Responsibility and self-expression

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 277-297

  Fischer, John Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Alternative possibilities; Control; Free will; Moral responsibility; Narrative; Self expression; Weakness of will

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649166825     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009881327796     Document Type: Review

References (35)

1. Peter Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962), pp. 187-211.
2. For the distinction between the two kinds of control, the claim that guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility, and an elaboration of the notion of guidance control, see John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control,Vol. 14of the Aristotelian Society Monograph Series (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); and John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Series in Philosophy and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
3. The classic source is, Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829-839.
4. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 131-159.
5. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, p. 141.
6. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 141-142.
7. Michael S. McKenna, "Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy," Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (1997), pp. 71-85; the quotation is from pp. 73-74.
8. McKenna, "Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy," pp. 74-75.
9. Keith D. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997), pp. 57-70.
10. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," p. 59.
11. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," p. 57.
12. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," p. 68.
13. Michael Otsuka, "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame," Ethics 108 (1998), p. 688. Otsuka qualifies the principle to apply to cases in which it is not the case that everything one is capable of doing at a given point in time is blameworthy because of some previous choice for which one is to blame.
14. Robert Kane, Free Will and Values, University of New York Press, 1985), esp. York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, SUNY Series in Philosophy (Albany: State p. 60
15. The Significance of Free Will (New 1996), esp. pp. 107-115.
16. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," p. 68.
17. Wyma, "Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action," p. 68.
18. Of course, someone might point out that it must be a different particular sculpture in the alternative sequence, since it would have been created by a different individual from the actual artist. I do not deny that one can say this, or that one can contend that the value of the artist's creative activity then consists in making a difference - in creating the actual sculpture rather than a different particular sculpture. But I do not find this explanation as natural and compelling as the explanation sketched in the text. It seems problematic in the same way as the flicker of freedom strategy for explaining the value of acting so as to be morally responsible.
19. Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 159.
20. A similar problem afflicts the view that in voluntarily and freely performing some act, one is "standing for something.
21. See, for example, Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)
22. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989)
23. Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
24. J. David Velleman, "Well-Being and Time," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991), pp. 48-77
25. this paper is reprinted in John Martin Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics ofDeath, Stanford Series in Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 329-357 (all subsequent pages references will be to the reprinted paper).
26. Velleman, p. 331.
27. Velleman, pp. 334-335, and p. 336.
28. Velleman, p. 336.
29. Velleman, p. 337.
30. Velleman, p. 337.
31. As Velleman points out, this view should not be confused with the view sometimes attributed to Nietzsche that literary or aesthetic considerations determine the value of a life (Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature).
32. For this point I am indebted to Eric Schwitzgebel.
33. I do not have an account of what precisely self-expression consists in, nor do I have a good explanation of why we value it. It does seem to me that we do in fact value something we conceive of as self-expression - something analogous to artistic self-expression. But a full defense of the view I have sketched in the text would say more about what self- expression is, and exactly why we value it (I am indebted to Paul Hoffman for pushing me on these points). Some are not inclined to find self-expression particularly valuable; these may however be precisely the same people who are not inclined to ascribe much intrinsic value to acting so as to be morally responsible. My contention is that the value, whatever one takes this to be, consists in a certain kind of self-expression.
34. Gary Watson, "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme," in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays on Moral Psychology(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 256-286.
35. I have benefited from reading versions of this paper to the philosophy departments at the University of Rochester, the University of California, Santa Barbara, the University of California, Riverside, the University of California, Davis, Cornell University and Utah State University. Additionally, I read a version of this paper at the Southern California Philosophy Conference at the University of California, Irvine. I am especially grateful to the following for their generous and helpful comments: Ted Sider, David Braun, Richard Feldman, Christopher McMahon, Kevin Falvey, Matthew Hanser, Mark Ravizza, Michael Bratman, Paul Hoffman, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Gideon Yaffe. I am particularly honored to have the opportunity to contribute to this volume in honor of Harry Frankfurt, whose original and elegant work has stimulated and challenged me throughout my career