Specifying and verifying hardware for tamper-resistant software

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Volumn 2003-January, Issue , 2003, Pages 166-177

  Lie, D ^a   Mitchell, J ^a   Thekkath, C A ^a,b   Horowitz, M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HARDWARE; RECONFIGURABLE HARDWARE; VERIFICATION;

FINITE STATE; HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE; IDEALIZED MODELS; LIVENESS; MODEL CHECKER; REPLAY ATTACK; SINGLE USERS; TAMPER RESISTANT SOFTWARE;

MODEL CHECKING;

EID: 4444322842     PISSN: 10816011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199335     Document Type: Conference Paper

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