23, at 654.
27. Hierschbiel, supra note 6, at 9.
28. David M. Forman, Unbundled Legal Services, HAW. B.J., Aug. 2001, at 20, 20;
29. Sylvia Stevens, Understanding 'Unbundling': Creating a Menu of Legal Services May Improve Accessibility, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1998, at 25, 25.
30. Klempner, supra note 23, at 654; Stevens, supra note 26, at 25.
31. See Klempner, supra note 23, at 654 (noting that unbundled legal services are "far less established and common in the litigation context").
32. See Swank, supra note 15, at 376 (noting the increase of pro se litigants in so-called poor people courts).
33. Brenda Star Adams, Note, "Unbundled Legal Services": A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts's Civil Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306-13 (2005).
34. Id. at 308-10.
35. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
36. See Raymond P. Micklewright, Discrete Task Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 5, 5 (arguing that clients forego attorney assistance because it is "unnecessarily expensive");
37. Anthony Zapata, Legal 'Ghostwriting' in Indiana: An Analysis, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2005, at 20, 23; Adams, supra note 30, at 304.
38. Minnesota and Arizona have self-service centers that cater to low-income, self-represented litigants, and other states have court-sponsored clinics that educate pro se litigants about court procedures. Adams, supra note 30, at 304-05; see also Zapata, supra note 33, at 20-21 (noting that many state supreme courts have created pro se advisory boards to advise self-represented litigants).
39. See Farley, supra note 21, at 563 (explaining that legal services organizations and pro bono programs only meet fifteen to twenty-five percent of the need of the nation's poor); Micklewright, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that the Legal Services Corporation turns away "thousands of potential clients annually because of cutbacks in funding").
40. ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 9 (1996) [hereinafter ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ downloads/sclaid/agendaforaccess.pdf (concluding that "many low- and moderate-income Americans confront legal issues in their lives and receive no help");
41. LEGAL SERV. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 18 (2005) [hereinafter JUSTICE GAP], available at http://www.lsc.gov/ JusticeGap.pdf;
42. ALGODONES ASSOCS., THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 6 (1998), http://www.algodonesassociates.com/legal_services/assessing_needs/ ABA%20Legal%20Needs.pdf (concluding that between sixty-one and seventy-five percent "of all low-income legal needs are unmet").
43. See JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (noting that on average there is one legal aid attorney for every 6861 people nationally while there is one private practice attorney for every 525 people in the population); Beth Lynch Murphy, Results of a National Survey of Pro Se Assistance Programs: A Preliminary Report, http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_murphy. asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) (indicating that over ninety-five percent of state respondents to an American Judicature Society study reported that there had been an increase in pro se litigation in their courts in the previous five years).
44. See Memorandum from Madelynn Herman, Pro Se Statistics (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Memos/ ProSeStatsMemo.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) (listing state court pro se statistics for domestic relations matters, such as divorce, small claims, landlord/tenant, probate, and other civil matters).
45. See Adams, supra note 30, at 308-10.
46. See Hierschbiel, supra note 6, at 9 ("Improving access to justice in the face of decreasing government funding and rising legal costs continues to challenge the legal community.").
47. E.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b); ME. R. CIV. P. 11(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 11(b); Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Op. on Prof'l Conduct No. 849 (1983) (concluding that an attorney may agree in advance with his client to limit the attorney's employment to drafting court documents, as long as the client gives his informed consent to such a limitation of employment).
48. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.").
49. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 6 (explaining that limited representation may be appropriate when the client has limited objectives for the representation); id. R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (noting that limited representation would not be appropriate when, for example, the attorney's limited work would be insufficient to yield advice on which the client could rely).
50. Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2691.
51. Id.
52. In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
53. See, e.g., In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426, 435 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (defining ghostwriting as the "act of an undisclosed attorney who assists a self-represented litigant by drafting his or her pleadings as part of 'unbundled' or limited legal services" (emphasis added)).
54. See, e.g., In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (discussing ghostwriting of a motion to reconsider); Jackson v. Am. Lubricant Co., No. 18482, 2001 WL 221661, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001) (same).
55. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 885 (D. Kan. 1997).
56. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that an attorney must play a "substantial role in the litigation" to qualify as a ghostwriter).
57. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (defining "substantial" by the amount of the brief preparation allocable to the attorney); Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Brown I, 354 B.R. at 544 (noting that the drafting of pleadings constitutes substantial assistance); Lauren A. Weeman, Note, Bending the (Ethical) Rules in Arizona: Ethics Opinion 05-06's Approval of Undisclosed Ghostwriting May Be a Sign of Things to Come, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1058-60 (2006) (explaining the "substantial assistance approach" to defining ghostwriting); cf. In re Eastlick, 349 B.R. 216, 221 n.17 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (explaining that preparation of a bankruptcy petition, schedules, and statements constitutes "material" participation, which is improper if not disclosed).
58. Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
59. Ellis, 448 F.2d at 1328.
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978) [hereinafter ABA Informal Op. 1414].
61. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1058.
62. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Several authorities note the difficulty in analyzing ghostwriting because of the inability to identify ghostwriters. See In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (berating a ghostwriting attorney for playing "a game of 'catch-me-if-you-can"'); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (dubbing ghostwriting "sub-rosa behavior"); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (condemning ghostwriters for shielding themselves in a "cloak of anonymity"); ABA Committee Abandons Previous Stance That Required Revealing Ghostwriting Lawyers, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at 352 (July 11, 2007) (characterizing ghostwriters as "shadow lawyers").
64. See 338 B.R. 906, 909-10 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
65. Id. at 914-15, 917.
66. See In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Attorneys appearing pro hac vice are not licensed to appear before a particular court, but, with court approval, may do so "[f]or this occasion or particular purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (7th ed. 1999).
70. In re Potter, 2007 WL 2363104, at *4; see also Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Sys., 303 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772-73 (E.D. Va. 2004) (admonishing an attorney for similar behavior); cf. Te-Ta-Ma Truth Found. - Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 246 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (criticizing a "non-attorney law school graduate" for potentially ghostwriting court documents).
71. See Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
72. Id. at *18.
73. It is important to note that in Delso, Richard Shapiro encouraged Rosann Delso to inform the court of his assistance drafting her motions. Id. at *4 n.3.
74. 168 F.R.D. 69, 71 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
75. In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
76. For other examples of conflicts of interest as manifested through ghostwriting, see Ailing v. Am. Tool & Grinding Co., 96 F.R.D. 221, 223 (D. Colo. 1982), and Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Lawson, 933 A.2d 842, 850 & n.1 (Md. 2007).
77. See, e.g., In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Brown (Brown II), 371 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007), amended by 371 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007); Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541-46; In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-15 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys., 326 B.R. 655, 673-75 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 767-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 732-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
78. For the 2007 iteration of the case, see Brown II, 371 B.R. at 493. For the 2006 version, see Brown I, 354 B.R. at 539-40.
79. For example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.8, which prohibit an attorney from representing a client with a concurrent or successive conflict of interest, may prohibit an attorney in bankruptcy court from representing a debtor if the attorney himself was a prepetition secured creditor of the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8 (2004); see also Brown II, 371 B.R. at 491-93.
80. See Brown II, 371 B.R. at 493; Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541.
81. Brown II, 371 B.R. at 491.
82. Id. at 492.
83. Id. at 493.
84. See, e.g., In re Bell, 212 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (noting another attorney's attempt to avoid a conflict of interest through ghostwriting).
85. MINN. STATE BAR ASS'N PRO SE IMPLEMENTATION COMM., REPORT OF THE MSBA PRO SE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MAY 2003 TO 2006, at 7, http://www2.mnbar.org/committees/pro-se/ CommitteeFinalReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) [hereinafter MSBA REPORT] (explaining that "fear of having to stay on a case forever" and "being unable to withdraw" is one principal concern related to unbundled legal services);
86. see also Elizabeth J. Cohen, Afraid of Ghosts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 80, 80 (arguing that the dangers of ghostwriting lie in the possibility that a "very real lawyer-client relationship may have been formed, with all its attendant obligations").
87. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198 (arguing that a ghostwriter, among other motives, wants to "avoid being forced to stay in the case by a judge who may decide that, once he appears, his withdrawal motion should be denied").
88. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004).
89. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Scary Parts of Ghostwriting, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2007, at 16, 17 (explaining lawyers' fear that pro se litigants '"might not be truly able to handle other aspects of the case on their own,"' and that lawyers question where their responsibilities with limited representations begin and end).
90. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
95. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
96. E.g., Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231 (noting that "pleadings filed pro se are to be interpreted liberally" and that pro se litigants are granted "greater latitude" in subsequent court hearings and at trial).
97. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 07-446]; Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1157-59.
98. E.g., Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) (describing ghostwriting as "unprofessional conduct" that is "patently unfair"); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (explaining that ghostwriting violates "the duty of honesty and candor to the court").
