Sovereignty, cosmopolitanism and the ethics of European foreign policy

European Journal of Political Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 349-364

  Ypi, Lea ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Cosmopolitanism; Ethics; European Union; Foreign policy; Human rights; Sovereignty

Indexed keywords

EID: 44449102175     PISSN: 14748851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1474885108089176     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. See K. Smith (2001) 'The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third World Countries: "Foreign Policy" with an Ethical Dimension?', in K. Smith and M. Light (eds) Ethics and Foreign Policy, pp. 186-202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. R. Kagan (2002) 'Power and Weakness', Policy Review 113: 3-28.
3. See M. Pollack (2003) 'Unilateral America, Multilateral Europe?', in J. Peterson and M. Pollack (eds) Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 115-27. London: Routledge.
4. For specific examples on such a policy, see Smith (n. 1), pp. 193-8.
5. J. Habermas (2001) The Postnational Constellation, tr. and ed. M. Pensky, p. 117. Cambridge: Polity Press.
6. F.M.A. Voltaire (1994) Political Writings, tr. D. Williams, p. 29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. A striking example of such conflicting interests is the choice between a restrictive immigration policy in order to maintain certain standards of welfare state and the duty to offer humanitarian assistance to strangers. For a deeper discussion of such issues, with regards to contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism, see C. Brown (2002) Sovereignty, Rights and Justice. International Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press.
8. The 4th edn of the dictionary of the Académie Française (1762) described the citoyen du monde as 'he who does not adopt a country' and is thus 'not a good citizen'. The same bias appears in German authors such as Johann Georg Schlosser for whom 'to be proud of one's nation is better than to have none'. For a deeper analysis of the German case with particular reference to Kant see P. Kleingeld (1999) 'Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany', Journal of the History of Ideas 60(3): 505-24, and (2003) 'Kant's Cosmopolitan Patriotism', Kant-Studien 94: 299-316. For more details on the understanding of the concept of cosmopolitanism during the European Enlightenment see G. Cavallar (2002) The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community and Political Justice since Vitoria, esp. pp. 229-319. Aldershot: Ashgate.
9. J.J. Rousseau (1991) 'Abstract and Judgement of Saint Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace', in S. Hoffman and D. Fidler (eds) Rousseau on International Relations, p. 54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Ibid.
11. J.J. Rousseau (1997) The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. V. Gourevitch, p. 174. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. J.J. Rousseau (1997) The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. V. Gourevitch, p. 158. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1772).
13. Ibid. pp. 39-152, p. 81.
14. Rousseau J.J. (n. 9), p. 61.
15. Particularly relevant for Kant's analysis of cosmopolitanism are his essays On the Common Saying: 'This may be True in Theory But does Not Apply in Practice', Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch and The Contest of Faculties, all included in 1. Kant (1991) Political Writings, tr. H.B. Nisbet. New York: Cambridge University Press. I focus more specifically on them in the following pages.
16. 16. I. Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History in Cosmopolitan Perspective', in Kant (n. 14), p. 47.
17. Ibid.
18. For Otfried Hoeffe those are pragmatic reasons, see (2006) Kant's Cosmopolitan Theory, pp. 189-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howard Williams, Georg Cavallar and Pauline Kleingeld argue for a kind of dialectic mediation between normative and empirical requirements. H. Williams (1983) Kant's Political Philosophy, pp. 253-60. Oxford: Blackwell. Cavallar (n. 8), pp. 323-49. P. Kleingeld (1998)'Kant's Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order', Kantian Review 2: 72-90. Katrin Flikschuh considered the problem irresolvable within the normative discourse of Kant's Doctrine of Right, in her 'Justice or Virtue? Kant's problem of "International Right"', conference paper, University of Roskilde, Copenhagen Aug. 2006.
19. Otfried Hoeffe and Pauline Kleingeld argue for a much more significant shift. O. Hoeffe (ed.) (1995) Zum Ewigen Frieden, pp. 109-32. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Kleingeld (2003, in n. 8), p. 301. However, in both his essay on universal history and in the Doctrine of Right Kant uses the Latin term Foedus Amphictyonum to refer to the kind of political organization that would be required to exit the anarchical order of the international sphere. Kant rarely uses Latin for arbitrary reasons in his writings and the specific reference to the Amphytionic league - the voluntary association for the preservation of peace among Greek city-states - may be evidence that the type of political body he has in mind in both the 'Idea for Universal History' and his later essays has not changed. See Kant (n. 15), p. 47, Kant (1991) The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. H.B. Nisbet, p. 165. New York: Cambridge University Press.
20. 1. Kant (1991) Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Political Writings, tr. H.B. Nisbet, p. 104. New York: Cambridge University Press.
21. Kant (n. 18), p. 172.
22. Kant (n. 19), p. 105.
23. Kant (n. 18), p. 172.
24. See I. Kant (1991) On the Common Saying 'This may be True in Theory But does Not Apply in Practice', tr. H.B. Nisbet, p. 77. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant here resumes the formula of the French Revolution by substituting independence for fraternity. Interestingly enough in the preparatory notes for the writing he associates the two ideas with the concept of cosmopolitan unity, which presupposes independence without a contract. This issue is discussed in more detail in Howard Williams's excellent study which provides also many good insights into the systematic link between cosmopolitanism and republicanism in light of Kant's broader theory of political obligation. See Howard Williams (2003) Kant's Critique of Hobbes, pp. 129-59. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
25. See Kant's remarks on patriotism (n. 23), p. 77. See also the first definitive article on perpetual peace (n. 19), p. 99.
26. Kant (n. 18), p. 136.
27. Ibid. p. 162.
28. Ibid. p. 165.
29. Ibid. p. 172. Unfortunately I cannot discuss further the justification of cosmopolitan right derived from the global extension of interactions among individuals but only mention that it may be linked to the broader 'relational' requirement of Kant's metaphysics of right. An excellent discussion of this issue is provided by Katrin Flikschuh (n. 17). Pauline Kleingeld (n. 17), pp. 78-9, has also focused on the justification of cosmopolitan right by referring it to Kant's innate right to freedom but the analysis is less grounded on the metaphysical requirements of the Doctrine of Right, thus appearing less satisfactory.
30. Kant (n. 18), p. 172.
31. Ibid. p. 173.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. p. 172.
34. The 'pragmatical' argument is instead made by Otfried Hoeffe (2006) Kant's Cosmopolitan Theory, pp. 189-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. Kant (n. 18), p. 171.
36. See Rousseau (n. 12), p. 174, and Kant (n. 19), p. 113.
37. Further evidence of Kant following Rousseau on this issue are his remarks on the diversity of languages and religions, a guarantee - as he puts it - of the fact that peace does not end in the 'graveyard of freedom' but is 'created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous royalry'. See Kant (n. 24), p. 114.
38. Kant (n. 19), p. 104. Katrin Flikschuh (n. 17), esp. pp. 11 and 24-5, rightly emphasizes the limits of the analogy between individuals and states with regard to the question of sovereignty. As she notices the relational metaphysics of Kant's Doctrine of Right allows for a distinction between the former and the latter, the ability of individuals to claim rights does not precede but rather follows the existence of a sovereign authority. Unlike states, individuals are not right-enforcers; they may be compelled to enter a civil condition but an attempt to coerce states would result in the dissolution of every relation of right.
39. Kant (n. 19), p. 108.
40. For further discussion on this issue see Lea L. Ypi (2008) 'Statist Cosmopolitanism', Journal of Political Philosophy 16(1): 48-71.