Federal tax arrears in Russia: Liquidity problems, federal redistribution or regional resistance?

Economics of Transition

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 373-398

  Ponomareva, Maria ^a   Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ^b,c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

^c NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Redistributive politics; Regional protection; Russia; Tax arrears; Transition

Indexed keywords

DEBT; FISCAL POLICY; REGIONAL POLITICS; TAX SYSTEM;

EURASIA; RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 4444348243     PISSN: 09670750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00186.x     Document Type: Article

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