99. E.g., Knight-McConnell v. Cummins, No. 03 Civ. 5035, 2005 WL 1398590, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (explaining that ghostwriting raises "concerns under Rule 11"); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (noting that ghostwriting violates Rule 11 and "interferes with the efficient administration of justice").
100. See, e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 98-1 (1998) (noting that ghostwriting litigation documents "would usually be misleading to the court and to other parties, and therefore would be prohibited"); Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2697.
101. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2004) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."); id. R. 4.1(a) ("In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.").
103. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 98-5 (1998) [hereinafter Conn. Informal Op. 98-5]; see also Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1592 (1994) (explaining that a failure to disclose an attorney's assistance "may also be a misrepresentation to the court and to opposing counsel").
104. The Model Rules are not binding authority on any particular jurisdiction; instead, as their name suggests, they serve as templates on which states may base their rules of professional conduct. See E. Norman Veasey, Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at xv (2004) (noting the variations in adopting the Model Rules among the fifty states and the District of Columbia).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF 'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(C) (2004).
106. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987) [hereinafter City of N.Y. Formal Op. 1987-2].
107. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1998); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915 n.36 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (explaining that ghostwriting violates the local equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)).
108. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *14.
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (explaining that the Rules should be administered to secure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" outcomes in every action).
110. See Duran, 238 F.3d at 1271-72; Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13; Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 885-86 (D. Kan. 1997); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
111. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
112. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231.
113. Somerset Pharms., Inc. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996); see also In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (indicating that ghostwriting "places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. Wesley, 987 F. Supp. at 886.
115. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
116. In re West, 338 B.R. at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) (quoting Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See, e.g., In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (explaining that ghostwriting "tax[ed] the Court's system" and "forc[ed] the Court to expend more time and effort to handle the matter").
118. See, e.g., Stewart v. Angelone, 186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether counsel intends to represent him in this case.").
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (7th ed. 1999) (defining satellite litigation as "[peripheral skirmishes involved in the prosecution of a lawsuit");
120. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 101 (1993).
121. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); In re West, 338 B.R. at 910-13.
122. In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
124. Id. R. 11(a).
125. Id. R. 11(b)(1)-(3).
126. Id. R. 11(c).
127. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971).
128. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
129. See id. (describing how the standards for investigation and research are different for pro se parties than for parties represented by counsel).
130. Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App'x 774, 778-79 (10th Cir. 2001) (admonishing a ghostwriting attorney); Washington v. Hampton Rds. Shipping Ass'n, No. 2:01CV880, 2002 WL 32488476, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Va. May 30, 2002) ("Ghostwriting is in violation of Rule 11."); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915, 917 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (sanctioning an attorney $1000 for violating the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (sanctioning an attorney $11,290.05 for violating the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (admonishing an attorney for violating the bankruptcy court equivalent to Rule 11).
131. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); accord Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (noting that ghostwriting is improper even though it may not per se violate Rule 11).
132. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14.
133. Id. at 1178, 1208-09.
134. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
135. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1209 (arguing that courts need to ensure that access to justice is not limited to either the extremely poor or the extremely rich).
136. Id. at 1157-58; see also N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21 (explaining that a client's entitlement to confidentiality may provide "an initial thrust against disclosure" in limited scope representation).
137. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Many scholars note, however, that even though the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the Conley standard in Twombly, any new limits are likely to apply only in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007), http://www.law .northwestern.edu/lawreview/ colloquy/2007/31/LRColl2007n31Bradley.pdf (arguing that Twombly "did not rework pleading rules across the board" and that it merely "modif[ied] the elements of an antitrust conspiracy claim").
138. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1157.
139. ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Fin. Instruments Group, Ltd. v. Leung, 30 F. App'x 915, 916 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Leung's pleadings before this court and the district court demonstrate an obvious legal sophistication, a complete familiarity with the rules of civil procedure, and an excellent command of the English language."); United States v. Bell, 217 F.R.D. 335, 339 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 2003) ("The court notes with interest that Bell's objections include citations prepared in Bluebook format. These documents strongly suggest the assistance of a legally trained person who is ghostwriting Mr. Bell's legal arguments."); Watkins v. Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998 WL 312124, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1998) ("Despite [the Plaintiff's] nominal pro se status, it seems pretty clear that someone familiar with legal practice and procedure has had a major hand in drafting the Complaint.").
142. See Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997).
143. See id.
144. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1174.
