A simple way of estimating interest group ideology

Public Choice

Volumn 136, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 69-86

  McKay, Amy ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Interest group ideology; Interest groups; NOMINATE; Organized interests

Indexed keywords

EID: 44749088100     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9281-2     Document Type: Article

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