Why are there serial defaulters? Evidence from constitutions

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 713-730

  Kohlscheen, Emanuel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44449108040     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/519814     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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