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendments, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 589 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Advisory Notes] ("When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the representation to the court.").
146. Farley, supra note 21, at 585-86 (stating that limited appearances for low-income litigants increase their access to justice); Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1208; Adams, supra note 30, at 306-13 (stating that pro se litigation causes delays and increases the chance for litigants to lose).
147. See, e.g., ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS, supra note 36, at 8 (concluding that "many low- and moderate-income Americans confront legal issues in their lives and receive no help"); JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (compiling national and state studies of pro se representation, and concluding that "less than one in five - 20 percent - of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive it").
148. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1206.
149. See Farley, supra note 21, at 563 (explaining that legal services organizations and pro bono programs only meet fifteen to twenty-five percent of the overall need of the nation's poor). Indeed, one jurisdiction considers increasing low-income litigants' access to civil justice of such importance that it permits ghostwriting only as part of an organized, nonprofit program to provide legal assistance to people of limited means. See N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21.
150. See Swank, supra note 15, at 376 (documenting the proliferation of pro se litigation in "traffic, landlord/tenant, and child support or other domestic relations issues").
151. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1147 (internal citation omitted); see also David L. Walther, Ghostwriters in the Sky, 17 AM. J. FAM. L. 61, 61 (2003) (explaining that one of the more "common forms" of unbundled services in marital settlements is "ghost writing").
152. See, e.g., Olvera v. Edmundson, No. 1:01CV74-C, 2001 WL 1019385, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. June 15, 2001) (arguing that pro se litigants are "ill equipped to prosecute the complex issues raised without continued legal assistance").
153. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1197-1205.
154. Id. at 1197-98.
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004).
156. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1197-1203; see also ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 (noting that an attorney "may be obliged under Rules 1.2 and 1.6 not to reveal the fact of the representation").
157. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1204.
158. Id. at 1204-05.
159. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 ("We conclude that there is no prohibition in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct against undisclosed assistance to pro se litigants, as long as the lawyer does not do so in a manner that violates rules that otherwise would apply to the lawyer's conduct."); Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1208-09.
160. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); Conn. Informal Op. 98-5, supra note 96; Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2712.
161. E.g., Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2711-12.
162. See, e.g., ABA Informal Op. 1414, supra note 54 (arguing that "extensive undisclosed participation" by an attorney is improper, but leaving the door open for more limited participation); Weeman, supra note 51, at 1056-61 (discussing the states that adhere to an "anonymous disclosure" approach, and recommending such an approach for Arizona).
163. See, e.g., Weeman, supra note 51, at 1066 (noting that the "schism" between proponents of ghostwriting and those opposing it has widened, and that confusion surrounding the ethics of ghostwriting has escalated).
164. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 ("We assume a jurisdiction where no law or tribunal rule requires disclosure of such participation . . . or otherwise regulates such undisclosed advice or drafting."); Ariz. Ethics Op. 05-06, supra note 2 (noting that the opinion does not revisit the committee's conclusion that ghostwriting may be prohibited by Rule 11, and that the legal boundaries of ghostwriting should be defined by those "with requisite authority"); N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21 (failing to comment on Rule 11's applicability to ghostwriting because "[t]his Committee has no jurisdiction over questions of federal civil procedure"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 613 (1990) (noting that lawyers should be "mindful of any court rule or authoritative judicial determinations" concerning ghostwriting); L.A. County Formal Op. 502, supra note 2 (sanctioning ghostwriting as long as there is "no court rule to the contrary").
165. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. KBA E-343 (1991).
166. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1208-09.
167. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1178.
168. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1157-58.
169. See, e.g., Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App'x 774, 779 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the liberal construction normally afforded to pro se litigants is "no longer warranted" because of the presence of a ghostwriter); cf. Goktepe v. Lawrence, No. 3:03CV89, 2005 WL 293491, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 2005) (refusing to construe the putative pro se litigant's pleadings "using the liberal standard typically afforded to pro se litigants in the past" because the litigant was actually an attorney).
170. See In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (arguing that a ghostwriter should not get a free bite "at the apple" of pleadings).
171. Of course, both represented parties and pro se litigants do have the ability to amend their pleadings once as a matter of course. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
172. See Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *11-12, *16 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (discussing how ghostwriting may raise an appearance of impropriety, and later, asserting that ghostwriting violates public policy).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 482 (1995).
174. See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).
175. Cf. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 867 (1988) (discussing the appearance of impropriety created by a judge who failed to recuse himself as a federal statute required); Young v. U.S. ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) (noting the appearance of impropriety when a judge appointed a prosecutor with personal interests in the prosecution).
176. Compare Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1169-78 (arguing that ghostwriters may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions), with ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 (arguing that ghostwriters are only bound by Rule 11 if they sign pleadings and thereby make an affirmative statement).
177. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; accord Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (noting the plaintiff's argument that Rule 11 does not apply to "non-signer[s] or non-presenter[s]").
178. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1174.
179. Id. (citing 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589).
180. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
181. The purpose behind Rule 11, as well as all of the Federal Rules, is to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
182. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 583-92.
183. See id.
184. E.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
185. E.g., In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
186. 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 588.
187. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1175.
188. See id. at 1174.
189. Id.
190. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
191. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1199-205.
192. Id. at 1199-202 (discussing how ghostwriting implicates Model Rule 1.6).
193. See id. at 1198.
194. Id. at 1199 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004)).
195. Id. at 1203 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000)).
196. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
197. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004) (failing to discuss the rule's application to clients).
198. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1200.
199. Id. at 1203-05.
200. See, e.g., In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 909-10 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (noting an attorney's attempt to circumvent electronic pleading rules by advising his client to submit written documents pro se).
201. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
202. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1203-04.
203. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
204. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1056.
205. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (2000); City of N.Y. Formal Op. 1987-2, supra note 99 (mandating the use of the phrase "Prepared by Counsel").
206. City of N.Y. Formal Op. 1987-2, supra note 99.
207. Id.
208. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Stewart v. Angelone, 186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether counsel intends to represent him in this case.").
211. For the most prominent example of a court concerned about frivolous allegations while being unable to identify the alleged ghostwriter, see Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (condemning a ghostwriter who supported the "irresponsible tactics" of a litigious plaintiff, and characterizing such assistance as "hit-and-run tactics"), and see also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 2001) (recounting one attorney's contention that an opponent did not conduct the "requisite pre-filing investigation of the facts underpinning the complaint's claims" and arguing that one attorney was using his client's case as a "vehicle to continue his vendetta" against the opposing parties).
212. See In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673-74 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (suggesting that ghostwriting wastes judicial resources).
213. Although ghostwriters who anonymously disclose assistance arguably would not be subject to Rule 11, Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057-58, the language of Rule 11 and the advisory committee's note suggests that anyone responsible for a violation may be subject to sanctions under the rule, see 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 588.
214. Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057.
215. See Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) ("We therefore order Johnson to disclose to the court in writing the identity, profession and address of the person who has been assisting her by February 20, 2007."); Blue Chip IR Group, Ltd. v. Furth, No. 2:06CV185 DS, 2006 WL 2350157, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 11, 2006) (ordering a suspected ghostwriter to "file a Notice of Appearance in compliance with the rules of this Court if he intended to continue to appear"); Stewart v. Angelone, 186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether counsel intends to represent him in this case."); In re Brown (Brown II), 371 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007) (recounting the court's previous order to an attorney to "make a full disclosure to the Court regarding any fees he had billed or payments he had accepted"), amended by 371 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007); cf. Nasrichampang v. Woodford, No. 04CV2400BTMRBB, 2006 WL 3932924, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006) (ordering an attorney to acknowledge "future ghostwriting" by signing "all court documents").
216. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 910-13 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
217. 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589.
218. E.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *12-16; Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985-87 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-79 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 541-42 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-16 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
219. For ethics opinions that advocate mandatory disclosure, see Conn. Informal Op. 98-5, supra note 96 ("It is our opinion that a lawyer who prepares and controls the content of a pleading, brief or other document to be filed with a court must, in some form satisfactory to the court, inform the court that the document was prepared by the lawyer.") and Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct, Formal Op. 96-31 (1997), and compare N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21 (requiring disclosure when ghostwriting is used as a tactic "to gain advantage in litigation," while permitting ghostwriting if such assistance is part of a "non-profit program designed to provide legal assistance to people of limited means").
220. See Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541 (explaining that ghostwriting has been met with "universal disfavor" in federal courts).
221. E.g., In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768-70.
222. E.g., Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
223. Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 342.
224. See In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 770.
225. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) ("It would be patently unfair for Johnson to benefit from the less-stringent standard applied to pro se litigants if, in fact, she is receiving substantial behind-the-scenes assistance from counsel.").
226. See Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2715-24.
227. Id. at 2716.
228. Id. at 2722.
229. Cf. id. at 2728-29 (concluding that courts and bar associations should encourage limited scope representation by permitting disclosed assistance, but failing to offer a model to encourage courts and bar associations to do so).
230. E.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78 (E.D. Va. 1997).
231. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (noting that courts around the country "increasingly are coming to grips with the practice").
232. See, e.g., Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007); Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04-C-6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007); In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Brown (Brown II), 371 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007), amended by 371 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
233. See, e.g., In re Potter, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4; Brown II, 371 B.R. at 493; Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541-46; In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-15 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys. 326 B.R. 655, 673-75 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 767-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 732-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
234. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2007); Edwards v. Creoks Mental Health Serv., Inc., No. 05-CV-0454-CVE-SAJ, 2007 WL 2254344, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2007); Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007); Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007); Ariola v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 9:04-CV-1262, 2007 WL 119453, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007).
235. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (indicating that ghostwriting is a "trendy" legal issue because of its increasing frequency).
236. Compare In re West, 338 B.R. at 915, 917 (sanctioning an attorney $1000 for violating the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11), and In re Cash Media, 326 B.R. at 674 (sanctioning an attorney $11,290.05 for violating the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11), with Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (stating that ghostwriting does not violate Rule 11, but that it "contravene[s] the spirit" of the rule), and Kircher, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (noting that while ghostwriting may not violate Rule 11, it is still improper).
237. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
238. ME. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
239. See FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 11(b).
240. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198 (indicating that a desire to avoid being conscripted into a full-service representation is one justification for ghostwriting); MSBA REPORT, supra note 79, at 7 (explaining that "fear of having to stay on a case forever" and "being unable to withdraw" is one principal concern related to unbundled legal services).
241. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
242. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 11(b).
243. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 11(b).
244. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
245. Tebo, supra note 82, at 17.
246. While this Section only discusses Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, its analysis is equally applicable to similar rules in other federal and state courts. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.
247. See, e.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that an attorney must play a "substantial role in the litigation" to qualify as a ghostwriter); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (noting that the drafting of pleadings constitutes substantial assistance); cf. In re Eastlick, 349 B.R. 216, 221 n.17 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (explaining that preparation of a bankruptcy petition, schedules, and statements constitutes "material" participation, which is improper if not disclosed).
248. See, e.g., Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
249. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2007); Edwards v. Creoks Mental Health Serv., Inc., No. 05-CV-0454-CVE-SAJ, 2007 WL 2254344, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2007); Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007); In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007).
250. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1147, 1198.
251. Cf. 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 583-92 (failing to distinguish between full-service and limited scope representations in previous iterations of Rule 11); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201 (1983) (same).
252. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198; MSBA REPORT, supra note 79, at 7.
253. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 17 (raising concerns about the costeffectiveness of limited scope representation).
254. See FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a).
255. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 584-85.
256. Cf. FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d) (failing to address the signature and certification requirements in Rule 11); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a) (same).
257. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589 (noting that responsibility for violations of Rule 11(b)(2) "is more properly placed solely on the party's attorneys" than on a represented party).
258. Possible sanctions under Rule 11 include directives of a nonmonetary nature, orders to pay a penalty into court, and reasonable attorneys' fees sufficient to deter repetition of violative conduct. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
259. Cf. Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2728-29 (concluding that courts should encourage limited scope representation by permitting disclosed assistance, but failing to offer a model to encourage courts and bar associations to do this).
260. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that Rule 11 does not expressly address ghostwriting); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994) (same).
261. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (explaining that, to that date, Rule 11 had only been amended twice).
262. Jeremy A. Colby, E-SOP's Fables: Recent Developments in Electronic Service of Process, J. INTERNET L., June 2006, at 3, 5.
263. Sonia Salinas, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who Foots the Bill?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1641 n.15 (2005).
264. See Hart, supra note 253, at 12 (describing how the 1993 amendments were proposed in 1990).
265. See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 112, at 100-01.
266. See id.
267. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (explaining that courts around the country "increasingly are coming to grips with the practice" of ghostwriting).
268. Hart, supra note 253, at 11-12.
269. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1184.
270. See, e.g., Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994) (recounting a legal service organization attorney's request for an advisory opinion on the ethics of ghostwriting).
271. JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (compiling national and state studies of pro se representation, and concluding that 'less than one in five - 20 percent - of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive it").
272. Id. at 4.
273. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Judicial Facts and Figures tbl.2.4, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table204.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) (providing data on the number of pro se cases filed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, excluding the Federal Circuit).